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EXPLORING THE DARK MATTER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: A
CONSTITUTIONAL CENSUS OF THE 1990S
Seth F. Kreimer*
Most debate about the power of judicial review proceeds as if courts
primarily invoke the Constitution against the considered judgment of elected
legislatures; most constitutional commentary focusses on confrontations
between the United States Supreme Court and state or federal legislatures.
In fact, the federal courts most often enforce constitutional norms against
administrative agencies and street-level bureaucrats, and the norms are
enforced not by the Supreme Court but by the federal trial courts. In this
Article, Professor Kreimer surveys this "dark matter" of our constitutional
universe.
The Article compares the 292 cases involving constitutional claims de-
cided by the Supreme Court during its 1990-1995 Terms with 431 cases
which comprise a one-in-ten sample of the reported constitutional cases
decided by federal trial courts in 1994. In some ways the trial court sample
mirrors the view of judicial review reflected in conventional, Supreme Court
oriented commentary: confrontations with legislatures focus on free speech
and equal protection issues. In other ways, trial courts and the Supreme
Court differ: dormant Commerce Clause cases, like issues of federalism and
separation of powers which bulk large in the Supreme Court, are largely
absent at the trial level. The most striking finding of this review, however, is
that even in the Supreme Court, legislative cases constitute a minority of the
occasions for the exercise of judicial review, and that minority shrinks to a
barely cognizable fraction at the trial court level. The rights invoked in the
bulk of constitutional cases are not the stuff of sophisticated doctrinal elab-
oration. Rather, the Supreme Court articulates basic standards of physical
dignity and fairness and empowers the lower federal judiciary to act as field
agents dispensing minimal federal justice.
The Article concludes by examining the implications of these observa-
tions for the role of judicial review as it is actually practiced. It argues that
the federal trial courts are well-adapted to the role of enforcing demands of
minimal decency against street-level bureaucrats, that this enforcement rais-
" Professor, University of Pennsylvania School of Law. This Article could not have
been written without the dedicated efforts, above and beyond the call of duty, of my
research assistant Jason Hoffman. It has benefitted, as well, from the generous com-
ments of my colleagues Matt Adler, Frank Goodman, Howard Lesnick, Ned Spaeth, and
Barbara Woodhouse. Each of these individuals is entitled to public acknowledgement
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es few of the problems of the "countermajoritarian difficulty," and that the
enforcement is crucial to preserving the ideals of our nation as a civilized
society.
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INTRODUCrION
The big gun of the "least dangerous branch" is the power of judicial
review, and it appears to be pointed at the heartland of democracy. For de-
cades, most debate about that power has proceeded as if all judicial review
takes place in the manner of Marbury v. Madison,' Lochner v. New York,2
Brown v. Board of Education,3 or Roe v. Wade4 : as a confrontation be-
tween substantive positions adopted by an elected legislative body and the
commands of the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
In that debate, commentators develop theories to describe and channel
exercise of that power by examining the Court's practice in confrontations
with legislatures. They may construct their theories inductively, use deduc-
tive claims to criticize practices or instances of judicial review, or do both.
But invariably the touchstone is the confrontation of a legislature and the
Supreme Court.
As my colleague Matt Adler recently emphasized,' a little reflection
should lead us to understand that most governmental decisions are not
adopted by a clear legislative mandate.6 Common law incremental
decisionmaking by courts, adjudication and rulemaking by agencies, and dis-
1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5 Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759 (1997).
6 Adler, of course, is not the first commentator to raise this issue. Charles Black's
criticism of Alexander Bickel and Learned Hand highlighted elegantly the ways in
which "[t]he accuracy of our perceptions of the nature of the confrontations found in
judicial review ... has been dulled by the intellectual and political fascination of the
question posed and answered in Marbury v. Madison." CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUC-
TURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 70 (1969). For more recent explora-
tions, see, for example, Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH L.
REV. 577, 630-34 (1993); Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilita-
tion: Comparative Illumination of the Counter Majoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH L. REV.
245, 246 n.7 (1995).
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cretionary decisions by street-level bureaucrats fill much more of our legal
world than the considered (or ill-considered) legislative decisions that trace
their pedigree to a directly elected legislature.
Nor are most instances in which the Constitution is invoked by the judi-
ciary legal confrontations between the political branches and the highest
court in the land. The vast bulk of legal disputes are not brought to court at
all; of those that are, most are resolved at the trial court level, often by
settlements "in the shadow of the law." The voice in which the judiciary
speaks the Constitution to most of the population is not the sonorous pro-
nouncements of the Supreme Court's explications, but the somewhat terse
and often hurried tones of the trial judge denying or granting motions for
summary judgment or suppression of evidence. Thus, just as astronomers
are beginning to speculate that the gravitational force that keeps the universe
together is provided by "dark matter" invisible to conventional telescopes,
the bulk of the claims invoking the power of judicial review is invisible to
much of constitutional theory.7
If we are to develop realistic conceptions of constitutional practice, we
should examine these unexplored phenomena. Such attention is imperative if
our theories involve either inductive descriptions of judicial practices or
normative critiques of the actual functioning of judicial review. Yet, al-
though accounts of the Supreme Court's legislative confrontations are le-
gion, few commentators survey the landscape outside of the "high practice"
of constitutional confrontation between legislature and judiciary at the Su-
preme Court level,8 and law review literature is virtually devoid of in-
The point is not entirely ignored in the literature. See, e.g., MICHAEL PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 3, 15-16 (1994) (suggesting an ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation that the Supreme Court and lower courts should
follow); J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72 TEX. L. REV.
1771, 1786 n.50 (1994) (suggesting an examination of practices of lower federal courts
and state courts in constructing constitutional grammar); Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Demand for Judicial Review, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 372, 379 (1993) ("[T]he relevant body
of cases for a study such as this must be those filed in the district court. That is the
only place where the parties get to choose and where we learn about their hopes and
strategies."); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 877, 925 n.108 (1996) (observing that trial courts are, "as a practical matter,
the courts of last resort for most citizens").
Having acknowledged the existence of the trial courts, most commentators never-
theless proceed to focus on the Supreme Court. The one exception I have found is Pro-
fessor Levinson's brief account of what he regards as the exclusively positivistic
doctrinalist posture adopted by lower court judges in constitutional cases. Sanford
Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants: "Inferior" Judges and the Task of Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REV. 843 (1993).
' William N. Eskridge Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 27 (1994), is something of an exception. Eskridge and Frickey expanded their
focus for the 1993 Term from legislative confrontation in the constitutional area to the
430 [Vol. 5:2
EXPLORING THE DARK MATTER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
formed discussion of the realities of the ways in which the Constitution is
used by trial courts.9
This Article begins the process of coming to grips with these realities by
examining a sample of constitutional practice in the last decade of the twen-
tieth century. In it, I examine both the Supreme Court's invocations of the
Constitution in the 1990-1995 Terms and the uses to which the Constitution
was put in reported decisions in the federal trial courts during the 1994
calendar year. Some of the findings are unsurprising. As one might predict
from reading the literature on judicial review, when the Court assesses the
handiwork of Congress, activism focuses on issues of governmental struc-
ture and free speech; in confronting state legislatures, the grounds of con-
tention tend to be the negative Commerce Clause, free speech, and equal
protection.1" The Court is more likely to invalidate local ordinances and
less likely to strike down the handiwork of Congress. Legislative review by
the trial courts tracks the Supreme Court's docket; there is no evidence that
trial courts are administering a constitutional order that differs substantially
from the one that most Court watchers seek to explain and debate.
Nonetheless, legislative confrontation constitutes a minority of the con-
stitutional business of the Supreme Court and an even smaller percentage of
exercise of judicial power vis i vis legislatures in statutory interpretation. Also, Nicho-
las S. Zeppos, Deference to Political Decision-Makers and the Preferred Scope of Judi-
cial Review, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 296 (1993), surveys the Supreme Court's use, between
1938 and 1992, of constitutional norms to limit federal legislative power both by direct-
ly invalidating and by narrowly construing legislation. Professor Zeppos addresses, as
well, the Court's use of statutory construction to invalidate federal agency actions.
9 Thus Professor Schauer articulated the acute insight that although "the lower
courts [are] the repository of a vast corpus of constitutional adjudication," they are
slighted by constitutional theory. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 399, 401 n.6 (1985). His constitutional theory, however, focuses resolutely on Su-
preme Court practice.
Professor Barry Friedman, whose admirable efforts to dissolve the
countermajoritarian difficulty by "describ[ing] what courts actually do and how they
actually operate in our constitutional system" also focuses almost exclusively on con-
frontations between the Supreme Court and state or federal legislators. Barry Friedman,
Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH L. REV. 577, 581 (1993). Professor Friedman
hints that his legislative focus is an effort to justify the actions of courts at their alleg-
edly "countermajoritarian worst" and asserts that "the vast majority of judicial overrul-
ing of government activity is concerned not with statutes ... but with the work of
administrative officials." Id. at 630, 634. His focus on the Supreme Court, however, is
steadfast. Professor Friedman's contention that judicial review is in fact less
problematically countermajoritarian than conventional theory suggests is bolstered by
the more particularized results of my explorations.
10 It is worth noting, however, that despite their prominence in scholarly -debate, at
both the trial and Supreme Court levels judicial review under the property clauses (tak-
ings and due process) and substantive due process protections of individual autonomy is
quite rare.
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the business of the trial courts. The Constitution in action at the trial court
level most frequently involves damage actions seeking to invoke protections
of minimal civil decency against street-level bureaucrats who exercise dele-
gated discretion. Here legal claims are neither normatively esoteric nor le-
gally sophisticated, and they are more often substantive than procedural.
Claimants invoke fact-bound norms of common perception: "probable
cause," "deliberate indifference," "unreasonable force," and "arbitrary ad-
ministration." Federal courts most frequently exercise a role that is both less
grand and less theoretically ramified than the image contained in most con-
stitutional theory. Their role is neither the countermajoritarian specter feared
by conservatives nor the moral prophecy idealized by some liberals. The
federal courts, for the most part, do not administer the "high" constitutional
law that seeks to structure the way we govern ourselves on the basis of
moral or political theory. Rather, the "low" constitutional law that consti-
tutes the dockets of the trials courts begins with common commitments to
political decency and seeks to apply those commitments to controverted
factual narratives. The federal courts' role is to manifest-albeit episodical-
ly-the American belief in the ultimate equality of the governors and the
governed by demonstrating that citizens who are treated shabbily by gov-
ernment officials should have their day in court."
I. THE CLASSICAL CORE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE 1990S
A. The Supreme Court and the Legislatures: The 1990-1995 Terms
1. Overview
No one reading the newspapers during the Supreme Court's latest Terms
could harbor the illusion that Marbury is dead. Last Term, to great eclaf, the
Court struck down the Brady Gun Control Act as inconsistent with the
Tenth Amendment,12 federal regulation of the Internet under the Communi-
cations Decency Act as a violation of the First Amendment, 3 and the Reli-
" I thus would amend Professor Klarman's assertion in Michael J. Klarman, Re-
thinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1996),
that the federal courts do not and cannot engage in "countermajoritarian heroics." Al-
though it is true that federal courts in the 1990s rarely "play the role of Galahad," id. at
4, against overweening national sentiment for repression, they can and do provide at
least occasional "havens of refuge for those who ... are helpless, weak, [or] outnum-
bered," id. at 6 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)) against public
officials who would physically abuse citizens in ways that are ultimately at odds with
our common moral aspirations.
12 Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
13 Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
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gious Freedom Restoration Act as a congressional overreaching under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." In the 1995 Term, the Court invali-
dated or cast doubt on federal statutes under the Eleventh Amendment,15
the First Amendment, 6 and the Export Clause. 7
At the state level, the Court confronted legislatures in high profile cases
concerning gay rights and racially conscious redistricting, 8 and, less fa-
mously, concerning commercial speech, drug testing, taxation of local and
foreign corporations, and standards for criminal punishment. 9
"' City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). In a lower profile case, Babbitt
v. Youpee, 117 S. Ct. 727 (1997), the Court also invalidated a statute regulating the
inheritance of Indian tribal land as an unconstitutional taking of property without just
compensation.
"5 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (holding that Congress cannot
authorize suits in federal courts against unconsenting states when legislating under pre-
Eleventh Amendment constitutional powers).
16 Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996)
(upholding provision of the federal Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competi-
tion Act that allows cable operators to block indecent programming on leased access
channels but holding that a provision that allowed operators to ban indecent program-
ming on public access channels violated the First Amendment); Colorado Republican
Fed. Election Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996) (holding that expendi-
ture limits on uncoordinated federal election campaign expenditures violate the First
Amendment).
17 United States v. IBM, 116 S. Ct. 1793 (1996) (holding that the Export Clause
prohibits assessment of nondiscriminatory federal taxes on goods in export transit) (cit-
ing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5). Cf United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432
(1996) (construing statute narrowly in light of retroactivity and takings concerns).
18 Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941_(1996) (invalidating, on equal protection grounds, a
racially gerrymandered electoral district); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996) (same);
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (invalidating, on equal protection grounds, a
state constitutional amendment preventing the state and local governments from protect-
ing persons against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
19 Camps Newfound/Owatonna Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590 (1997)
(invalidating, on Commerce Clause grounds, a denial of a tax exemption to camps
which served out-of-state clients); Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997) (inval-
idating, on Fourth Amendment search and seizure grounds, a statutory requirement that
candidates for state office submit to drug testing); Lynce v. Mathis, 117 S. Ct. 891
(1997) (invalidating, under the Ex Post Facto Clause, a statute reducing prisoners' early
release credits); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996) (invalidat-
ing, on First Amendment grounds, a ban on advertisement of liquor prices); Cooper v.
Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996) (invalidating, on due process grounds, a statute re-
quiring criminal defendants to prove by clear and convincing evidence that they are
incompetent to stand trial); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 116 S. Ct. 848 (1996) (invalidat-
ing a state's intangibles tax as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce).
The Court dealt obliquely with constitutional challenges to state abortion limitations
in Leavitt v. Jane L., 116 S. Ct. 2068 (1996) (per curiam) (limiting the effect of the
lower court's invalidation of portions of Utah's restrictive abortion statute and reversing
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Although during the last three Terms the Court played a particularly
activist role with regard to federal statutes," the classical image of con-
frontation between the Court and legislatures is a constant and substantial
part of the Supreme Court caseload during the 1990s.2" Claims of constitu-
tional violations appeared in 292 of the 595 cases in which the Court ren-
dered opinions during the 1990-1995 Terms, 120 of which reviewed legisla-
tive handiwork.22 At the same time, given the vast tapestry of rules that
legislatures have adopted at the federal, state, and local levels, the Court's
average of ten invalidations per year, combined with three cases a year in
which constitutional challenges remained viable on remand, hardly suggest a
Court bent on using judicial review to wrest control of the legal system
away from democratically elected legislatures.23
the lower court on the issue of severability) and Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning,
116 S. Ct. 1063 (1996) (upholding the lower court's invalidation of refusal to fund
abortions in accord with federal entitlement, but limiting relief).
0 The Court's invalidation of parts of 13 federal statutes during the last three Terms
compares with only three total invalidations during the preceding four Terms.
The Court also has construed federal statutes in light of possible violations 11 times
during the 1990-1995 Terms. Professor Zeppos, in reviewing the period 1938-1992,
found 69 invalidations of federal statutes and 86 narrow constructions in light of consti-
tutional values. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Deference to Political Decisionmakers and the
Preferred Scope of Judicial Review, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 296 (1993). Thus some part of
the greater likelihood of the Supreme Court invalidating state statutes is accounted for
by the fact that the Court can avoid constitutional issues more easily in construing fed-
eral statutes.
21 The data for this section were gathered in accordance with methodology described
in the appendix. See infra Appendix. The tables do not include Supreme Court cases
from the 1996 Term, but the trends identified in the 1990-1995 Terms are consistent
with the most recent Term.
' See infra Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 lists 149 claims, because some of the cases
raised more than one constitutional claim. A similar effect applies to all of the tables
which list the claims raised in trial court and Supreme Court samples.
The figures here are derived from Table 1, adjusted for the fact that three claims
that were "sustained" and four that were "possible" nonetheless resulted in no relief for
the plaintiffs for procedural or other reasons. Claims are classified as "rejected," "possi-
ble," or "sustained," depending on the Court's self-proclaimed resolution of the issues.
Thus, for example, a case in which the claimants challenged a statute on both due pro-
cess and equal protection grounds, but the Court invalidated the statute on equal protec-
tion grounds without addressing the due process claim, would be coded as a sustained
equal protection claim and a possible due process claim.
In some cases, a single statutory invalidation may cast doubts on other cognate
statutes. Thus, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995), sounded the
death knell for a range of other term limitation efforts in other states, and Miller v.
Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995), portended invalidation of race-conscious districts in
states outside of Georgia. Even so, the work of the Court is-and indeed must
be-more a tailoring of the edges than a reweaving of the statutory fabric.
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Table 1
Table of Constitutional Claims
Query: Supreme Court Cases
Legislature = Yes
Violations Total Claims Rejected Possible Sustained % Rej. % Poss. % Sust.
Freedom of Speech 25 10 6 9 40.00% 24.00% 36.00%
Commerce Clause 18 6 0 12 33.33% 0.00% 66.67%
Equal Protection 17 6 3 8 35.29% 17.65% 47.06%
Separation of Powers 13 8 1 4 61.54% 7.69% 30.77%
Civil Procedural DP 12 4 2 6 33.33% 16.67% 50.00%
SDP-Punitive Damages 10 7 2 1 70.00% 20.00% 10.00%
Federal Structure 9 0 2 7 0.00% 22.22% 77.78%
8th - Death Penalty 7 6 0 1 85.71% 0.00% 14.29%
Criminal Procedural DP 6 5 0 1 83.33% 0.00% 16.67%
Other Constitutional Claim 5 3 1 1 60.00% 20.00% 20.00%
Commercial Speech 4 1 0 3 25.00% 0.00% 75.00%
SDP-Rochin 4 3 0 I 75.00% 0.00% 25.00%
Freedom of Association 3 1 1 1 33.33% 33.33% 33.33%
Takings 3 3 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
SDP-Fundamental Rights
8th - Excessive Fines
Rationality - Property
Establishment Clause
Free Exercise '
Minimal Contacts DP
8th Cruel/Unusual
5th - Double Jeopardy
Administrative Procedural DP
Freedom of Press
4th Arrest
4th Search/Seizure
Rationality - Liberty
5th - Self Incrimination
6th - Effective Counsel
6th - Right to Fair Trial
Criminal Trial Violations
4th Excessive Force
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
0 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
0 50.00% 50.00% 0.00%
1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
149 68 21 60 45.64% 14.09% 40.27%TOTALS:
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Table 2
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Crosstab Query
Query: Supreme Court Cases
Legislature = Yes
Constitutional Violation
Volume Row Totals Yes No Possible
Yes 16 3 9 4
5.48% 18.75% 56.25% 25.00%
112 28 17 11 0
9.59% 60.71% 39.29% 0.00%
113 19 4 8 7
6.51% 21.05% 42.11% 36.84%
114 20 8 9 3
6.85% 40.00% 45.00% 15.00%
115 19 13 4 2
6.51% 68.42% 21.05% 10.53%
116 17 12 4 1
5.82% 70.59% 23.53% 5.88%
TOTALS: 57
47.90%
45
37.82%
17
14.29%
Percent of all Hits: 40.75%
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Judicial review of statutes during the 1990-1995 Terms followed the
outline of a classical constitutional law course and the flow of conventional
constitutional commentary. Just as Marbury, Brown, and the evolution from
Schenck2e to Brandenburg5 form the relatively uncontroversial core of
modem judicial review, the Court's activism vis A vis legislatures in recent
years, for the most part, focused in three areas: protection of the structures
of governance established by the Constitution, protection of rights of associ-
ation and communication under the First Amendment, and protection against
discrimination involving "suspect classifications" under the Equal Protection
Clause and its cognates.' Combined, these claims appear in more than
'4 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
2 First amendment free expression cases account for the largest segment of these
decisions (28 free speech, commercial speech, press, or association cases, of which 16
involve statutory invalidations). Free expression cases cluster in five areas:
(1) Criminal prohibitions on disruptive speech (5): McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994); NOW
v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993); R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
(2) Media regulation (6): Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,
116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Camp-
bell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); United States v. Edge Broad. Co.q
509 U.S. 418 (1993); Leathers v. Medlock 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
(3) Access to the Political Process (4): Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.
v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992); Norman v.
Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992); Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312 (1991).
(4) Erotica (3): United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994);
Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S.
544 (1993).
(5) Commercial Speech (3): 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495
(1996); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1595 (1995); Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
The next most frequent areas involve structures of governance: (1) Dormant Com-
merce Clause challenges (18 cases with 11 statutory invalidations); (2) separation of
powers (12 cases with four invalidations); (3) federal structure (nine cases, all of which
sustained the challenger's claims).
Finally, the other major individual rights claims are equal protection (17 cases, six
statutory invalidations) and civil procedural due process (12 cases, six statutory invali-
dations).
Thus, the lament, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1753, 1754-55 (1994), that standard discussions of constitutional
theory which focus on equal protection, substantive due process and the First Amend-
ment operate as a "bait and switch" ploy, see also NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT AL-
TERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 254
(asserting that constitutional scholarship focuses on a small comer of American public
policy), is inaccurate if we limit our view to the exercise of legislative review by the
Supreme Court (and--as we shall see-the lower courts).
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two-thirds (83/119) of cases challenging legislative action in the Supreme
Court, and more than three-fourths (46/60) of successful challenges. Each of
the areas is relatively uncontroversial as a basis for judicial review; com-
mentators may differ regarding appropriate methodology, but each of the
areas is conceded to be an appropriate field for judicial endeavor under the
constitutional text.27
By contrast, it is worth attending to the silence of several doctrinal dogs
which were not barking at the Supreme Court in recent years. In the much
mooted area of property rights, takings cases combined with substantive due
process challenges on behalf of property owners comprise barely one-tenth
of. the legislative caseload (13/119) and less than two percent of the success-
ful challenges to legislation (1/60).' The disputed "fundamental rights"
element of substantive due process has accounted for only two cases before
the Court in the 1990-1995 Terms, 29 though admittedly the echoes of one
27 Although it embodies all of the characteristics of "substantive due process," the
debate concerning scrutiny of federal enactments for discrimination has really never
caught hold in academia and has never been questioned seriously by the modem Court.
Professor Choper's call to abandon structural review in federalism cases, JESSE H.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980), which was followed
in PERRY, supra note 7, at 109 (advocating judicial review in rights and liberties cases
but not in cases involving separation of powers and federalism issues), has fallen on
deaf ears. Indeed, half of the cases in which the Supreme Court has invalidated federal
legislation in the 1990s have involved separation of powers or federalism issues. Simi-
larly, although Justice Scalia has campaigned to limit review of state statutes under the
Commerce Clause, which accounts for the highest number of statutory invalidations
during the 1990-1995 Terms, even he has not challenged the legitimacy of the basic
endeavor. But see Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct.
1590 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine is "overbroad and unnecessary").
' The sole case in which the Court invalidated legislation during the 1990-1995
Terms, Allied Signal v. Dept. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 (1992), invoked notions of
territorial limits to taxation that are, at least arguably, as much a function of federalism
as of property rights. Last Term, in Babbitt v. Youpee, 117 S. Ct. 727 (1997), however,
the Court decided for the plaintiff in a second Takings Clause case, invalidating a feder-
al statute which prohibited the- devise of fragmentary interests in Indian tribal lands.
The protection of innocent property owners subject to civil forfeiture which the
Court read into the federal forfeiture statute in United States v. A Parcel of Land, 507
U.S. 111 (1993), appears in light of two recent cases to be a matter that can be overrid-
den by determined legislatures. See U.S. v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996) (holding that
civil in rem forfeitures are not a form of punishment subject to the protection against
double jeopardy); Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (holding that the forfeiture
of property jointly owned by a husband and wife is not an unconstitutional taking even
though the wife was innocent of any violation of the law).
29 Leavitt v. Jane L., 116 S. Ct. 2068 (1996); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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of those cases have, rung through two presidential elections.
Challenges to legislative action fall into a common remedial pattern. In
most cases, the relief sought would be granted primarily through an injunc-
tion and occasionally by reversal of criminal liability or regulatory ac-
tions." They were likely to be resolved on the merits at the Supreme Court
level, rather than remanded.3
Some recent commentary suggests that the Court's exercise of judicial
review in recent Terms has tilted toward the interests of business and prop-
erty.32 In challenges to legislation, the record during the 1990-1995 Terms
gives some weight to this assertion, despite the absence of successful claims
directly invoking property rights. Of the 120 legislative review cases, a large
proportion (51) involved claimants that were businesses, business groups,
landowners, or taxpayers. Cases brought by these groups accounted for a
similar proportion of the cases in which legislative enactments were invali-
dated (25/57). By contrast, of the forty-three cases brought by individuals
outside of these groups, only twelve resulted in statutory invalidations.
The proportionately most successful, albeit less frequent, challengers to
legislative enactments were neither property owners nor individuals but
plaintiffs who in some sense represented public interests. The Supreme
Court found a constitutional violation in eighteen of the twenty-two legisla-
tive challenges brought by class action or nonprofit entities. On balance,
therefore, the Court's activism on behalf of property owners and public
Last Term, although the Court's docket saw an upsurge in substantive due process
cases, in none of them did the Court sustain a challenge. Three substantive due process
claims drew full opinions. In Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997), and Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2259 (1997), the Court unanimously sustained prohibitions on
assisted suicide against substantive due process challenges. In Kansas v. Hendricks, 117
S. Ct. 2072 (1997), the Court was again unanimous in rejecting a substantive due pro-
cess attack on a statute providing for the civil commitment of sexually violent preda-
tors. Two other cases resulted in per'curiam rejections of challenges to abortion regula-
tions. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 117 S. Ct. 1865 (1997) (per curiam) (upholding a statute
restricting the performance of abortions to licensed physicians); Lambert v. Wicklund,
117 S. Ct. 1169 (1997) (per curiam) (upholding a statute requiring parental notification
for minors seeking abortions).
" Fifty-seven cases involved injunctive relief, 10 involved reversal of regulatory
action, 25 involved criminal dismissal or habeas, and seven involved damage actions.
" Injunctive cases (57) were successful in 56% of the claims and were possible only
in 8.7%. Efforts to reverse regulatory actions (10) were successful in 60% of the
claims, with no "possible" claims. Challenges to convictions (25) succeeded in 24% of
the claims and were possible in 12%. The small category of damage actions (7) present
a different picture: 57% were sustained, and claims were possible in 28%.
32 Cf Zeppos, supra note 8, at 313 (noting that business associations have prevailed
before the Court in 'challenges to federal statutes at a heightened rate since 1971);
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 8, at 44, 50 (asserting that the Court is "prone to ex-
pand protection of property rights").
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plaintiffs is comparable.3"
2. Review of Legislation and Federal-State Comparisons
Both positive and normative reasons support the expectation that the
Supreme Court will treat determinations by state and federal legislatures
differently. On one hand, the case for aggressively reviewing the work prod-
uct of a coordinate branch of government for constitutional conformity is
weaker than the case for policing the actions of subordinate state or local
legislatures.' A federal legislative determination carries with it the demo-
cratic imprimatur of a national electorate; it claims to embody national val-
ues. A Congressional judgment does not threaten national unity, and there is
no explicit constitutional basis for judicial supremacy over the legislative
branch.
By contrast, for those who worry about such things, the explicit com-
mand of the Supremacy Clause" gives a textual warrant for judicial review
of state determinations that was absent in Marbury v. Madison. State and
local legislatures represent parochial rather than national judgments. At a
more practical level, commentators have long noted that the federal bench is
likely to draw on the same sources of policy that nourish the federal legisla-
ture,36 and Congress is a more formidable political antagonist than the state
or local legislature.
In fact, during the 1990s, the Court's behavior in reviewing legislation
tracks the rationale for judicial review as guardian of national political de-
mocracy: much of its work at all levels focuses on protection of the political
process and national governance structures. The Court is most deferential to
legislative enactments that can claim the broadest democratic pedigree.37
" This result accords with Professor Zeppos's suggestion that the "demand for judi-
cial review" is distributed among both "powerful" and "powerless" groups. Zeppos,
supra note 8, at 312-14.
" Thus, even James Bradley Thayer, the godfather of modern hostility to aggressive
judicial review, advocated less deference to state legislatures than to Congress. James B.
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARv. L. REv. 129, 154 (1893) (maintaining that in reviewing state laws, "courts may
have to ask themselves a question different from that which would be applicable if the
enactments were those of a coordinate department").
3 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
36 E.g., Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
" The difference between the state and federal invalidations is at least in part a
function of the greater ability to interpret federal statutes in light of constitutional
norms. Another way of reading this tendency is suggested by Eskridge and Frickey: the
Court is more willing "to invalidate state legislation ... because state legislatures can-
not hurt the Court the way Congress can." Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 8, at 44. But
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Challenges to federal and state statutes are equally likely to be rejected;
challenges to state statutes are more likely to succeed than challenges to
federal statutes; and challenges to the enactments of local legislatures are
substantially more likely to succeed and less likely to be rejected than chal-
lenges to more broadly based enactments."
if this is so, then why the still greater willingness to invalidate local legislation?
" Challenges to federal statutes account for 55 claims (49% rejected, 22% succeed-
ed); to state statutes, 85 (48% rejected, 45% succeeded). Of the nine challenges to local
legislation, only one was rejected, and seven were sustained.
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Table 3
Table of Constitutional Claims
Query: Supreme Court Cases
Federal = Yes
Legislature = Yes
Violations Total Claims Rejected Possible Sustained % Rej. % Poss. % Sust.
Freedom of Speech
Separation of Powers
SDP-Punitive Damages
Federal Structure
Civil Procedural DP
Other Constitutional Claim
Equal Protection
Commercial Speech
SDP-Rochin
8th - Excessive Fines
Takings
Rationality - Property
Administrative Procedural DP
Criminal Procedural DP
Minimal Contacts DP
Freedom of Press
8th Cruel/Unusual
Freedom of Association
Establishment Clause
SDP-Fundamental Rights
4th Arrest
4th Search/Seizure
Rationality - Liberty
5th - Self Incrimination
6th - Effective Counsel
8th - Death Penalty
6th - Right to Fair Trial
5th - Double Jeopardy
Commerce Clause
Criminal Trial Violations
4th Excessive Force
I1 8
6 4
5 0
5 2
3 1
o 0
0 o
o 0
0 0
o 0
o 0
5
1
2
2
2
1
0
0
0
1
0
I
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
33.33% 41.67%
72.73% 9.09%
66.67% 33.33%
0.00% 40.00%
40.00% 40.00%
33.33% 33.33%
50.00% 0.00%
50.00% 0.00%
100.00% 0.00%
0.00% 100.00%
100.00% 0.00%
0.00% 100.00%
100.00% 0.00%
100.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
53 26 15 12 49.06% 28.30%
25.00%
18.18%
0.00%
60.00%
20.00%
33.33%
50.00%
50.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
Free -eicisc
22.64%TOTALS:
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Table 4
Table of Constitutional Claims
Query: Supreme Court Cases
State = Yes
Legislature = Yes
Violations Total Claims Rejected Possible Sustained % Rej. % Poss. % Sust.
Commerce Clause 16 6 0 10 37.50% 0.00% 62.50%
Equal Protection 14 5 2 7 35.71% 14.29% 50.00%
Freedom of Speech 10 6 1 3 60.00% 10.00% 30.00%
8th - Death Penalty 7 6 0 1 85.71% 0.00% 14.29%
Civil Procedural DP 7 2 0 5 28.57% 0.00% 71.43%
Criminal Procedural DP 5 4 0 1 80.00% 0.00% 20.00%
Federal Structure 4 0 0 4 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
SDP-Punitive Damages 4 3 0 1 75.00% 0.00% 25.00%
Freedom of Association 3 1 1 1 33.33% 33.33% 33.33%
Other Constitutional Claim 2 2 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
SDP-Rochin
SDP-Fundamental Rights
5th - Double Jeopardy
8th Cruel/Unusual
Rationality - Property
Takings
Freedom of Press
Establishment Clause
Commercial Speech
Minimal Contacts DP
8th - Excessive Fines
Free Exercise
1 0 0
1 0 0
1 1 0
1 0 1
Administrative Procedural DP 0 0 0
4th Arrest 0 0 0
Separation of Powers 0 0 0
4th Search/Seizure 0 0 0
Rationality - Liberty 0 0 0
5th - Self Incrimination 0 0 0
6th - Effective Counsel 0 0 0
6th - Right to Fair Trial 0 0 0
Criminal Trial Violations 0 0 0
4th Excessive Force 0 0 0
1 50.00% 0.00% 50.00%
2 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
I 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% . 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
85 41 5 39 48.24% 5.88% 45.88%
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Table 5
Table of Constitutional Claims
Query: Supreme Court Cases
Local = Yes
Legislature = Yes
Violations Total Claims Rejected Possible Sustained % Rej. % Poss. % Sust.
Freedom of Speech 3 0 0 3 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Equal Protection 2 0 1 1 0.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Free Exercise I 0 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
Commercial Speech 1 0 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
r..1.,. Iil i n n I A AAO n iNo/ 1 nn nAo/
Takings
SDP-Rochin
SDP-Fundamental Rights
Administrative Procedural DP
Criminal Procedural DP
Minimal Contacts DP
Civil Procedural DP
4th Arrest
Freedom of Press
8th Cruel/Unusual
Freedom of Association
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Separation of Powers
A.60 / I~.-
Other Constitutional Claim
Rationality- Liberty
5th - Self Incrimination
6th - Effective Counsel
8th - Excessive Fines
8th -Death Penalty
6th - Right to Fair Trial
5th - Double Jeopardy
Rationality - Property
SDP-Punitive Damages
Criminal Trial Violations
Federal Structure
4th Excessive Force
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
100.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
7 11.11% 11.11% 77.78%
ommercc ause
, 3 L I [./11 1111 ll; 11 | v*,.,, 1 O, Ugl / U V U
carc cime
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a. Federal Legislation
In confrontations with the federal legislature, the Court has behaved in a
way that would gladden the hearts of cautious "representation reinforce-
ment" theorists. The Court invalidated fourteen federal statutes in six years,
with nine more subject to possible modification.39 Judicial scrutiny focused
on claims under the First Amendment, federal structure and separation of
powers, and procedural due process." Judged by this record, judicial re-
view is hardly a story of constant confrontation with Congressional policy;
we are not in the midst of a swell of judicial activism that threatens to over-
whelm popular democracy at the national level.41 Announcement of a prin-
ciple in one area may have implications in a number of others, and some
legislation may never be adopted because of anticipated judicial disapproval.
Nonetheless, the principles the Court invokes for the most part do not stand
in the way of a Congressional majority accomplishing its chosen substantive
goals; they concern means rather than ends.42 The one area in which the
Court regularly intervenes against federal legislation in a fashion that con-
strains substantive policy is the protection of speech, and even then, at the
federal level, many instances of actual invalidation are marginal to national policy.43
39 For technical reasons, Table 3 does not include Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 55 (1992), and Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995). In
both of these cases, the Court invalidated federal legislation as violative of separation of
powers, and I have included them in the textual discussion.
o See Table 3.
41 Unlike many other areas, there are reasons to expect that the Supreme Court's
docket will comprehensively represent activism vis-A-vis the federal legislature. See
H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE 245 (1991) (noting that the Supreme Court
almost always grants certiorari to cases in which a lower court declared a federal statute
unconstitutional).
42 E.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (invalidating a requirement
that local law enforcement officials check criminal records of handgun purchasers, but
leaving open the possibility that federal requirements could be directly enforced by
federal officials); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (invalidating the
particular Congressionally provided statutory enforcement mechanism of a suit against
but apparently leaving open the possibility of judicial enforcement through an action
against state officials); United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (defining a series
of findings that Congress must make regarding "commercial nexus" rather than a limita-
tion on the scope of Congressional power).
Last Term, however, the Court did move toward putting an area of regulation en-
tirely outside of Congressional regulatory authority in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.
Ct. 2157 (1997) (striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as exceeding
Congressional authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). Whether Con-
gress can craft protections of religious minorities within the Court's emerging parame-
ters remains to be seen.
4' E.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (invalidatiig a two-gener-
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On the other hand, the Court hardly has foresworn judicial review. As
an arbiter of federal structure, a defender of judicial process, and a protector
of free speech against political overreaching, the Court's actions in the
1990-1995 Terms accord reasonably well with a theory that its interventions
should protect the structure of democratic decisionmaking. In the past six
years, the Court rarely has confronted federal legislative policies with open-
ended claims of normative justice.44
b. State and Local Legislation
Confrontations with state and local legislatures encompass an array of
issues different from challenges to national legislative mandates.45 The
Court's activism is somewhat greater in confronting state legislative choices;
its action in support of contestable constitutional values is somewhat more
intrusive.
The defense of nationalized trade marks the Court's most assertive clash
with state and local legislatures. Eleven of the seventeen cases involving the
dormant Commerce Clause46 resulted in invalidation, rendering it the
Court's primary vehicle for protecting national decisionmaking. Unlike the
ations-old statute which was virtually without contemporary justification); United States
v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) (interfering only margin-
ally with federal efforts to prevent conflicts of interest of certain governmental employ-
ees).
On the other hand, Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116
S. Ct. 2374 (1996), and Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997), may mark the begin-
ning of a First Amendment confrontation with Congress in the area of telecommunica-
tions. But cf. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997) (upholding
"must carry" requirements for cable systems after previous constitutional doubts sug-
gested in Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)). Moreover, in
the 1995 Term, the Court, in Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 116
S. Ct. 2309 (1996), reentered the contested terrain of campaign financing.
The enthusiasm for speech protection at the federal level is a modem innovation.
Cf. Dahl, supra note 36, at 292 ("In the entire history of the Court there is not one case
arising under the First Amendment in which the Court has held federal legislation un-
constitutional.").
The only controversial and successful normative claim in the 1990s that the Court
sustained against federal legislation outside of the First Amendment area is the remand
of the equal protection claim in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097
(1995). Although the decision potentially had broad effect, it is far from clear that it
flouted a contemporary political consensus.
" Review of local legislation, although rarer, was more likely to be successful than
review of state legislation; the Court rejected only one of the nine local claims in the
past six years. Except for one Commerce Clause case, the issues concentrated on civil
rights and civil liberties: free speech, equal protection, free exercise, commercial
speech, and takings. See supra Table 5.
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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separation-of-powers cases at the national level, Commerce Clause review
places some policies entirely outside of the states' control. Nonetheless,
Congressional authorization can reverse judicial invalidations. Like most
structural decisions, Commerce Clause activism ultimately transfers author-
ity from one democratically accountable body to another, rather than sub-
stantively displacing majoritarian norms.47
Successful free speech challenges are almost as frequent as Commerce
Clause challenges, but generally are not subject to Congressional override.
Although Commerce Clause interventions directly benefit business interests,
the Court's free speech activism has occurred predominantly at the behest of
political outsiders and is largely defensible in classic terms of protecting
access of dissident voices to the public arena.4"
The demands of procedural due process have invalidated state and local
legislative enactments almost as often as the mandates of the First
Amendment. The Court's procedural due process activism, however, does
not interfere so much with the achievement of popular goals in the name of
open-ended claims of substantive justice as channel the means by which the
goals may be achieved.49
"' Similarly, the immunity from state taxation of federal retirement benefits invoked
in Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994), and Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509
U.S. 86 (1993), could be lifted by affirmative federal authorization. The only structural
invalidation of state or local legislation in the sample that was not reversible by federal
legislation was U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
" See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995) (anonymous
individual political speech); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (right of an
individual to criticize government policy on her property); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul
505 U.S. 377 (1992) (racist speech by a juvenile); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Move-
ment, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (parade by white supremacist fringe group); Norman v.
Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992) (minority political party); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Mem-
bers of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (speech of convicted
criminal).
Thus, the full array of state legislative cases casts some doubt on assertions that the
Court's emerging First Amendment jurisprudence primarily benefits established inter-
ests. E.g., Mary Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Case for Judicial
Review, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 975 (1993); Morton J. Horwitz, The Constitution of
Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 109-
16 (1993); see also infra n. 77 (discussing similar First Amendment claims at the lower
court level). Only in 44 LiquorMart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996), and
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993), did the court sus-
tain First Amendment challenges to state and local legislation which primarily benefited
established interests.
"' The cases invalidating statutory schemes as violating procedural due process in
the civil context involved a variety of state substantive initiatives. See Reich, 513 U.S.
106 (system for providing remedies for illegal tax assessments); Honda Motor Co., Ltd.
v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (system for adjudicating punitive damage claims); Harp-
er, 509 U.S. 86 (system for providing remedies for illegal tax assessments); Foucha v.
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The Equal Protection Clause, which provoked Justice Scalia's recent
fulminations against judicial overreaching," provides the primary forum in
which open-ended federal norms confront state legislative value choices. As
the Court recently noted,5' every piece of legislation involves a decision to
treat certain persons differently, and thus every legislative choice carries
some potential demand for justification under equal protection review. In
response to most equal protection claims, however, in recent years, the
Court generally has deferred to state choices with regard to substantive val-
ues.52 In recent school desegregation cases, as in voting rights cases seek-
ing to vindicate the claims of minorities, the Court has not been aggressive
in reviewing state legislative decisions; indeed, the Court's primary interven-
tion has been to trim the relief granted by lower courts.53
The Court has engaged in open confrontation with the values adopted by
state legislatures in three areas during the 1990-1995 Terms. First, its efforts
to implement a vision of color-blind equality in the face of contrary state
and local legislative judgments have brought the Court into regular confron-
tation with conflicting local priorities.54 This conflict shows no sign of
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (system of civil commitment); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S.
158 (1992) (prejudgment attachment); Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991) (same).
In none of the cases do the constitutionally required procedures substantially impede the
state's substantive objective.
' United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2291-309 (1996) (Scalia, J. dissenting);
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629-37 (1996) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
"I Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627 ("[M]ost legislation classifies for one purpose or anoth-
er, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons.").
52 E.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (rejecting a disability discrimination
claim); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992) (rejecting a challenge to discrimination
against new property owners); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648 (1992)
(rejecting a challenge to discrimination against out-of-state corporations); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (rejecting an age discrimination claim); Leathers v.
Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) (rejecting a challenge to discrimination among media
entities).
" Desegregation cases include Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995); United
States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); and
Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). The only voting rights case directly
invoking equal protection on behalf of minorities is Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25
(1993).
The challenges to voting district boundaries drawn to maximize the political pow-
er of racial minorities commenced in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), and litigation
has continued apace. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 116
S.Ct. 1894 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
In the area of government contracting, the Court pursued color blindness in con-
frontation with minority set-asides in Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen.
Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993) (challenging city ordinance
according preferential treatment to certain minority-owned contractors), and Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (challenging federal highway con-
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abating. Second, although the Court has heard only one full-fledged chal-
lenge to legislative action based on reproductive autonomy during the 1990-
1995 Terms, that case was an important one. In Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,55 the Court reaffirmed the protection for abortion it established in
Roe v. Wade;56 the opinion seemed to contemplate an open-ended judicial
review of both the legitimacy of legislative motivations and the degree of
burden associated with abortion limitations. The Court, however, has de-
clined to entertain any plenary substantive due process cases in the abortion
area since Casey.57 And last Term, although it entertained three substantive
due process challenges based on claims of fundamental rights, the Court
tract program).
The Court's other activist stance during the last six years in the equal protection
area has been in implementing principles of color-blindness in jury selection by invali-
dating the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jury members on the basis of race.
See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); Trevino v. Texas, 503 U.S. 562 (1992);
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400 (1991); Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511
U.S. 127 (1994) (extending the principle to peremptory strikes exercised to exclude
women from the jury ). But c.f Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (uphold-
ing the exclusion of bilingual jurors).
" 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973), and holding
that an undue burden test would be applied in evaluating, pre-viability abortion restric-
tions).
56 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
5' E.g. Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 116 S. Ct. 1582 (1996) (denying certiorari);
Edwards v. Hope Medical Group for Women, 115 S. Ct. 1 (1995) (denying request for
stay); Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994) (denying request for stay); Fargo Women's Health
Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013 (1993) (denying request for stay).
In two per curiam cases, the Court declined to overturn invalidations of restrictive
statutes but reduced the relief granted to the plaintiffs. See Leavitt v. Jane L., 116 S. Ct.
2068 (1996) (per curiam) (reversing lower court on severability of unconstitutional
provision in anti-abortion statute); Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Servs., 116 S.
Ct. 1063 (1996) (per curiam) (reversing trial court on the scope of injunction imple-
menting a federal Medicaid entitlement). Last Term, in two other per curiam opinions,
the Court rejected challenges to abortion regulations. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 117 S. Ct.
1865 (1997) (per curiam) (upholding a statute restricting the performance of abortions
to licensed physicians); Lambert v. Wicklund, 117 S. Ct. 1169 (1997) (per curiam)
(upholding a statute requiring parental notification for minors seeking abortions).
Lower courts have been circumspect in applying Casey outside of the area of abor-
tion. Cf Sandra Lynne Tholen & Lisa Baird, Note & Comment, Con Law is as Con
Law Does: A Survey of Planned Parenthood v. Casey in the State and Federal Courts,
28 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 971 (1995).
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rejected each unanimously.5" Finally, in Romer v. Evans,59 the Court in-
validated a broad exclusion of gays and lesbians from protection against dis-
crimination, branding popular animosity toward gays and lesbians an illegit-
imate state interest.' Whether this seed bears fruit depends on whether Ev-
ans turned on the peculiarly broad and gratuitous character of Colorado's
Amendment 2.
B. The View from the District Courts: The Constitution and the
Legislatures in 1994
The Supreme Court's use of legislative review might not reflect trial
courts' exercise of judicial power. Selection effects may skim off some sets
of cases into settlements, and the Supreme Court's discretion in granting
certiorari may mask a very different array of trial and appellate litigation.61
Commentators periodically have noted the problem62 but rarely investigated
the reality.
It is easy enough to observe the Supreme Court's exercise of judicial
review. In a docket of approximately one hundred cases a year, a six-year
sample of constitutional objections addressed by the Court in published
opinions yielded only 292 cases invoking the Constitution. By contrast, in
federal district courts, annual filings for the 1990s hovered around the one-
quarter million mark, with a yearly average of more than twenty thousand
civil rights cases and more than fifty thousand prisoner cases.63
Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (rejecting a challenge to a prohibition on
assisted suicide); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (same); Kansas v.
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (rejecting a substantive due process challenge to
commitment of sexually violent predators).
59 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
60 Id. at 1629.
61 For a discussion of selection effects of settlement that might cause the cases de-
cided by final judgment to differ from those initially filed, see, for example, Theodore
Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical
Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337 (1990); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to
No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 319, 339, 367 (1991); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). For a discussion of certiorari
filters, see, for example, PERRY, supra note 7, at 245-60.
62 E.g., Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 379-80; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 7, at
1786 n.50; Schauer, supra note 9, at 401 n.6; Frederick Schauer, Judging in a Corner
of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717, 1722 (1988) (arguing that appellate adjudication
occupies a small and skewed portion of the "universe of law"); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 110-11 (1992) (noting that
the impact of doctrines can be determined crucially by the way in which lower courts
apply them).
63 See LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL
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Clearly, within the constraints of reasonable expenditures of energy, a
review of every case for even a single year is impossible. It is no wonder,
therefore, that there is no recent comprehensive survey of the constitutional
caseload of the federal district courts.' In the summer of 1995, I examined
a one in ten sample of 1994 federal district court opinions available on
Lexis, a sample that yielded 667 constitutional claims in 431 cases.6 5
Rough calculations suggest that federal trial judges confronted constitutional
claims in more than twenty-five thousand published opinions during the six
years in which the Supreme Court addressed 292 cases raising constitutional
66issues.
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1995 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 141-43 tbl.
C-2A (civil cases), 207-09 tbl. D-2 (criminal cases) (1995).
Not all of these cases, of course, involve an exercise of judicial review. Of the
27,655 civil rights cases filed in 1993, for example, 12,962 were "employment cases"
and 13,776 were "other civil rights cases." Id. at tbl. C-2A. Only a portion of the cases
involved constitutional claims.'See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality
of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 670 tbl. V (1987) [hereinaf-
ter Eisenberg & Schwab, Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation] (citing a 1980-1981
sample in the Los Angeles federal district court finding that 70% of "other civil rights"
cases and 20% of employment civil rights cases involved constitutional claims); see
also Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litiga-
tion: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 719, 725 tbl. I (1988) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Schwab, Explaining
Constitutional Tort Litigation] (noting that in a larger sample, 74% of "other civil
rights" cases involved constitutional tort actions, and 18.7% of the cases concerning
employment). Using these ratios, roughly 12,000 affirmative requests for constitutional
review were filed nationwide in 1993. Similarly, of the 53,451 prisoner cases, 13,054
were habeas cases, and 33,933 were civil rights cases. Eisenberg and Schwab estimated
in 1980 that nonprisoner constitutional tort cases represented 8.9% of the federal civil
docket, and prisoner cases represented 17% of the docket. Id at 725.
" An effort to compile a database of cases brought against state and local govern-
ments in the federal courts was aborted when federal budget reductions eliminated the
entity which undertook the project. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERGOVERNMEN-
TAL RELATIONS, FEDERAL COURT RULINGS INVOLVING STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL
GOVERNMENTS: CALENDAR YEAR 1994 (1995) (identifying 2095 opinions filed in Sec-
tion 1983 cases brought against state and local governments in the trial and appellate
federal courts in 1994).
,' For a discussion of the way in which the sample was drawn and the various limi-
tations on the generalizability of the results, see infra Appendix.
' Six hundred sixty-seven claims are in the sample, included in 431 published opin-
ions, in a year in which 20,136 Lexis-reported cases were filed. If this represents 4300
cases raising constitutional claims out of a total of 20,136 during 1994, this yields a rate
of 21%. Between June 1990 and June 1996, 121,986 Lexis-reported cases were filed in
the district courts. If 21% of these involved constitutional issues, the total constitutional
universe among published opinions would be 25,600.
Even rougher calculations suggest that more than 250,000 cases filed in the federal
trial courts involved constitutional claims. Administrative Office statistics suggest that
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The cases in my sample suggest that the subjects on which trial courts
confront legislatures substantially mirror patterns in the Supreme Court. The
main difference between Supreme Court and trial court activism in the legis-
lative area is the relative absence of cases invoking concerns of constitution-
al structure or federalism at the trial court level. Judicial review of legisla-
tion, however, constitutes a smaller portion of the trial courts' dockets than
that of the Supreme Court.
1. The Incidence of Judicial Review of Legislation
At the Supreme Court level, the classical confrontation between the
Court and legislatures predominated. Legislative actions are at issue in two
of five cases decided by the Supreme Court. In the district court, the
Marbury/Brown scenario is rare; in the sample, only thirty-three cases
(7.6%) involved challenges to legislative action.
At the trial court level, not only were published court pronouncements
less likely to involve challenges to legislative action, but the challenges
were less likely to be successful. In the Supreme Court, exercises of review
over legislation led to a finding of constitutional violations in almost half of
the cases (48%). By contrast, at the trial court level, challenges were sus-
tained at only half that rate (24%).67
It could be argued that this is an artifact of the opinions sampled; pub-
lished trial court opinions involve both interlocutory and final judgments.
Disposition of a discovery request or denial of summary judgment for the
defendant could appear as a "possible" plaintiff's victory, even though a
final judgment appealed to the Supreme Court might appear as a case in
which the plaintiff prevailed. Because the sample excluded cases in which
the trial court filed no opinion, it may undercount the number of statutory
invalidations.
This result is unlikely. One would expect that most trial judges who
invalidate statutes would file opinions. 68 And it turns out that interlocutory
between 1991 and 1995, plaintiffs commenced 171,481 prisoner civil rights cases; 66,2-
13 prisoner habeas cases; 68,848 other civil rights cases; and 67,127 employment civil
rights cases. MECHAM, supra note 63, at 141-43 tbl. C-2A. Eisenberg and Schwab find
that roughly 80% of "other civil rights" cases and 20% of employment cases raised
constitutional claims. Eisenberg & Schwab, Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation,
supra note 63, at 670 tbl. V.
67 The overall rate at which claims of constitutional violation were rejected in legis-
lative cases, however, is similar (36% of trial court cases and 38% of Supreme Court
cases).
6 Judgments which invalidate statutes seem more likely to be published than opin-
ions rejecting challenges. A trial judge is unlikely to invalidate a legislative action with-
out regarding the occasion as worthy of being noted, while rejecting a garden-variety
challenge to a statute on settled precedent might well be deemed unworthy of publica-
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opinions leaving constitutional issues open do not usually result in subse-
quent published invalidations. When I reviewed the history of the thirteen
cases in the 1994 sample listed as possible legislative invalidations, I found
that only one resulted in a subsequent published statutory invalidation, and
eight resulted in victories for defendants. Thus, the level of judicial activism
in the lower courts vis-a-vis legislatures is quite modest. In reviewing feder-
al, state, and local legislation combined, assuming my sample is representa-
tive, less than one hundred federal cases in 1994 invalidated any portion of
any legislation in reported federal cases. The sample, moreover, contained
only two instances of invalidations resting on anything but the most routine
of legal applications."
Within their smaller universe of legislative review, trial courts are less
likely than the Supreme Court to deploy judicial review against the federal
or state legislatures and more likely to review local ordinances.'0 At all
governmental levels, the challenged legislation is less likely to survive con-
stitutional scrutiny in the lower courts.
71
tion. The published trial court opinions may, therefore, overstate the success rate. A
discovery ruling on the way to an ultimate rejection of a claim would also appear as a
"possible" claim.
69 In the eight successful legislative challenges, two raised federal preemption claims
against state statutes, one challenged a local occupation tax applied to federal judges,
three challenged local ordinances on First Amendment grounds, and one read a federal
sentencing statute narrowly in light of minimum rationality concerns.
Of the eight cases, only two called on the courts to engage in anything approaching
a creative application of existing doctrine. In United States v. Davis, 864 F. Supp. 1303
(N.D. Ga. 1994), the court refused to apply an enhancement of federal sentences for
crack cocaine to sales of cocaine base on the ground that such an enhancement would
be irrational. In Louisiana Debating and Literary Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 1994
WL 86689 (E.D. La., Mar. 10, 1994), aft'd, 42 F.3d 1483 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 2583 (1995), the court enjoined the city from investigating the membership of
private clubs in enforcing a local human rights ordinance.
70 LEGISLATIVE CASES
District Courts Supreme Court
Federal 5/33 (15%) 44/120 (36%)
State 11/33 (33%) 67/120 (56%)
Local 16/33 (48%) 9/120 (7.5%)
71 CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO LEGISLATION SUSTAINED
District Court Supreme Court
Y N ? Y N ?
Federal 1 3 1 14 18 12
20% 60% 20% 31% 40% 27%
State 3 3 5 37 26 4
27% 27% 45% 54% 39% 6%
Local 4 4 8 7 1 1
25% 25% 50% 77% 11% 11%
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Table of Constitutional Claims
Query: 1994 Federal District Court Cases
Legislature = Yes
Violations Total Claims Rejected Possible Sustained % Rej. % Poss. % Sust.
Equal Protection 14 7 7
Other Constitutional Claim 10 3 3
Freedom of Speech 9 3 3
Takings 5 2 3
SDP-Fundamental Rights 5
Freedom of Association 3
Commerce Clause 3
Rationality - Liberty 2
Criminal Procedural DP 2
Rationality - Property 2
Administrative Procedural DP 2
Civil Procedural DP I
8th Cruel/Unusual I
SDP-Punitive Damages I
6th - Effective Counsel I
Federal Structure 0
Freedom of Press 0
Establishment Clause 0
Free Exercise 0
Criminal Trial Violations 0
4th Search/Seizure 0
5th - Double Jeopardy 0
5th - Self Incrimination 0
6th - Right to Fair Trial 0
SDP-Rochin 0
4th Arrest 0
4th Excessive Force 0
8th - Excessive Fines 0
Minimal Contacts DP 0
3 I
I I
1 2
2 0
2 0
0 2
2 0
0 1
1 0
1 0
l -0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 50.00% 50.00% 0.00%
4 30.00% 30.00% 40.00%
3 33.33% 33.33% 33,33%
0 40.00% 60.00% 0.00%
1 60.00% 20.00% 20,00%
1 33.33% 33.33% 33,33%
0 33.33% 66.67% 0,00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 .100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
61 29 23 9 47.54% 37.70% 14.75%
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Table 6
TOTALS:
EXPLORING THE DARK MATTER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
2. Patterns of Judicial Activism
In this diminished "classical core," the distribution of issues differed
from the Supreme Court primarily in the relative absence of challenges
under the structural provisions of the Constitution. More than one-quarter of
the constitutional claims presented to the Supreme Court involved separation
of powers, federal structure, or the dormant Commerce Clause, and these
provisions accounted for almost forty percent of the successful legislative
challenges.72 By contrast, the trial court sample contains no efforts to attack
statutes on federalism or separation-of-powers grounds; only three of sixty-
one claims invoke the dormant Commerce Clause, and none of the three
resulted in a statutory invalidation; four more invoked federal supremacy or
preemption claims with substantial success.7 3 The great issues of federalism
and inter-branch comity rarely impinge directly on the consciousness of the
trial courts as they exercise judicial review.
In other dimensions, the profile of trial court legislative cases is quite
similar to the Supreme Court's caseload. First Amendment speech and asso-
ciation cases, the most prevalent area of challenge to legislative enactments
in the Supreme Court, accounted for twenty-three percent of the Court's
legislative caseload. The trial court sample contained a comparable propor-
tion of First Amendment cases challenging legislation (33%) with compara-
ble rates of success.74 Although First Amendment challenges to legislation
in the Supreme Court often dealt with issues of high constitutional policy
involving allegations of state or national efforts to criminally punish uncon-
ventional speech, structure national media, or regulate the political pro-
cess,75 the trial courts' legislative docket was preoccupied with local ordi-
nances administering access to local public forums. Trial courts protected
See supra Table 1.
Comparing the total of actual and "possible" invalidations, however, the potential
success rate of Commerce Clause claims at the trial court (2/3; 66%) matched the rate
at the Supreme Court (12/18; 66%). One reader of this Article, struck by the dispropor-
tion between the role of the negative Commerce Clause in the Supreme Court and the
lower courts, suggested that Commerce Clause cases may be adjudicated at the trial
level by state rather than federal courts. This hypothesis does not seem to be supported
by the facts. When I took a 1-in-20 case sample of Lexis-reported constitutional opin-
ions in the lower state courts in 1994, I could identify only 2 of 290 cases raising Com-
merce Clause challenges.
At the district court level, the category "other" contains four Supremacy Clause
claims (1 rejected; 2 successful), three right to travel claims (2 rejected), and one feder-
al tax claim (sustained).
4 At the Supreme Court level, 16 of the 45 First Amendment challenges to legisla-
tive action were rejected (35%); in the District Court sample, 4 out of 11 (36%).
5 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 16.
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unconventional speech, but the threats they confronted were more likely to
be matters of administration 76 than threats of wholesale censorial suppres-
sion. Judicial review by the trial courts does not seem to be so much an
opportunity to shape public consciousness by dramatizing the overarching
importance of free expression as a quotidian effort to patrol the boundaries
of access to the public arena on behalf of the dispossessed.'
Equal protection challenges were much more common within the trial
courts' legislative docket than at the Supreme Court. Cases raising these
claims constituted approximately fourteen percent (17/120) of the Supreme
Court's legislative caseload and appeared in forty-two percent (14/33) of the
legislative challenges in trial courts.78 The distribution of the activism,
however, was quite similar.
In the Supreme Court, successful equal protection challenges to legisla-
tion were found almost exclusively in the half of the equal protection docket
which dealt with racial classifications. Two cases involved remedies for
previously adjudicated claims against segregated educational systems
brought on behalf of African-American plaintiffs;79 six comprised challeng-
76 Of the 11 legislative First Amendment cases, five involved municipal "time,
place, and manner" regulations of expressive activity. These accounted for four out of
seven potentially successful claims. One case involved a ballot access claim, and anoth-
er involved a First Amendment challenge to the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy.
Both were potentially successful.
' Those concerned that judicial review in the First Amendment area primarily bene-
fits the powerful, see, e.g., Becker, supra note 48, at 976-77 (challenging the case for
binding judicial review from the perspective of women); Horwitz, supra note 48, at
108-12 (addressing the question of whether free speech protections benefit entrenched
interests), may be comforted by the array of plaintiffs in the trial court sample. Poten-
tially successful plaintiffs included three minor political parties, gay members of the
military, a fringe pro-life group, and a religious sect. The only arguably entrenched
group to challenge a legislative enactment successfully at the trial court level was the
Louisiana Debating and Literary Association. See Louisiana Debating and Literary
Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 1994 WL 86689 (E.D. La., Mar. 10, 1994) (enjoining
the city from investigating the membership of private clubs in enforcing a local human
rights ordinance), affid, 42 F.3d 1483 (5th Cir.), cert.denied, 115 S. Ct. 2583 (1995). In
the sample, a similar challenge to a human rights statute by the Elks was rebuffed in
Benevolent and Protective Order of the Elks v. Reynolds, 863 F. Supp. 529 (W.D.
Mich. 1994).
Among nonlegislative claims at the trial court, the results are similar. Prisoners and
dissident public employees asserted more than half of the First Amendment claims.
Other potentially successful claimants included those claiming retaliatory arrests. The
only establishment claimants were the media, who invoked the First Amendment in two
cases. See infra note 114.
78 Equal protection challenges to legislation, however, were less likely to succeed
before the trial courts (none sustained, 50% possible, 50% rejected by the trial courts;
47% sustained, 35% rejected by the Supreme Court).
' Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995); United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S.
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es by white plaintiffs to racially conscious legislation aimed at benefiting
minorities.'0 By contrast, efforts by businesses to challenge legislation as
irrational were uniformly unsuccessful, as were challenges by disabled plain-
tiffs, aged plaintiffs, and criminal defendants to legislative line drawing."
Only in Romer was a plaintiff successful in an equal protection challenge to
legislation outside of the area of race. 2
The trial court profile was similar. Two challenges by African-American
plaintiffs to allegedly racially invidious legislation survived initial judicial
scrutiny, while the single affirmative action challenge by a white plaintiff
was rejected. 3 One of the five efforts by businesses to challenge regulatory
legislation' and two of the five challenges by nonracial minorities' sur-
vived judicial scrutiny.
Challenges to legislative regulation of property under takings or substan-
tive due process theories were somewhat more prevalent but no more suc-
cessful in the trial courts than in the Supreme Court.' In the trial courts,
substantive due process claims raising fundamental rights complaints, which
occupied only two of the 120 legislative cases considered by the Supreme
Court, accounted for five of the thirty-three cases on the trial court legisla-
717 (1991).
' Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996);
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.
Ct. 2097 (1995); Shaw v. Reno 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Northeastern -Fla. Chapter of
Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993).
81 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 58.
82 Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996) (invalidating a broad exclusion of gays
and lesbians from protection against discrimination).
' Because the sample of cases here largely preceded the Supreme Court's recent
surge of activism against racially conscious government legislation which seeks to bene-
fit minorities, the incidence of affirmative action challenges in my sample may
underrepresent such litigation.
" Two cases were rejected on the merits, and two were dismissed on procedural
grounds.
8 Trial courts rejected equal protection challenges by disabled plaintiffs, homeless
plaintiffs, and criminal defendants. Challenges by a gay plaintiff and by a treatment
center for alcoholics survived initial scrutiny.
The Supreme Court decided 13 property cases, which constituted 10.8% of its
legislative caseload. Of the 13, one was successful and three were potentially success-
ful. Property cases constituted 22% of the trial courts' legislative caseload. Three cases
in which claims are listed as "potentially successful" in supra Table 1 nonetheless were
dismissed for procedural reasons, so of the eight cases, two were potentially successful.
Thus, the concern that recent Supreme Court precedent "delegates to the lower federal
courts, stocked plentifully with Reagan and Bush appointees" the ability to use the Tak-
ings Clause to block regulation (see, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 62, at 111) seems to
have proven excessive. Cf infra text accompanying note 118 (indicating that lower
court property cases involving nonlegislative decisionmakers have a somewhat higher
success rate).
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tive docket, with only two of those claims surviving initial judicial scruti-
ny.87
3. Who Wins?
The relative tendency to vindicate business and property claimants was
absent in legislative challenges at the trial court level. At the Supreme
Court, businesses, taxpayers, and property holders accounted for almost half
of the constitutional activism against legislative determinations; public plain-
tiffs, although much more successful, brought only one-sixth of these cases.
In contrast, at the trial court level class actions and public groups brought
forty percent of the legislative challenges (13/33), and the receptivity of the
courts was greater than that in the thirty-six percent (12/33) of legislative
claims brought by business, taxpayers, and property holders." Likewise,
the rate of success and rejection for nonbusiness individuals in the trial
court was comparable to the business success rate. 9 Women appeared as
plaintiffs in legislative cases at both the trial court and Supreme Court levels
less than a third the number times men appeared, though their success rates
are comparable.'
II. THE "DARK MAT'TER" OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW: NONLEGISLATIVE
DECISIONMAKERS
A. The View from the Supreme Court
Although the paradigm of Marbury and Brown accounts for 120 cases
(149 claims) before the Court during the early 1990s, almost one-and-a-half
87 Both potentially successful cases involve challenges to exclusions of rape and
incest survivors from state medicaid programs. Plaintiffs prevailed in each case on fed-
eral statutory grounds. The court rejected substantive due process challenges by gay
soldiers, operators of nude bars, and dissident public employees.
88 The Court rejected four (30%) of the 13 public/class action legislative cases;
claimants prevailed in four (30%), and the Court left open the possibility of victory in
the remaining five cases (38%). The Court rejected the claims in three (25%) of the
twelve business/property/taxpayer legislative cases; claimants won (2/12) or retained the
possibility of winning (4/12) in half the cases. Claimants lost five (55%) of the nine
individual (nonbusiness) legislative cases, won two (22%), and retained the possibility
of a victory in the other two (22%).
89 See supra note 88.
0 At the trial court level, two of the 33 legislative challenges involved female
claimants, with half losing; nine of the 33 legislative challenges were brought by male
claimants, with 44% losing. Before the Supreme Court, ten of the 119 legislative chal-
lenges involved female claimants, and the Court rejected half of their claims; 37 of the
119 legislative challenges were brought by men, and 54% failed.
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times that number of constitutional review cases do not involve challenges
to decisions made by legislative bodies. Of these 172 cases, 83 challenged
judicial actions, 45 challenged an action by an administrative body, 30 in-
volve a decision by individual administrative officials, and 24 challenged
police decisions.
These decisions fall outside of standard discussions of judicial review.
The colorful claim that federal judicial review represents an illegitimate
coup d'6tat91 rests on the image of courts confronting Congress or perhaps
state or local legislatures. Much of the constitutional business of the Su-
preme Court, however, involves the actions of officials whose claims to
represent the will of the people are at least as diffuse as the mandate of the
judiciary. Whether the issue is democratic responsiveness or fidelity to na-
tional values, there is no strong reason to believe that the judgment of a
state judge, a local prison warden, or a police officer on the beat is prefer-
able to that of the Supreme Court.92 The Court's decisions periodically al-
lude to this distinction,93 but usually it passes unnoticed.
Conversely, much review of nonlegislative decisions cannot be justified
by some of the most popular defenses of the practice of judicial review. In
the nonlegislative arena, the Court feels relatively free to administer norms
not directly linked to text or history; these norms cast the Court not as a
guardian of democratic politics or constitutional structure but of the
citizenry's rights against physical oppression and arbitrary treatment.
E.g. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 6 (1971) (asserting that the nonoriginalist Court is a "perpetrator of limited
coups d'etat" and that the only possible response for a citizen who does not share the
Court's moral and political views is to "ignore the Court whenever he can get away
with it and overthrow it if he can").
' Cf Friedman, supra note 6, at 634-35 (asserting that when judges review the
work of administrative officials, "making the countermajoritarian difficulty stick is
extremely difficult").
The rate at which defendants prevail in the Supreme Court sample has some rela-
tionship to the level of government reviewed, but no consistent relation to the presence
or absence of direct democratic mandate:
GOVERNMENTAL DEFENDANTS' SUCCESS RATE IN CONSTITUTIONAL CASES BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT AND TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES DECIDED
Decisionmaker Federal State Local
Legislators 49% (21/43) 46% (30/66) 22% (2/9)
Administrative Agencies 66% (10/15) 35% (6/17) 30% (4/13)
Police/Individual Officials 66% (10/15) 38% (11/30) 37% (3/8)
9 BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1604-07 (1996) (Breyer,
J., concurring) (discussing the lack of legal constraints on juries' determination of puni-
tive damages); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 455-57
(1993) (Stevens, J.) (comparing the rationality standard for legislatures and juries given
the different safeguards that are available in the different processes).
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Table 7
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Table of Constitutional Claims
Query: Supreme Court Cases
Legislature = No
Violations Total Claims Rejected Possible Sustained % Rej. % Poss. % Sust.
Criminal Procedural DP 41 15 14 12 36.59% 34.15% 29.27%
4th Search/Seizure 17 8 8 1 47.06% 47.06% 5.88%
Freedom of Speech 16 3 5 8 18.75% 31.25% 50.00%
8th - Death Penalty 16 9 2 5 56,25% 12.50% 31.25%
Equal Protection 15 5 3 7 33.33% 20.00% 46.67%
Civil Procedural DP 10 5 2 3 50.00% 20.00% 30.00%
SDP-Rochin 10 6 3 1 60.00% 30.00% 10.00%
6th - Right to Fair Trial 10 4 3 3 40.00% 30.00% 30.00%
8th rn/ll,,Unuual 9 I 7 I 11 11% 7 7R/ 11 110%
Other Constitutional Claim
5th - Self Incrimination
Administrative Procedural DP
5th - Double Jeopardy
Takings
SDP-Punitive Damages
Commercial Speech
6th - Effective Counsel
Freedom of Press
Senaration of Powers
4th Arrest
Freedom of Association
Establishment Clause
Commerce Clause
4th Excessive Force
Minimal Contacts DP
Federal Structure
SDP-Fundamental Rights
Criminal Trial Violations
Free Exercise
Rationality - Property
Rationality - Liberty
8th - Excessive Fines
9
8
7
6
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
8
3
2
5
2
3
1
0
1
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
3
0
1
0
0
3
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1 88.89% 0.00% 11.11%
3 37.50% 25.00% 37.50%
2 28.57% 42.86% 28.57%
1 83.33% 0.00% 16.67%
1 50.00% 25.00% 25.00%
1 75.00% 0.00% 25.00%
2 33.33% 0.00% 66.67%
0 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
0 33.33% 66.67% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1 33.33% 33.33% 33.33%
1 50.00% 0.00% 50.00%
1 50.00% 0.00% 50.00%
1 50.00% 0.00% 50.00%
0 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0 0.00%
0 0 0.00%
0 0 0.00%
0 0 0.00%
0 0 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
56 43.96% 28.99% 27.05%TOTALS: 207 91 60
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As Table 7 indicates, claims based on federal structure and separation of
powers are virtually absent outside the legislative realm. Issues of free
speech and equal protection are less prevalent, though somewhat more likely
to succeed. Free speech and equal protection issues in these cases generally
address local administration of government property or court procedure
rather than broad political or structural concerns.94
In the First Amendment arena, issues of allegedly impermissible employment
decisions and rules governing access to public fora predominated the nonlegislative
docket, followed by local police regulations regarding professional advertising.
The seven public forum cases are: Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (challenging denial of university funds to a Christian student
publication); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995)
(seeking an injunction requiring the advisory board to issue a permit for the erection of
a Latin cross in plaza next to the state capitol); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
& Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (alleging that a group's exclusion of a gay
organization from its St. Patrick's Day parade violated Massachusetts' public accommo-
dation law); Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995) (alleging
that Amtrak's rejection of an artist's lease of billboard space because his display was
political violated the First Amendment); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (alleging that a school district violated a religious
organization's constitutional rights by refusing its request to use school facilities for a
religious film series); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505
U.S. 672 (1992) (challenging a port authority's restrictions on distribution of literature
and solicitation of contributions in airport terminals); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191
(1992) (seeking to enjoin enforcement of Tennessee statutes prohibiting solicitation of
votes and display of campaign materials within 100 feet of entrances to polling places
on election days).
The five government employee cases are: O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of
Northlake, 116 S. Ct. 2353 (1996) (challenging a contractor's removal from a city's
rotation list of available towing service contractors); Board of County Comm'rs. v.
Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996) (alleging that a county board terminated a government
contract in retaliation for the contractor's criticism of the county and the board) ; Wa-
ters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994) (alleging that the plaintiff's discharge because of
criticism violated the First Amendment); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) (involving
discharged state employees who-brought suit claiming they had been discharged because
of their political affiliation); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U.S. 507 (1991) (in-
volving dissenting employees' claim that the collection and use of service fees in an
agency shop violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights).
The three local advertising cases are: Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S 618
(1995) (challenging the constitutionality of state bar rules which prohibited lawyers
from using direct mail to solicit personal injury or wrongful death clients within 30
days of an accident); Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Bus. & Prof Regulation, 512 U.S. 136
(1994) (appealing a decision of a state agency reprimanding the plaintiff for referring to
her C.P.A. license in advertising); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (challenging
a state's ban on in-person solicitations by C.P.A.'s).
A smaller segment of the nonlegislative First Amendment confrontations involved
matters of high policy (see, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (challenging
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regulations prohibiting abortion counseling, referrals, and activities promoting abortion
as a method of family planning)), efforts to punish speech directly (see Madsen v.
Women's Health Center, 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (challenging an injunction against anti-
abortion protesters); Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992) (holding that it was an
error to admit a stipulation of the defendant's membership in a white, racist prison gang
because that evidence was not relevant to any issue being decided at the punishment
phase); Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (holding that the "substantial likeli-
hood of material prejudice" test satisfies the First Amendment)), and the freedom of the
press (see, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (involving an action
to recover for breach of contract and misrepresentation after publishers revealed the
identity of a confidential source); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine Inc., 501 U.S. 496
(1991) (involving a libel claim based on altered quotations published in magazine arti-
cles and a book)).
Among the equal protection cases, nonlegislative claims focused on challenges to
allegedly impermissible peremptory challenges in jury selection and school desegrega-
tion. For jury cases, see Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that under the
Equal Protection Clause, the criminal defendant may object to race-based exclusions of
jurors effected through peremptory challenges whether or not the defendant and the
excluded juror are of the same race); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (hold-
ing that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in
purposeful face-based exclusion of jurors); Trevino v. Texas, 503 U.S. 562 (1992) (hol-
ding that the defendant adequately preserved his claim that the state's use of peremptory
challenges violated the Equal Protection Clause); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (holding that a private litigant in a civil case may not use pe-
remptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of their race because it would violate
the challenged jurors' equal protection rights); Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991)
(rejecting a state's procedural rule barring consideration of constitutional issues involv-
ing challenges to jury selections). See also J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994)
(extending equal protection prohibitions to peremptory strikes exercised to exclude
women from the jury). But c.f Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (uphold-
ing exclusion of bilingual jurors)).
For school desegregation cases, see Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (holding
that a district court has the authority to relinquish supervision and control over a school
district in incremental stages before full compliance with judicial desegregation decree
has been achieved in every area of school operations); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498
U.S. 237 (1991) (holding that in determining whether to dissolve a desegregation de-
cree, a trial court should consider whether the school district complied in good faith
with the decree and whether vestiges of past discrimination have been eliminated to the
extent practicable).
The 1995 Term had the potential to begin an exception to this trend in the equal
protection area, but it did not. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (chal-
lenging a state military school's male-only admissions policy), involved a local contro-
versy on gender equity. Both United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996) (re-
jecting a claim of selective prosecution based on race because of lack of credible evi-
dence that similarly situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted but
were not), and Wisconsin v. New York 116 S. Ct. 1091 (1996) (holding that a state
decision not to statistically adjust census figures was not subject to heightened scrutiny),
had potentially sweeping implications regarding the administration of justice and the
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Outside the legislative arena, the basis for a perception of emerging
constitutional activism on behalf of property fades. Challenges to regulatory
measures based on doctrines that directly protect property rights were raised
in only six of the 172 nonlegislative cases, and were successful in only
two." Business, taxpayer, and property plaintiffs account for barely ten
percent of the Supreme Court's nonlegislative constitutional caseload. The
Court sustained only six (31%) of the constitutional claims in the nineteen
cases involving taxpayers, businesses, or landowners and sustained thirty-
four (26%) of the 124 constitutional cases involving nonbusiness individu-
als, including criminal defendants.
In cases in which legislative action is not at issue, the Court often is
preoccupied with the control of forcible government coercion, criminal jus-
tice, and administrative overreaching. The claims here do not arise from the
constitutional provisions conventionally highlighted in theories of judicial
review. Rather, nonlegislative cases focus on criminal procedure, the Fourth
Amendment, the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and the
protections afforded by substantive due process against physical abuse.96
These are not, in large measure, areas in which the Court deduces results
from broad and controversial political premises or historical debates; they
are topics in which, starting from consensus ideals of minimal physical
dignity and fairness, the Supreme Court delegates to lower courts the appli-
cations of standards of "legitimate expectations," "deliberate indifference,"
"reasonable suspicion," and "fundamental fairness." The rights invoked are
not the stuff of sophisticated doctrinal elaboration, but they are crucial to
our image of a decent order of government. High policy and social trans-
formation are not dictated by the Supreme Court in these cases. Rather, the
Court empowers the lower federal judiciary to act as field agents dispensing
minimal federal justice.
The Supreme Court's review of legislative actions usually is framed as a
legal resolution of claims for prospective relief. In the nonlegislative arena,
by contrast, relief is predominantly retrospective.97  The cohort of
census. In each case, the Court upheld the challenged federal actions.
9 BMW of North America, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1589; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374 (1994). One might suggest that Dolan is a case of such moment that a 1994 trial
court sample could not adequately capture its impact. Accordingly, in January 1997 I
sought to identify all 1996 district court cases which implemented Dolan. Only two
cases cited Dolan; only one concerned an alleged regulatory taking, and the plaintiff
lost. Marshall v. Board of County Commissioners, 912 F. Supp. 1456 (D. Wyo. 1996)
(dismissing a damage action against land use regulators because of governmental immu-
nity).
' One hundred nonlegislative cases, 58% of all nonlegislative cases, presented those
claims.
In 38 of the 45 challenges to actions by administrative agencies, the plaintiffs
sought injunctive relief or reversal of regulatory actions, a pattern similar to legislative
1997] 463
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
nonlegislative damage cases tended to focus on claims that individual gov-
ernment functionaries abused the person or freedom of individual citizens.98
The relevant constitutional norms directly engage the moral sensibility of the
trier of fact, but because the trier was intensely dependent on the resolution
of disputed factual accounts and contextual judgments, the cases were un-
likely to be resolved on appeal.99
challenges. Claims against individual officials, by contrast, were primarily retrospective.
Eighteen of 30 sought damages, and eight sought habeas or reversal of a conviction.
Against police, the breakdown was similar: 13 of the 24 involved habeas or reversal,
and 6 sought damages.
"' See infra Table 8. Of the 29 nonlegislative damage cases before the Supreme
Court, 23 involved challenges to actions by individual officials or police officers.
In the nonlegislative damage cases, defendants prevailed in the Supreme Court in
11 of the 29 cases; the Court remanded the remaining 18.
[Vol. 5:2464
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Table 8
Table of Constitutional Claims
Query: Supreme Court Cases
Legislature = No
Damages = Yes
Violations Total Claims Rejected Possible Sustained % Rej. % Poss. % Sust.
8th Cruel/Unusual 5 0 5 0 0.00% 100.00% 0.00/0
Administrative Procedural DP 5 2 2 1 40.00% 40.00% 20.00%
SDP-Rochin 5 2 3 0 40.00% 60.00% 0.00%
Freedom of Speech 4 0 4 0 0.00% 100.00% 0.000/
Criminal Procedural DP 4 0 4 0 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
4th Search/Seizure 4 0 4 0 0.000/ 100.000/0 0.00%
Takings 2 1 1 0 50.00% 50.00% 0.00%
4th Arrest 1 1 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Civil Procedural DP 1 0 1 0 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
Other Constitutional Claim 1 I 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
4th Excessive Force 1 0 1 0 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
Commercial Speech 0 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1'edel Strucur fl fl 0 A fl00 / N fl°4 flAflo/.
Freedom of Association
Freedom of Press
Establishment Clause
Free Exercise
Minimal Contacts DP
Equal Protection
Criminal Trial Violations
Commerce Clause
Separation of Powers
SDP-Punitive Damages
Rationality - Liberty
5th - Self Incrimination
6th - Effective Counsel
8th - Excessive Fines
8th - Death Penalty
6th - Right to Fair Trial
5th - Double Jeopardy
Rationality - Property
SDP-Fundamental Rights
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.000/0
0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.000/0
0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.000/0
0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0 0.00% 0.000/0 0.00%
0 0 0.00% 0.000/ 0.000%
33 7 25 1 21.21% 75.76% 3.03%TOTALS:
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
B. Dark Matter in the Trial Courts
At the Supreme Court level, the challenged decisionmaker is most often
a legislature and less often an individual executive official. Legislative ac-
tions are at issue in two of five cases decided by the Supreme Court; deci-
sions by individual bureaucrats appear only half as often. The frequency of
cases roughly mirrors the breadth of effect and dramatic import of the chal-
lenged decision: the legislative decision is the most deserving of the Su-
preme Court's limited resources and is the least likely to be controlled by
sub-constitutional decision rules.
In the trial courts, the order is reversed: challenges to legislative actions
are by far the least common type of constitutional review, while challenges
to actions by street-level bureaucrats" generate almost half of the consti-
tutional claims. In the district court sample, only thirty-three cases (7.6%)
involve challenges to legislative action. In contrast, decisions by individual
officials and police officers, which accounted for barely one-fifth of the
Supreme Court's cases (18%), spawned forty-five percent of the cases be-
fore the trial courts. Individual civilian officials' actions were challenged in
121 cases (28%), and police officers', in seventy-five (17.5%). °I This re-
versal is not solely an application of the proposition that applying the law is
a far more frequent activity than legislating. Although both judges and ad-
ministrative agencies apply law, decisions account for the same proportion
of cases in the Supreme Court and the district courts. Judges made the deci-
sions challenged in about one-third of the cases," 2 and challenges to ad-
ministrative agency action comprise about one case in six.'0 3
Among all cases adjudicated by the Supreme Court, the Justices tended
to enforce the Constitution prospectively; claimants were three times as
likely to raise constitutional claims in requests for injunctive or declaratory
relief as in claims for damages." 4 At the trial court level, the relationship
" The term "street-level bureaucrat" is Professor Lipsky's. MICHAEL LIPSKY,
STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES 1
(1980) ("Most citizens encounter government ... not through letters to Congressmen or
attendance at school board meetings, but through their teachers, and their parents' teach-
ers, and through the policeman on the corner or in the patrol car.").
101 This is partly attributable to the prevalence in district courts of claims involving
prisoners. Even among the nonprisoner cases, however, the combination of police and
other individual official action accounts for 36% (98/265) of the cases.
102 Challenges to judicial decisions accounted for 28% of the Supreme Court's docket
and 33% of the trial courts' dockets.
103 Challenges to administrative agency action accounted for 15% of the Supreme
Courts' docket and 16.7% of the trial courts' dockets.
"o Parties in 36 (12.3%) of the Supreme Court cases sought damages, 90 (30%)
sought injunctive relief, and 15 (55%) sought reversal of regulatory actions.
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was reversed: the typical case involved an effort to remedy prior constitu-
tional violations. Claims for damages predominated by a two-to-one ra-
tio."3 In part, this reflects the fact that claims challenging legislative ac-
tion, which are less common at the trial court level, are also more likely to
involve injunctive relief. Even among nonlegislative claims, however, dam-
ages were more likely to be sought at the trial court level."l As at the Su-
preme Court level, damage claims disproportionately represent interactions
with official deployments of force.1 7 Interactions with prison officials or
police generated sixty percent of the cases in which damages were sought,
and another sixteen percent of damage cases involved alleged denials of
procedural due process."l
'0' There were 349 claims for damages (61% rejected, 4.58% sustained) and 158
claims for equitable relief (56% rejected, 16.46% sustained) (but of the 51 claims that
sought equitable but not damages relief, 37.25% were rejected, and 21.57% were sus-
tained).
106 PERCENTAGE OF CASES WHICH RAISED DAMAGE CLAIMS
Decisionmaker Supreme Court District Court
Administrative Agencies 13% (6/45) 56% (42/72)
Police 25% (6/24) 72% (54/75)
Individual Officials 60% (18/30) 90% (109/121)
"' Among Eighth Amendment claims, 87% (62/71) involved damage claims. Among
Fourth Amendment force claims (arrest, seizure, and excessive force) the ratio was
61/83 (73%), and among claims of official physical abuse under Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952), 12 of the 15 were raised in damage actions (80%). This is to be
expected. It is difficult to anticipate being subjected to many deployments of physical
force, and the standards by which force is constrained are not amenable to clear and en-
forceable statements ex ante; injunctive relief is therefore difficult to obtain. Moreover,
because force is often deployed at a limited point in time, injunctive relief is unlikely to
benefit the plaintiff in the future. Additionally, after force is deployed, the effects are
rarely reversible but are instead merely compensable.
These categories account for 40% of the 341 damage claims in the sample. See
infra Table 10. Claims under the Fourth Amendment's constraints on search and seizure
appeared in 33 cases, of which only 16 (48%) involved claims for damages. The claim-
ants in 82% (14/17) of the nondamage Fourth Amendment cases were unsuccessful; the
claims were dismissed in only 44% (7/16) of the damage cases.
10" Of the 210 out of 431 cases that sought damages in trial courts, 54 involved
claims against police officials and 76 more involved claims by prisoners. Prisoner (28)
and police (34) cases accounted for 65% of the 95 potentially successful damage cases.
Thirty-five other cases involved claims of administrative denial of procedural due pro-
cess, but only 11 (33%) were potentially successful. At the Supreme Court level, dam-
ages were sought in 36 cases, of which eight were prisoner cases and six were police
cases.
The other major sources of damage actions at the trial court level were public em-
ployees, whose 34 damage cases (50% of which were potentially successful) accounted
for almost half of the damage cases outside of the prisoner/police cluster, and the 25
cases brought by business, landowner, or taxpayer plaintiffs, which were potentially
successful in 40% of the cases.
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Table of Constitutional Claims
Query: 1994 Federal District Court Cases
Injunction = Yes
Violations Total Claims Rejected Possible Sustained % Rej. % Poss. % Sust.
Administrative Procedural DP
Equal Protection
8th Cruel/Unusual
Freedom of Speech
SDP-Fundamental Rights
Other Constitutional Claim
Civil Procedural DP
Commerce Clause
Takings
Freedom of Association
Rationality - Property
Free Exercise
SDP-Rochin
4th Search/Seizure
6th - Effective Counsel
8th - Excessive Fines
SDP-Punitive Damages
5th - Self Incrimination
4th Excessive Force
4th Arrest
6th - Right to Fair Trial
5th - Double Jeopardy
Criminal Procedural DP
Minimal Contacts DP
Criminal Trial Violations
Establishment Clause
Freedom of Press
Federal Structure
Rationality - Liberty
5
10
3
5
6
25
15
11
11
10
8
5
4
4
3
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
6
1
5
4
1
2
3
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
105 55 34 16 52.38% 32.38% 15.24%
468
5 56.00% 24.00% 20.00%
4 33.33% 40.00% 26.67%
0 90.91% 9.09% 0.00%
3 27.27% 4545% 27.27%
1 50.00% 40.00% 10.00%
1 75.00% 12.50% 12.50%
0 60.00% 40.00% 0.00%
0 25.00% 75.00% 0.00%
0 50.00% 50.00% 0.00%
1 33.33% 33.33% 33.33%
0 66.67% 33.33% 0.00%
0 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0
0
TOTALS:
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Table 10
Table of Constitutional Claims
Query: 1994 Federal District Court Cases
Damages - Yes
Violations Total Claims Rejected Possible Sustained % Rej. % Poss. % Sust.
8th Cruel/Unusual 62 41 20 1 66.13% 32.26% 1.61%
Administrative Procedural DP 58 38 16 4 65.52% 27.59% 6.90%
Freedom of Speech 30 18 12 0 60.00% 40.00% 0.00%
4th Arrest 29 12 15 2 41.38% 51.72% 6.90%
Equal Protection 28 19 6 3 67.86% 21.43% 10.71%
Criminal Procedural DP 17 11 4 2 64.71% 23.53% 11.76%
4th Excessive Force 16 4 11 1 25.00% 68.75% 6.25%
4th Search/Seizure 16 9 5 2 56.25% 31.25% 12.50%
Other Constitutional Claim 16 14 2 0 87.50% 12.50% 0.00%
SDP-Rochin 12 5 7 0 41.67% 58.33% 0.00%
Civil Procedural DP 12 11 I 0 91.67% 8.33% 0.00%
SDP-Fundamental Rights 12 8 4 0 66.67% 33.33% 0.00%
Rationality - Property 8 4 3 1 50.00% 37.50% 12.50%
Takings 7 4 3 0 57.14% 42.86% 0.00%
6th - Effective Counsel
Freedom of Association
SDP-Punitive Damages
5th - Self Incrimination
Criminal Trial Violations
Free Exercise
Commerce Clause
6th - Right to Fair Trial
Establishment Clause
8th - Excessive Fines
Freedom of Press
Minimal Contacts DP
Rationality - Liberty
5th - Double Jeopardy
Federal Structure
3
3
2
2
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
3
2
2
2
2
1
0
0
0
0
00
0
1
0
0
0
0
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 66.67% 33.33% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 50.00% 50.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
341 213 112 16 62.46% 32.84% 4.69%TOTALS:
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1. The Constitutional Claims
a. Minimal Decency
The constitutional universe at the trial court level comprises more of the
"dark matter" and less of the "classical core" of constitutional adjudication
than does the sample at the Supreme Court. Even more than the Supreme
Court, federal trial courts administer not the high constitutional law of gov-
ernmental structure or contested social norms but the constitutional law of
what a number of commentators describe as "moral minimalism": the basic
guarantees against abusive force and arbitrary government action."
Two-thirds of the claims refer to abuses by street-level bureaucrats in
their imposition of force or criminal penalties or failure to provide minimal
due process.1 ' Indeed, claims of administrative due process violations,
which appeared in only three percent of the nonlegislative cases before the
Supreme Court, constituted the largest category of claims at the trial court
level.
Plaintiffs invoking constitutional claims in the trial courts are frequently
at the rough end of the government's monopoly on coercive violence. Of the
398 nonlegislative cases in the sample raising constitutional claims, more
than one-third, and half of the damage or injunctive cases, were brought
either by prisoners challenging their treatment while in custody or by al-
leged victims of police abuse, and almost half of these cases survived an
initial decision by a trial court.' Another quarter of the reported
nonlegislative constitutional opinions involve claims by criminal defendants,
but these challenges were more likely to be dismissed by trial courts than by
109 See infra Part IlI.B (discussing moral minimalism).
Trial courts dealt with the Commerce Clause in only six of their 667 claims. The
category of "other" claims includes four Supremacy Clause claims, four right to travel
claims, two separation of powers claims, and one Tenth Amendment claim.
110 Cases involving administrative due process, cruel and unusual punishment, crimi-
nal procedure, arrest, search, effective counsel, criminal trial, excessive force, self-in-
crimination, Rochin, double jeopardy, and fair trial comprise 64% (393/606) of the total
cases heard by federal trial courts. See infra Table 11. These categories account for
57% of the nonlegislative claims before the Supreme Court. See supra Table 7.
... Of the 166 cases brought by prisoners, 93 sought injunctions or damages, and 67
sought either relief from criminal convictions or suppression of evidence. Of the 93
cases seeking affirmative relief, 33 remained viable.
Seventy-five cases involved claims of constitutional violations by police officers;
54 sought injunctive relief or damages, of which, 34 were actual or potential claimant
victories. Of the 13 police damage cases were brought by prisoners, nine failed and four
survived.
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Table of Constitutional Claims
Query: 1994 Federal District Court Cases
Legislature = No
Violations Total Claims Rejected Possible Sustained % Rej. % Poss. % Sust.
Administrative Procedural DP 75 49 19 7 65.33% 25.33% 9.33%
8th Cruel/Unusual 70 46 21 3 65.71% 30.00% 4.29%
Criminal Procedural DP 63 48 8 7 76.19% 12.70% 11.11%
Equal Protection 41 29 6 6 70.73% 14.63% 14.63%
Freedom of Speech 36 21 13 2 58.33% 36.11% 5.56%
Other Constitutional Claim 36 32 2 2 88.89% 5.56% 5.56%
4th Arrest
4th Search/Seizure
Minimal Contacts DP
6th - Effective Counsel
Civil Procedural DP
Criminal Trial Violations
4th Excessive Force
5th - Self Incrimination
SDP-Rochin
SDP-Fundarnental Rights
5th - Double Jeopardy
Rationality - Property
6th - Right to Fair Trial
Takings
8th - Excessive Fines
Free Exercise
Freedom of Association
Commerce Clause
SDP-Punitive Damages
Establishment Clause
Freedom of Press
Rationality - Liberty
Federal Structure
33 23 6
31 17 2
27 24 2
9 5 3
8 7 0
6 5 1
2 48.48% 45.45% 6.06%
4 69.70% 18.18% 12.12%
12 54.84% 6.45% 38.71%
1 88.89% 7.41% 3.70%
3 76.00% 12.00% 12.00%
1 87.50% 8.33% 4.17%
1 29.41% 64.71% 5.88%
1 87.50% 6.25% 6.25%
0 46.67% 53.33% 0.00%
0 61.54% 38.46% 0.00%
3 66.67% 0.00% 33.33%
I 55.56% 33.33% 11.11%
1 87.50% 0.00% 12.50%
0 83.33% 16.67% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1 33.33% 33.33% 33.33%
0 66.67% 33.33% 0.00%
0 66.67% 33.33% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
606 416 131 59 68.65% 21.62% 9.74%
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the Supreme Court."'
b. Civil Rights and Liberties on the Ground
Even in areas in which values clash at a high level of generality and
political conflict in the Supreme Court, the trial courts face a more concrete
and less controversial set of applications. The trial courts' decisions focus
on discrete interactions with lower-level government entities rather than on
matters of broad policy.
i. First Amendment
First Amendment claims retain a hold on the constitutional attention of
the trial courts, although they represent a lower proportion of cases among
the nonlegislative caseload than at the Supreme Court level."' The trial
courts' First Amendment caseload outside of the legislative arena is not
characterized by the great confrontations between government and the me-
dia. Almost half of the cases involve claims by public employees alleging
retaliatory job actions for criticism of their employers, and another twenty
percent were brought by inmates challenging administrative decisions.""
The trial courts are called upon to resolve contested facts regarding
either the motivation for adverse administrative actions or the balance be-
tween administrative interests and First Amendment rights in particular
situations. This is not to say that such determinations are unimportant; the
capacity to enforce constitutional rights is what makes them real. Neverthe-
less, in announcing the resolution of these claims, the trial courts are unlike-
ly to elaborate on contested norms so as to guide future decisionmakers.
.12 The district court sample includes 67 habeas cases. in ten (15%), the claimant did
or could prevail. The sample also includes 42 cases in which criminal defendants sought
dismissal or reversal of their prosecutions. In 12 (28%), the claimant could or did pre-
vail.
"' In the trial courts, 6% (40/606) of the nonlegislative claims involve the freedoms
of speech, press, or association. Forty-two percent (17) were, or could be, sustained.
These claims comprised 12% (25/207) of the Supreme Court's nonlegislative docket, of
which 64% (16) were, or could be, sustained.
114 Public employees brought 17 of the 40 First Amendment claims, of which eight
were possible victories. Prisoners brought seven claims, two of which succeeded. The
remaining potentially successful cases include one claim of a retaliatory arrest, one
successful challenge to a rule of judicial conduct, one challenge of a denial of access to
a criminal trial, and one successful claim of a reporter's privilege asserted in response
to a discovery order.
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ii. Equal Protection
Equal protection cases represent identical proportions of nonlegislative
claims before the trial courts and the Supreme Court. The trial court claims
are substantially less successful, however,1 5 and the focus of the claims
differs from that in the cases which preoccupy the Supreme Court.
Almost three-quarters of the nonlegislative equal protection cases before
the Supreme Court involved efforts to institute a norm of racial neutrality in
the use of peremptory challenges, and in all but one of these cases, the
plaintiff succeeded." 6 Jury selection cases were largely absent from trial
court reports of constitutional decisions; only two of the forty-one equal
protection claims involved peremptory challenges, and neither of these
claims were successful.
Nonlegislative equal protection claims before the trial courts focused on
claims of unequal application of law by administrative officials. Three-quar-
ters of these cases turned on contested facts about settled norms of nondis-
crimination, and in eighty-seven percent of these, the plaintiffs failed."7
Five of the forty equal protection cases in the nonlegislative sample
brought the trial court into confrontation with administrative decisionmakers
about contested issues of social policy. Two cases involved school desegre-
gation decrees; in one, the court approved a consent decree, and in the oth-
er, the court withdrew supervision from a school district it declared to be
unitary. In two more cases, the trial courts invalidated local affirmative
action programs. In the final case, the trial court entertained an equal protec-
tion challenge to a police department's lax enforcement of criminal prohibi-
tions on domestic violence.
115 Fifteen of the 207 nonlegislative claims (6.7%) heard by the Supreme Court in-
volve equal protection, and it rejected 33%. Forty-one of the 606 nonlegislative claims
(6.7%) heard by the federal trial courts implicate equal protection, and the courts reject-
ed 70%.
116 See supra note 94.
117 Of the 41 claims, 11 involve minority plaintiffs claiming disparate administrative
treatment because of their race. Only two of these claims, a challenge to an allegedly
racially motivated arrest for shoplifting and a claim of racially motivated employment
sanctions, survived the trial courts' scrutiny.
Seventeen more claims involved administrative treatment of individual plaintiffs
that allegedly lacked minimum rationality. Only one of these claims, a successful attack
on a police policy of entertaining only the first filed of two conflicting claims of as-
sault, survived in the trial courts.
Three claims challenged alleged disparate treatment or harassment by employers on
the basis of sex; one survived trial court scrutiny.
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iii. Property Rights
Trial court activism on behalf of civil rights and liberties beyond moral
minimalism in the nonlegislative arena is limited; extrapolating from my
sample, less than 150 published First Amendment cases and less than 100
published equal protection cases involving personal rights survived initial
scrutiny in 1994.
In comparison with this record, my data suggests that a total of sixty
published "property rights" cases survived initial judicial scrutiny in 1994.
Four of the equal protection claims in the trial court sample involved alle-
gations that the administration of local business or property regulations was
so wanting in public justification as to violate the demands of minimum
rationality imposed by equal protection. Unlike cases involving legislative
enactments, where such challenges were predominantly unsuccessful, three
of the four equal protection challenges by business plaintiffs survived trial
court scrutiny. In addition, four of the seven challenges by businesses or
property owners to administrative determinations based on substantive due
process or takings allegations survived initial trial court scrutiny. Combining
equal protection and substantive property protection, six cases challenging
police power regulations survived initial scrutiny by the trial courts."8
Thus, well-represented economic claimants are apparently able to invoke
"minimum rationality" at least to press their claims in federal court with
sufficient force to tie up the resources of enforcement agencies almost as
often as individuals can raise potentially successful personal equal protection
claims.
The result should not be overstated. Challenges to administrative imple-
mentation of police power regulations survived in six cases, and one could
imagine that judges are more apt to publish cases involving business plain-
tiffs than individual claimants. It does suggest, however, that economic
claimants invoke "minimum rationality" with more prospects of success than
a review of Supreme Court practice would predict.
2. Who Wins?
The profile of cases in the nonlegislative area overall is similar in the
trial courts and in the Supreme Court; neither reveals a distinctive activism
on behalf of property holders. In both venues, cases brought by individual
rights claimants were several times as common as cases raising claims by
..8 One of the potentially successful cases raised both equal protection and substan-
tive due process property claims.
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businesses, landowners, and taxpayers." In both, there was no substantial
difference between the rates of rejection of business/landowner/taxpayer
claims and the rate of rejection of claims brought by nonprisoners outside of
those classes.
Among nonlegislative claims, however, property claimants were less
likely than individuals to prevail before the Supreme Court and more likely
than individuals to succeed before the district courts. Overall, property
claimants were proportionately more frequent in the nonlegislative docket at
the trial court than they were in the Supreme Court. This excess, however,
is accounted for by the fact that twenty-nine of the sixty-nine business, cases
before the trial courts raised due process challenges to jurisdiction based on
an absence of minimum contacts---claims that were not found among cases
before the Supreme Court.
Prisoners in both venues were substantially more likely to have their
claims rejected than other claimants. Women in both venues represented
only a fraction of the nonprisoner individual cases, although the fraction was
higher in the trial courts than in the Supreme Court. Claimants at the Su-
preme Court were eight times more likely to be male, and at the trial court
level, four times more likely. 2' In both venues, women's claims were re-
jected substantially less often than men's, and at the trial court women were
119 SUCCESS RATES IN THE 172 NONLEGISLATIVE CASES BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT
Plaintiff Cases Rejected Prevailed
ublic/Class Action 21 9 (42%) 8 (38%)
usinesses/Landowners/ 19 9 (43%) 4 (21%)
Taxpayers
Nonprisoner Individuals
Prisoners
Plaintil
Public/Class
Businesses/I
Taxp
Nonpriso
Prisoners
120
Female
Male
Female
Male
41(45%)
23 (57%)
32 (35%)
3 (7.5%)
SUCCESS RATES IN THE 398 NONLEGISLATIVE CASES BEFORE
THE DISTRICT COURTS
Cases Rejected Prevailed
Action 16 3 (18%) 8 (50%)
Landowners/ 69 37 (53%) 12 (17%)
tayers
ner Individuals 152 81(53%) 18 (11%)
166 122 (73%) 8 (5%)
NONPRISONER CASES IN WHICH PARTIES ARE IDENTIFIABLE BY SEX
Supreme Court
Total Rejected Prevailed
10 4 (40%) 2 (20%)
78 31(38%) 35 (43%)
District Court
Total Rejected Prevailed
31 6 (19%) 13 (41%)
124 15 (12%) 70 (56%)
Pt
B'
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more likely to prevail.
3. Nonlegislative Decisionmakers in the Trial Courts
a. The Parallels: Administrative and Judicial Decisions
At the trial court level, the proportion of challenged nonlegislative deci-
sions was nearly double the proportion at the Supreme Court level. The
difference, however, came almost exclusively from the prevalence of cases
challenging the decisions of officials and police. The trial court sample and
the Supreme Court cases contained virtually identical percentages of judicial
and administrative decisions.
The subject matter of the trial court and Supreme Court cases also re-
sembled each other where the cases challenged judicial and administrative
actions. Differences arose in only two areas. First, the trial court challenges
to administrative action showed a far greater incidence of administrative due
process challenges and damage actions. Second, the most successful chal-
lenges in the judicial category at the trial court level claimed a lack of mini-
mum contacts, a contention entirely absent before the Supreme Court.
i. Administrative Agencies
In large measure, the substance of the district court claims in the sample
challenging administrative agency decisions tracked the distribution at the
Supreme Court, with one major exception."' Claims of failure of adminis-
trative due process, which appeared in three of the fifty-one cases before the
Supreme Court, generated almost half of the challenges to the administrative
actions before the trial courts.'22 From the evidence in this sample, the
1 As at the Supreme Court level, assertion of the rights of free speech and equal
protection account for a substantial proportion of claims. Before the trial courts, howev-
er, the incidence of free speech claims is much lower, and both claimant classes were
somewhat less likely to succeed.
Challenges to administrative actions under the Takings Clause and other constitu-
tional property protections accounted for four of the 51 administrative legislative claims
before the Supreme Court and nine (9%) of the 101 claims before the trial courts.
Federal agencies were more likely than state or local agencies to prevail at both the
trial court and Supreme Court levels, but all agencies were more likely to prevail in the
trial courts than the Supreme Court:
AGENCIES' SUCCESS RATE
Federal State Local
Supreme Court 66% (10/55) 35% (6/17) 30% (4/13)
District Courts 82% (19/23) 56% (17/30) 39% (9/23)
" At the Supreme Court level, 5.8% (3/51) of the claims against administrative
bodies raised due process challenges. At the trial court level, 44% (44/101) of the cases
claimed a lack of procedural due process. The proportion of due process challenges was
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most prevalent role of judicial review of administrative agencies is to con-
fine the range of procedurally arbitrary exercises of authority.
District court cases differed from Supreme Court cases in the relatively
greater prevalence of damage actions. Cases precipitated by administrative
decisions sought damages at the trial court level more than four times as
often as cases before the Supreme Court.'23
consistent across levels of government: federal agencies, 40% (11/27); state agencies,
45% (20/44); nonprisoner state agency, 42% (14/33); and local agency, 40% (14/35).
'" In the district courts, 56% (41/72) of the claimants sought damages; in the Su-
preme Court, the ratio was 6/45 (13%).
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Table of Constitutional Claims
Query: 1994 Federal District Court Cases
Administrative Body = Yes
Violations Total Claims Rejected Possible Sustained % Rej. % Poss. % Sust.
Administrative Procedural DP 44 27 10 7 61.36% 22.73% 15.91%
Equal Protection 15 7 3 5 46.67% 20.00% 33.33%
Freedom of Speech II 5 4 2 45.45% 36.36% 18.18%
Rationality - Property 6 3 2 1 50.00% 33.33% 16.67%
SDP-Fundamental Rights 4 2 2 0 50.00% 50.00% 0.00%
Criminal Procedural DP 4 4 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Takings 3 2 1 0 66.67% 33.33% 0.00%
Other Constitutional Claim 3 3 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Civil Procedural DP 2 0 1 1 0.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Commerce Clause 2 1 1 0 50.00% 50.00% 0.00%
SDP-Punitive Damages 2 2 0 0 100.00% 0.06% 0.00%
8th Cruel/Unusual 2 1 1 0 50.00% 50.00% 0.00%
5th - Self Incrimination 2 2 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
4th Arrest 1 1 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Minimal Contacts DP 0 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Establishment Clause 0 0 0 0 0.00% '0.00% 0.00%
Freedom of Press 0 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Freedom of Association 0 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Free Exercise
SDP-Rochin
4th Excessive Force
Rationality - Liberty
6th - Effective Counsel
8th - Excessive Fines
6th - Right to Fair Trial
5th - Double Jeopardy
Criminal Trial Violations
Federal Structure
4th Search/Seizure
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
101 60 25 16 59.41% 24.75%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
15.84%TOTALS:
1997] 479EXPLORING THE DARK MATIER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Table 13
Table of Constitutional Claims
Query: Supreme Court Cases
Administrative Body = Yes
Violations Total Claims Rejected Possible Sustained % Rej. % Poss. % Sust.
Freedom of Speech 11 3 3 5 27.27% 27.27% 45.45%
Equal.Protection 9 3 3 3 33.33% 33.33% 33.33%
Takings 4 2 1 1 50.00% 25.00% 25.00%
Commercial Speech 3 1 0 2 33.33% 0.00% 66.67%
Administrative Procedural DP 3 1 1 I 33.33% 33.33% 33.33%
Other Constitutional Claim 3 2 0 1 66.67% 0.00% 33.33%
8th Cruel/Unusual 2 0 1 1 0.00% 50.00% 50.00%
Establishment Clause 2 1 0 1 50.00% 0.00% 50.00%
Civil Procedural DP 2 I I 0 50.00% 50.00% 0.00%
Separation of Powers 2 2 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
4th Search/Seizure 2 1 1 0 50.00% 50.00% 0.00%
Commerce Clause 2 1 0 1 50.00% 0.00% 50.00%
SDP-Fundamental Rihts I I 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Federal Structure
8th - Death Penalty
4th Arrest
SDP-Rochin
SDP-Punitive Damages
Criminal Trial Violations
Freedom of Association
Freedom of Press
Free Exercise
Minimal Contacts DP
4th Excessive Force
Rationality - Property
8th - Excessive Fines
5th - Double Jeopardy
6th - Right to Fair Trial
Rationality - Liberty
5th - Self Incrimination
6th - Effective Counsel
Criminal Procedural DP
1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
51 23 11 17 45.10% 21.57% 33.33%TOTALS:
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Table of Constitutional Claims
Query: 1994 Federal District Court Cases
Judicial = Yes
Violations Total Claims Rejected Possible Sustained % Rej. % Poss. % Sust.
Criminal Procedural DP
Minimal Contacts DP
6th - Effective Counsel
Other Constitutional Claim
Criminal Trial Violations
Civil Procedural DP
Equal Protection
5th - Self Incrimination
8th Cruel/Unusual
5th - Double Jeopardy
6th - Right to Fair Trial
Freedom of Sneech
4th Arrest
4th Search/Seizure
8th - Excessive Fines
SDP-Rochin
Takings
Administrative Procedural DP
Commerce Clause
Free Exercise
Establishment Clause
Freedom of Press
Freedom of Association
Rationality - Property
4th Excessive Force
SDP-Fundamental Rights
SDP-Punitive Damages
Federal Structure
31 17 2 12
25 22 2 1
23 20 1 2
22 19 2 1
14 11 1 2
9 9 0 0
9 8 0 1
3 2 1 0
3 3 0 0
2 2 0 0
1 0 0
I 0 0
Rationality - Liberty 0 0 0 0
81.82% 9.09%
54.84% 6.45%
88.00% 8.00%
86.96% 4.35%
86.36% 9.09%
78.57% 7.14%
100.00% 0.00%
88.89% 0.00%
75.00% 12.50%
62.50% 0.00%
85.71% 0.00%
80.00% 0.00%
100.00% 0.00%
66.67% 33.33%
100.00% 0.00%
100.00% 0.00%
100.00% 0.00%
100.00% 0.00%
100.00% 0.00%
100.00% 0.00%
100.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 100.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00%
224 179 15 30 79.91% 6.70% 13.39%
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Table 14
9.09%
38.71%
4.00%
8.70%
4.55%
14.29%
0.00%
11.11%
12.50%
37.50%
14.29%
20.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
100.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
............ r .........
TOTALS:
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Table of Constitutional Claims
Query: Supreme Court Cases
Judicial = Yes
Violations Total Claims Rejected Possible Sustai
Criminal Procedural DP 35 14 10
8th - Death Penalty 16 9 2
6th - Right to Fair Trial 10 4 3
Civil Procedural DP 9 4 1
Other Constitutional Claim 6 5 0
5th - Double Jeonardv 6 5 0
SDP-Rochin
Freedom of Press
Freedom of Speech
SDP-Punitive Damages
Equal Protection
6th - Effective Counsel
Freedom of Association
8th Cruel/Unusual
Commerce Clause
5th - Self Incrimination
Senaration of Powers
Federal Structure
Minimal Contacts DP
Establishment Clause
Commercial Speech
Free Exercise
Administrative Procedural DP
SDP-Fundamental Rights
4th Arrest
4th Search/Seizure
Rationality - Liberty
8th - Excessive Fines
Rationality - Property
Takings
Criminal Trial Violations
4th Excessive Force
TOTALS:
3
3
3
1
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0-
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
ned % Rej. % Poss. % Sust.
I 1 40.00% 28.57% 31.43%
5 56.25% 12.50% 31.25%
3 40.00% 30.00% 30.00%
4 44.44% 11.11% 44.44%
I 83.33% 0.00% 16.67%
1 83.33% 0.00% 16.67%
1 75.00% 0.00% 25.00%
0 33.33% 66.67% 0.00%
3 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
1 66.67% 0.00% 33.33%
3 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
0 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
1 50.00% 0.00% 50.00%
0 50.00% 50.00% 0.00%
1 0.00% 0.00%. 100.00%
1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.000/0 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
110 51 22 37 46.36% 20.00% 33.64%
............ if-- --d
-- r ..............
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ii. Judicial Determinations
In both samples, challenges rooted in criminal procedure accounted for
more than half of the claims challenging judicial determinations, although
the trial courts rejected a far higher percentage of these challenges than did
the Supreme Court. At the Supreme Court level, Eighth Amendment chal-
lenges to the imposition of the death penalty accounted for fifteen percent of
the claims, while such cases were rare in the trial courts. By contrast, the
most successful class of claims in the trial court sample-accounting for
twelve of the thirty successful assertions of constitutional rights-was chal-
lenges to an assertion of personal jurisdiction based on the "minimum con-
tacts" requirement of due process. This class was virtually absent at the
Supreme Court level.
b. The Divergence: Street-Level Bureaucrats, Prisoners, and the Police
As noted above, claims challenging the actions of street-level bureau-
crats under the Constitution were far more prevalent in the trial court sample
than at the Supreme Court level.12 Most of these cases were brought
against police officers and prison officials. This fact highlights a distinctive
and dominant role of constitutional adjudication in the federal trial courts, a
role somewhat obscured from view when Supreme Court decisions are the
principal unit of analysis: federal trial courts predominately deploy consti-
tutional norms of decent treatment against street-level bureaucrats authorized
to use coercive violence.
i. Individual Officials and Prisoners
Eighteen percent of the Supreme Court's cases challenged actions by
individual officials other than police. More than half of these cases focused
on fact-intensive challenges to alleged abuses in the deployment of coercive
force or criminal justice."z The plurality of claims were not resolved as a
matter of law on appeal but remained open for resolution on remand.'1
In the trial court sample, the incidence of individual official claims was
substantially higher, accounting for forty-five percent of the trial court cases.
The focus of constitutional inquiry, however, was similar. As at the Su-
preme Court, approximately half of the 185 trial court claims challenging
actions by individual officials involved physical coercion or criminal justice
issues, but a higher proportion of the claims (30%) challenged alleged cruel
'u See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
1 Three of the equal protection claims also focused on challenges to racially biased
peremptory challenges.
126 In the 13 of the 30 cases, the Court left open the possibility that the claimant
could prevail.
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Table 16
Table of Constitutional Claims
Query: Supreme Court Cases
Individual Official = Yes
Violations Total Claims Rejected Possible Sustained % Rej. % Poss. % Sust
Criminal Procedural DP
SDP-Rochin
8th Cruel/Unusual
Equal Protection
Administrative Procedural DP
5th - Self Incrimination
Freedom of Speech
4th Search/Seizure
Other Constitutional Claim
6th - Effective Counsel
6th - Right to Fair Trial
SDP-Fundamental Rights
Cnmmpsrpin rnPech
Federal Structure
Freedom of Association
Freedom of Press
Establishment Clause
Free Exercise
Civil Procedural DP
Minimal Contacts DP
4th Excessive Force
Commerce Clause
8th - Death Penalty
2 0 2 0
1 0 1 0
1 I 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
o.L-r n v aJWrnarcsV
4th Arrest
Separation of Powers
Takings
Rationality- Property
Rationality - Liberty
5th - Double Jeopardy
8th - Excessive Fines
Criminal Trial Violations
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
36 9 21 6 25.00% 58.33%
14.29% 71.43% 14.29%
50.00% 50.00% 0.00%
0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
40.00% 0.00% 60.00%
25.00% 50.00% 25.00%
33.33% 33.33% 33.33%
0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00/0
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.000/0
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
L= - - - -Commercial S ech
16.67%TOTALS:
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Table of Constitutional Claims
1994 Federal District Court Case$
Individual Official = Yes
Total Claims Rejected Possible Sustained % Rej. % Poss. % Sust.
8th Cruel/Unusual 57
Administrative Procedural DP 30
Freedom of Speech 19
Equal Protection 14
SDP-Fundamental Rights 10
Criminal Procedural DP 8
SDP-Rochin 8
Other Constitutional Claim 6
Civil Procedural DP 5
4th Arrest 5
4th Search/Seizure 5
4th Excessive Force 3
Rationality - Property 3
8th - Excessive Fines 2
Freedom of Association 2
Takings 2
Free Exercise 2
5th - Self Incrimination I
5th - Double Jeopardy I
6th - Effective Counsel I
Establishment Clause I
SDP-Punitive Damages 0
Freedom of Press 0
Federal Structure 0
Minimal Contacts DP 0
Rationality - Liberty 0
Commerce Clause 0
6th - Right to Fair Trial 0
Criminal Trial Violations 0
38
19
10
11
7
4
3
6
5
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
17
I!
9
2
3
2
5
0
0
3
1
2
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2 66.67% 29.82% 3.51%
0 63.33% 36.67% 0.00%
0 52.63% 47.37% 0.00%
1 78.57% 14.29% 7.14%
0 70.00% 30.00% 0.00%
2 50.00% 25.00% 25.00%
0 37.50% 62.50% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 40.00% 60.00% 0.00%
2 40.00% 20.00% 40.00%
0 33.33% 66.67% 0.00%
0 66.67% 33.33% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1 0.00% 50.00% 50.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
57 8 64.86% 30.81% 4.32%
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and unusual punishment. 27 Issues of administrative due process, which ac-
counted for less than ten percent of the individual cases in the Supreme
Court (3/33), were somewhat more common at the trial court level, account-
ing for sixteen percent (30/185) of their cases. Additionally, 166 of the 185
trial court claimants sought damages.
The most substantial difference between the Supreme Court and the trial
court was the identity of the claimants. At the trial court level, a preponder-
ant role of federal judicial review is to provide prisoners a forum in which
they may assert their right to minimally decent physical treatment. Two-
thirds (77/121) of the cases alleging individual official misconduct in the
trial courts were brought by prisoners, compared with one-third (10/33) at
the Supreme Court level.'2
This preponderance of prisoner litigation in the trial sample corresponds
with other observations of the federal court system. Prisoner litigation has
constituted a growing part of the federal trial court docket over the last
decade. Between 1984 and 1994, prisoner civil rights cases and habeas peti-
tions increased from one-tenth to almost one-fifth of the federal civil dock-
et. 29 During the same period, the number of prisoner civil rights cases in-
creased from 18,375 (7.07%) to 33,933 (14.36%) at a time when the total
number of federal civil cases declined slightly. 3° This growth in prisoner
litigation is largely attributable to the growth in the American prison popula-
tion. Despite a varying rate of litigation per prisoner from district to district,
the overall rate of civil rights litigation per prisoner has remained roughly
constant over the last two decades.
1 31
17 Only 13% of the Supreme Court cases raised Eighth Amendment conditions-of-
confinement challenges. A much higher proportion of the individual claims were reject-
ed outright by the trial courts (64% rejected by the trial courts; 24% by the Supreme
Court).
' Constitutional claims of prisoners were most likely to assert misconduct by indi-
vidual officials (77 cases), police (18 cases), or administrative agencies (12 cases), or
challenge judicial determinations (67 cases). The prevalence of prisoner claims was
particularly pronounced (89/106, or 83%) in cases involving individual state defendants.
Local indiyidual official violations had an incidence more comparable to that at the
Supreme Court (17/54, or 31%). Nonprisoner cases, like prisoner cases, clustered
around norms regarding fair procedure (11/73, with 72% rejected), the use of violence
(16/73, with 31% rejected) and the First Amendment (14/73, with 46% rejected).
'29 THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION 534 (4th ed. 1996).
130 See Robert G. Doumar, Prisoner Cases: Feeding the Monster in the Judicial
Closet, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 21, 23 (1994).
131 Professor Eisenberg observes that the rate of prisoner filings in the federal courts
has remained stable nationally, with between six and seven thousand filings per hundred
thousand prisoners over the last twenty years. EISENBERG, supra note 129, at 535; see
also ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K. DALEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHALLENG-
ING TiE CONDITION OF PRISONS & JAILS: A REPORT ON SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 2-3
(1995) (noting a constant annual rate of 1 lawsuit for every 30 inmates).
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Although there is no shortage of articles by frustrated judges and judi-
cial administrators remarking on these trends,'32 few national accounts sys-
tematically address the nature of prisoner civil rights litigation.'33 What we
do know is embodied in studies of litigation in particular districts. In one
early study of prisoner litigation in five districts, the most frequent claims
alleged a failure to provide adequate medical care, denials of access to
courts, property loss, disciplinary procedures, and guard harassment or bru-
tality.' 34 More recent studies of district court filings in particular districts
continue to show a plurality of medical treatment cases, followed by disci-
plinary complaints and assertions of failure to protect from fellow inmates
or guard brutality. 135 A study of a large sample of cases disposed of in
This stability masks substantial temporal variation from district to district. See
Note, Resolving Prisoners' Grievances Out of Court: 42 U.S.C. § 1997e,104 HARV.
L.REv. 1309, 1315, 1329 (1991) (reviewing trends in civil rights filings per prisoner in
nine states from 1978 to 1990: Virginia rates began at 17.6/100 and ended at 7.1/100;
Iowa rates began at 4.6/100 and ended at 12.4/100; North Carolina rates began at
3.0/100 and ended at 3.1/100). In contrast, statewide rankings of the rates of prisoner
lawsuits have remained relatively constant. HANSON & DALEY, supra, at.2.
My calculations, based on statistics from the Administrative Office, put the rate in
the same range as that reported by Hanson and Daley, slightly lower than that reported
by Eisenberg, but still constant: in 1980, 13,495 prisoner claims/493,815 prisoners
(.026); in 1987, 23,297 claims/880,957 prisoners (.026); in 1993, 33,018 claims/
1,408,685 prisoners (.023). See Doumar, supra note 130, at 23 (prisoner cases); NA-
TIONAL CENTER ON INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND ALTERNATIVES, THE REAL WAR ON
CRIME 34 (Steven Donziger ed., 1996) (prison populations).
132 E.g. Doumar, supra note 130, at 21; FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RECOMMENDED
PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURT
(1980); Carl B. Rubin, Section 1983: A Limited Access Highway, 52 U. CIN. L. REV.
977 (1983).
133 The most systematic survey of constitutional tort litigation, which was conducted
by Eisenberg and Schwab (surveying filings in three districts representing 8% of the
federal civil filings for the year 1981), noted the large proportion of constitutional tort
cases represented by prisoner plaintiffs (626 prisoners; 509 nonprisoners) as well as the
relatively low success rate for prisoners (82% rejected by courts as opposed to 50% for
nonprisoners). Eisenberg & Schwab, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation, supra
note 63, at 733 (1988). Eisenberg and Schwab do not, however, report the nature of the
claims raised by the prisoners.
13 William Bennett Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983
Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610, 661 (1979). Claims for denial of
medical care accounted for a fifth or more of the total claims filed in four of five dis-
tricts. Cf. William Wayne Justice, The Origins of Ruiz v. Estelle, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1,
3-5 (1990) (noting that prisoner complaints fall into four main areas: brutality, medical
care, overcrowding, and summary discipline).
"' Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prison Civil Rights Cases and the Provision of
Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417, 457 (1993) (finding that in 937 cases drawn from court
records in three districts in 1991, medical complaints represented 14% of the cases in
the federal court for the Eastern District of Montana, 21% in the Southern District of
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1992 in sixteen districts found that more than half of the prisoner civil
rights cases concerned medical treatment, physical security, or due pro-
cess." In each of the district studies, the percentage of prisoner cases that
were dismissed or rejected by the courts was quite high, and almost always
greater than two-thirds. Moreover, the proportion in which relief was ob-
tained by the prisoner was quite low, never exceeding twenty percent. 137
Illinois, and 16% in the Eastern District of Arkansas; discipline complaints represented
19% of the cases in the Montana district court, 21% in the Illinois court, and 9% in the
Arkansas court; and failure to protect/excessive force complaints represented 12% in the
Montana district court, 15% in the Illinois court, and 23% in the Arkansas court); Kim
Mueller, Comment, Inmates' Civil Rights Cases and the Federal Courts: Insights De-
rived from a Field Research Project in the Eastern District of California, 28
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1255 (1995) (sampling 42 cases drawn from those filed in 1991 in
the federal court for the Eastern District of California and noting that ten of these cases
involve medical care, six involve discipline, and 11 involve guard brutality or a failure
to protect).
136 HANSON & DALEY, supra note 131, at 17. Of the 4481 claims made in 2700
cases, 17% concerned medical treatment, 21% concerned physical security, and 13%
concerned due process.
137 Id. at 19. A case sample of 4481 cases showed that 94% of prisoner civil rights
cases were dismissed by the courts, 4% resolved by stipulated dismissal, and less than
half of the 2% of cases tried resulted in plaintiffs' verdicts. Id. at 36.
Eisenberg found that in a sample of 937 cases from 1991, 5% of the prisoner cases
in the federal court for the Eastern District of Montana were settled, and 8% were vol-
untarily dismissed, with 65% being dismissed before trial. Eisenberg, supra note 135, at
458. In the federal court for the Southern District of Illinois, 1% of the prisoner cases
were settled, 3% were voluntarily dismissed, and 76% were dismissed by the courts
before trial. Id. In the federal court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, 6% were set-
tled, 16% were voluntarily dismissed, and 52% were dismissed by the courts before
trial. Id.
In their three district study of 626 prisoner cases from 1980 to 1981, Eisenberg and
Schwab found that 18% of the prisoner cases were potentially successful (with 1% of
these succeeding at trial), and 82% were dismissed by the courts at or before trial. The-
odore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal Court
System?, 56 U CHI. L. REV. 501, 525 (1989); Eisenberg & Schwab, Explaining Consti-
tutional Tort Litigation, supra note 63, at 729.
In a 42 case sample of prisoner litigation filed in the Eastern District of California
during 1992, Mueller reported that six (14%) obtained monetary relief by trial or settle-
ment, and seven others (17%) survived pretrial dismissals. Mueller, supra note 135, at
1284. Turner, in his sample of 664 cases, found only 15 instances of equitable relief
and two successful damage actions, but did not report the incidence of settlements.
Turner, supra note 134, at 624.
Most recently, Judge Robert Doumar of the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk
Division, reported that in his court, of the 442 prisoner civil rights cases closed in the
1993-1994 term, only two cases recorded monetary settlements, and one case received a
nominal damage verdict. Three other cases went to trial unsuccessfully. Judge Doumar
did not report voluntary dismissals. Doumar, supra note 130, at 36.
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None of the studies disaggregated the rates of success by the nature of the
prisoners' claims.
In my 1994 trial court sample, prisoners who sued over allegedly uncon-
stitutional conduct by individual officials most often (in 71 out of 77 cases)
tendered claims for damages. 38 In fourteen cases, plaintiffs sought injunc-
tive relief as well; in two cases, injunctive relief alone was at issue. Among
the damage actions, more than two-thirds (53/77) involved claims of cruel
and unusual punishment. As one might expect from anecdotal reports of
prisoner litigation and prior local studies, the bulk of such claims were re-
jected.139
The rate of rejection, however, varied among the types of claims.
Archetypally frivolous claims were represented in the sample of claims of
cruel and unusual punishment, 14 and such claims were uniformly dis-
missed by the courts. More than half of the Eighth Amendment cases, how-
ever, involved allegations of serious physical impositions on prison-
ers--either denials of medical treatment (21 cases) or physical assaults by
guards (9) or other prisoners (5). Among these cases, the prisoner rate of
rejection was comparable to the rates in other civil rights areas.
Among claims of denial of medical treatment, the five cases involving
serious injury or threat to health all survived initial judicial scrutiny,14 1 and
the sixteen rejected cases involved arguably minor physical ailments.'42
Similarly, of the fourteen cases in the sample alleging stabbing, beating, and
138 Such cases represented the bulk of the 102 non-habeas cases brought by prisoners
in the district court sample.
139 In 32 of the damage cases (61%), the courts rejected the plaintiffs' claims of cruel
and unusual punishment; they also rejected eight injunction claims (80%). Among pris-
oner damage actions as a group, in 64% (57/89) of the cases, the courts rejected all of
the plaintiffs' claims, and among injunctive actions, 75% (16/20) of the decisions were
for the defendants.
14 One plaintiff, for example, claimed that prison officials had engaged in telepathic
mind control; another viewed the loss of his chess set as cruel and unusual punishment.
141 Those cases involved an untreated abscess, denial of back surgery, failure to order
a biopsy for a breast lump, denial of care resulting in a fatal heart attack, and refusal to
treat "numbing pain."
142 The complaints included a sprained ankle, a badly capped tooth, scabies, back
pain, an earache, delay in setting a broken finger, and hemorrhoids. Although most of
these ailments can be excruciating, it is difficult for courts to determine whether the
alleged pain is being feigned.
As a practical matter, therefore, the pattern of results in this sample is not far from
the proposition advanced by Justice Thomas in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 17-29
(1992) (Thomas, J. dissenting), that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause does not
protect against pain unaccompanied by lasting physical injury. It suggests as well that
the provision of the 1996 Prison Litigation Reform Act barring actions "for mental or
emotional injury ... without a prior showing of physical injury," 42 U.S.C. 1997e(e), is
unlikely to have substantial effect in the area of Eighth Amendment suits.
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other serious physical abuse by guards and fellow prisoners, ten survived
initial or intermediate judicial evaluation, and two were tried, with findings
for the prisoner plaintiffs. 143 An additional nineteen prisoner cases filed
against individual officials sought relief from alleged violations of procedur-
al due process. Again, almost half of these claims (42%) survived.
What does this tell us about the role that lower federal courts play in
prison administration? Aside from the potential therapeutic effects of access
to courts, even where cases are dismissed before litigation on the merits,4 4
federal courts seem most likely to address the claims of prisoners alleging a
disregard of minimum standards of physical decency resulting in palpable
physical injury. Whether plaintiffs ultimately prevail, at least in published
cases, it is prisoners claiming damages for substantial physical abuse who
seem able to invoke the attention of federal courts.'45 Federal courts stood
relatively ready, as well, to consider claims of failures to abide by the mini-
mal requirements of due process in prison discipline and maintenance."
143 In Devon v. Keane, 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13692 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1994), the
jury awarded a total of $32,550 where prisoners alleged being beaten in restraints and
made to run a gauntlet of guards, but the trial court ordered a new trial. In Davis v.
Moss, 841 F. Supp. 1193 (M.D. Ga. 1994) the jury awarded $35,000 because a guard
threw a handcuffed prisoner down a fire escape.
My data is consistent with the observation by Daley and Hanson that among their
sample of 1992 cases, 45% of the cases that settled (where the terms of the settlement
are reflected in the files) involved the physical security of inmates, as did the three
plaintiffs' verdicts with specified awards. HANSON & DALEY, supra note 131, at 36-37.
Daley and Hanson report that the plaintiffs' verdicts ranged from $10,000 to $40,000.
Id.
14 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 439-41 (arguing that unsuccessful suits
may have beneficial effects both in bringing grievances to the attention of officials and
allowing inmates to retain an opportunity for interactions in which they are treated with
respect); Eisenberg & Schwab, Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, supra note 63,
at 676 (suggesting that the fact that an officer is sued, albeit unsuccessfully, may pro-
vide some specific deterrence).
145 See HANSON & DALEY, supra note 131, at 28-29, 36-37 (finding that cases in-
volving physical security of inmates are most likely the prisoner cases that involve
longer and more extensive judicial proceedings and are those most likely to result in
judicial relief).
My sample contained 93 prisoner civil rights cases seeking damages or injunctive
relief. Of these, twenty-one were medical claims, of which five were serious. This is
consistent with other district court studies suggesting that 20% of prisoner claims in-
volve alleged denials of medical treatment. Also in my sample, 14 of the 93 cases in-
volved serious physical abuse. This is comparable to the Hanson and Daley rate of 21%
for "physical security." HANSON & DALEY, supra note 131, at 17.
1 The recently adopted amendments to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) which preclude prison-
er actions for "mental or emotional injury ... without a showing of physical injury", if
held to apply to due process claims, combined with the narrowing of the scope of due
process requirements for prisoners in Sandin v. Conner, 115 S.Ct 2293 (1995), may
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When compared with a prison population of 1.5 million in 1994,"4"
rough calculations suggest that the proportion of the prison population
whose efforts to obtain individual relief from federal courts are seriously
considered is probably between four and seven prisoners out of every thou-
sand.'48
The courts' role in these cases is almost wholly retrospective and horta-
tory; damages are sought but substantial sums are rarely awarded. The most
optimistic interpretation of this outcome is to hope that the prospect of ulti-
mate review in a damage action by a judge outside of the closed institution-
al culture of corrections provides a mediating influence on the decision to
apply or sanction brutality or physical abuse. The pessimistic version is that
the largely symbolic availability of a toothless remedy allows judges to
legitimate brutal prison regimes.
Entertaining individual cases is not necessarily the most important feder-
al judicial intervention in America's correctional system, though it is clearly
the most frequent. Although the incidence of class action civil rights cases
in the federal trial courts has declined to only one-tenth of what it was in
the late 1970s,'49 in 1993, almost one-third of local jails, forty states, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands were under court
orders to eliminate unconstitutional prison conditions. 5 ' These cases do
not make up a large fraction of reported opinions. In the six years of Su-
preme Court decisions surveyed, only two cases involved a prisoner class
action."' In the 1994 sample, only two cases of the 431 trial court cases
involved class action challenges by prisoners, and a more intensive search of
well portend the constriction of due process actions.
147 See REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 131, at 34 (noting that 1.54 million prison-
ers were incarcerated in state and federal prisons and local jails in 1994).
14' The "four" figure was calculated using Eisenberg and Schwab's 18% possible
success rate (.18 x 33,000 prisoner cases = 5940 / 1.5 million prisoners = .004). The
"seven" figure was calculated using the higher 33% rate in my sample. See Eisenberg &
Schwab, supra note 137, at 525.
141 See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J.
2619, 2630 (1995) (tracking the decline of class actions reported filed in federal courts
as "civil rights class actions" from 1837 actions in 1977 to 169 in 1990).
Within the search parameters I used to identify constitutional claims in 1994, I
identified 110 .class actions in Lexis-reported federal district court cases: 21 prisoner
class actions, 19 class actions on behalf of social entitlement recipients, 13 employment
class actions, 9 police abuse class actions, 8 election class actions, 7 school class ac-
tions, 6 custodial institution class actions, and 27 others.
" Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 639, 641 (1993).
151 Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996) (holding, inter alia, that alleged inadequa-
cies in a prison law library did not act to deny an inmate's access to the courts); Rufo
v. Inmates of Suffolk Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992) (remanding a case involving a sheriff's
request to modify a consent decree which required the construction of a new jail).
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all 1994 Lexis cases unearthed the incidence rate predicted by my one-in-ten
sample: twenty-one opinions involving class litigation by prisoners.
Yet if each of the twenty-one reported class actions affected two thou-
sand inmates,' the number of prisoners affected by the relief at issue in
class actions far outweighs the number of published individual prisoner
cases in the federal district courts in 1994 and equals or exceeds the total
number of cases filed by all prisoners in the federal trial courts.'53 More-
over, the impact of such cases greatly exceeds the number of successful
individual claims. Individual prisoner claims involving damage actions were
rejected in more than two-thirds of the cases in the sample, and claims seek-
ing injunctive relief failed in more than three-quarters of the cases. By con-
trast, only three of the twenty-one reported 1994 class action cases involved
outright rejections of constitutional claims.'
Class litigation is thus clearly a more efficient means of bringing judi-
cial scrutiny to bear on potentially oppressive prison conditions. What it
lacks, however, is the potential for individual vindication; the existence of a
pending class action, or the threat that some representative action may occur
in the future, does not necessarily give the individual prisoner a sense that
someone outside of the institution will listen to his (and it usually is
"his"' 55) complaint. As Dean Eisenberg comments,
152 Few of the cases explicitly report the number of inmates at issue, although Small
v. Hunt, 858 F. Supp. 510 (N.C. 1994), affd, 98 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 1996), refers to
30,000 inmates subject to the decree and Coleman v. Wilson, No.CV-S-90-0520, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20786 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 1994), affid, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal.
1995), appeal dismissed, 101 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 1996), granted relief covering the pro-
vision of mental health services to inmates in all of California's prisons.
153 Prisoners filed 73 damage and injunctive actions in the trial court sample, which
suggests less than a thousand cases generating published opinions in 1994. According to
the Administrative Office, prisoners filed a total of 33,933 civil rights actions in 1994.
MECHAM, supra note 63, at 142 tbl. C-2A.
'" Whether this rate of success survives the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996
depends in large measure on how the courts interpret the statutory mandate that
"[p]rospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no
further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plain-
tiff plaintiffs," and the mandate that relief be "narrowly drawn, extend[] no further than
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means
necessary." 18 U.S.C. § 3636(a)(1)(A) (1994).
15' Women constitute roughly 6.6% of the incarcerated population in the United
States (100,000/1.5 million including jails and 64,403/1.05 million excluding jails).
REAL WAR ON CRIME, supra note 131, at 147. From my sample, it appears that women
are also less likely than men to seek relief in the federal courts. Women were plaintiffs
in 4 of the 166 cases (2.4%) in the trial court sample. This result accords with conven-
tual wisdom. See, e.g., Ellen M. Barry, Jail Litigation Concerning Women Prisoners, 71
PRISON J. 44 (1991).
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Sometimes the real "relief' sought by the prisoner is neither
money damages, an injunction, nor a declaration of rights by
a federal court but simply being treated in a more humane
and less cavalier manner. In a number of cases the prisoner
actually obtains substantially the relief he seeks, not through
the order of the court, but simply because some responsive
person has seen the complaint after litigation was filed."s
Class litigation, as currently practiced, does not give inmates an opportunity
to be heard as individuals.1
57
ii. Police Litigation
For most citizens, the most common interaction with visible government
authority comes in the form of contact with the police. Certainly, when
compiling a list of officials who are in a position to violate minimal claims
of constitutional duty, police rank high. Yet, at the Supreme Court level,
challenges to police conduct appear in only twenty-four cases (8.2%) claim-
ing constitutional violations, and of these, seventeen arise from the criminal
justice system. Two were habeas challenges and fifteen were efforts to re-
verse criminal convictions.
At the trial court level, the picture is quite different. Claims of constitu-
tional violations in published opinions involve police almost twice as often.
Seventy-five cases, or 17.5% of the sample, alleged constitutional violations
by police. Moreover, although the bulk of the Supreme Court's consider-
ation of police actions arise in the context of criminal proceedings, fifty-four
of those seventy-five cases (72%) at the federal trial level involve damage
136 Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 439 (footnote omitted).
Il' The Supreme Court's increasing skepticism regarding prisoner class actions in
Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996), combined with the Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1996 Supp.), which effectively eliminates consent de-
crees as binding resolutions of prison condition cases, suggests that class litigation may
further recede as a means of potential relief.
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Table of Constitutional Claims
1994 Federal District Court Cases
Police = Yes
Violations Total Claims Rejected Possible Sustained
4th Search/Seizure 27 20 5 2
4th Arrest 27 11 14 2
4th Excessive Force 17 5 11 1
Criminal Procedural DP 12 8 2 2
Equal Protection
SDP-Rochin
8th Cruel/Unusual
Criminal Trial Violations
6th - Effective Counsel
5th - Self Incrimination
Other Constitutional Claim
Freedom of Speech
Civil Procedural DP
Administrative Procedural DP
6th - Right to Fair Trial
Rationality - Property
Freedom of Association
Freedom of Press
Establishment Clause
Free Exercise
Minimal Contacts DP
Federal Structure
Rationality - Liberty
Commerce Clause
SDP-Punitive Damages
Takings
8th - Excessive Fines
5th - Double Jeopardy
SDP-Fundamental Rights
7 4
7 3
6 4
5 5
4 4
4 3
4 3
4 2
3 2
2 2
1 1
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 00 0
0 0
4 0
2 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
% Rej. % Poss. % Sust.
74.07% 18.52% 7.41%
40.74% 51.85% 7.41%
29.41% 64.71% 5.88%
66.67% 16.67% 16.67%
57.14% 28.57% 14.29%
42.86% 57.14% 0.00%
66.67% 33.33% 0.00%
100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
75.00% 25.00% 0.00%
75.00% 25.00% 0.00%
50.00% 50.00% 0.00%
66.67% 33.33% 0.00%
100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
131 78 45 8 59.54% 34.35% 6.11%
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Table 18
Query:
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TOTALS:
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Table of Constitutional Claims
Query: Supreme Court Cases
Police = Yes
Violations Total Claims Rejected Possible Sustained % Rej. % Poss. % Sust.
4th Search/Seizure 15 7 7 1 46.67% 46.67% 6.67%
5th - Self Incrimination 5 2 1 2 40.00% 20.00% 40.00%
4th Arrest 3 1 1 1 33.33% 33.33% 33.33%
Criminal Procedural DP 2 2 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
SDP-Rochin 2 2 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00%
4th Excessive-Force i 0 1 0 0.00% 100.00% 0.00%
Criminal Trial Violations 0 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
11 A 0 h A A nAAO/ n Afll/ n nno/0A
Freedom of Speech
Freedom of Association
Freedom of Press
Establishment Clause
Free Exercise
Civil Procedural DP
Minimal Contacts DP
Federal Structure
Administrative Procedural DP
8th Cruel/Unusual
Equal Protection
Takings
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
Separation of Powers
Commerce Clause
Other Constitutional Claim
Rationality - Liberty
SDP-Punitive Damages
6th - Effective Counsel
8th - Excessive Fines
8th - Death Penalty
6th - Right to Fair Trial
5th - Double Jeopardy
Rationality - Property 0 0 0
0 0.00/0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.000/0 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.000/0
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.000/
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% "
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00% 0.000/0
28 14 10 4 50.00% 35.71% 14.29%
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Table 19
oUmImelr; a~ll peec ~lIV
Other Constitutional Claim
V V V
TOTALS:
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actions arising out of police activity.158
The challenged actions in the trial court sample are predominantly
(47/75) those of local police officers. Among the potentially successful
claims, the proportion of local police defendants is even more pronounced.
Damage actions arising out of state or federal police actions are rejected in
seven cases out of ten; actions against local police are rejected in less than
one-third of the cases.
159
158 This is consistent with the findings of Eisenberg and Schwab that "cases brought
against the police are the largest and most successful class" of constitutional tort cases.
Eisenberg & Schwab, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation, supra note 63, at 734.
Eisenberg and Schwab found that 156 of the 513 cases (30.4%) in a sample of 1981
nonprisoner constitutional tort litigation in three federal districts were brought against
police. This represented 13.6% of the total constitutional tort cases. Id. at tbl. V. The
parallel proportions of damage cases in this study is 41 of the 121 nonprisoner damage
cases (34%) and 54 of the total 210 damage cases (25.7%).
A rough measure of the stability of the proportion of claims involving police ac-
tions over the last quarter century is suggested by the following LEXIS searches:
"Section 1983" "and police" "and damages"
1974 616 179 (29%) 112 (18%)
1984 1109 368 (33%) 250 (22%)
1986 1623 517 (32%) 320 (20%)
1988 2216 651 (29%) 361 (16%)
1990 2284 849 (37%) 481 (21%)
1992 2703 968 (36%) 552 (20%)
1994 2732 1109 (40%) 710 (26%)
1996 1930 1219 (41%) 759 (26%)
This is not to say that issues of police action are absent from the federal criminal
trial system; applications of the exclusionary rule occur in the course of federal criminal
trials. They do not, however, often result in published opinions at the trial court level.
By contrast, when I reviewed a comparable one-in-ten sample of federal appellate cases
in 1994, I found that more than half of the cases, 55 of 92, involving police arose in the
course of criminal proceedings. These accounted for 10.6% of all cases raising constitu-
tional claims (31 were damage actions).
A 1/20 sample of 1994 state appellate court constitutional cases from intermediate
courts generated a starker contrast: 47 of the 50 constitutional claims involving police
were raised in criminal proceedings; these actions accounted for 16% of all cases rais-
ing constitutional issues.
59 Two-thirds of the damage cases claiming violations by federal police officials
resulted in defendant victories, as did 5/7 of the damage cases claiming violations by
state officers. By contrast, courts dismissed only 14 of the 45 cases claiming a constitu-
tional violation by a local police officer. This too is consistent with Eisenberg and
Schwab, whose 1981 data suggests a 40% failure rate for constitutional claims against
police. Eisenberg & Schwab, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation, supra note 63,
at 734-35. It is also consistent with the results reported in Victor E. Kappeler et al., A
Content Analysis of Police Civil Liability Cases: Decisions of the Federal District
Courts, 1978-1990, 21 J. CRIM. JusT. 325, 332-34 (1993), which found that in a nation-
al sample of opinions in reported Section 1983 cases involving police officers, the offi-
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Before the Supreme Court, claims involving police officers most often
concerned allegedly unlawful searches. At the trial court level, however,
allegations of misuse of official prerogatives of force and arrest came to the
fore. 16' Allegations of unlawful searches declined in importance and were
more often rejected. Among damage claims against police, allegations of
excessive force were most likely to survive preliminary determinations.16 '
In each of these categories, the bulk of the claims not dismissed re-
mained pending as "possible" claims; published pronouncements of the fed-
eral trial courts did not so much announce final dispositions as set the stage
for future settlements or trials. Particularly striking was the profile of exces-
sive force claims, where 25% were dismissed but only 6.25% were sus-
tained.
162
The picture that emerges places the federal court in the role of forum of
cers prevailed in 40% to 60% of the cases, depending on the year.
160 CLAIMS AGAINST POLICE
28 Supreme Court Claims (24 Cases) 131 District Court Claims (75 Cases)
Search 15 (53%) 46% rejected 27 (20%) 74% rejected
Force 6" (21%) 50% rejected 56" (42%) 43% rejected
* Of the 6 "force" claims, 3 involved improper arrest; 2, Rochin; 1, excessive force;
and 0, the Eighth Amendment.
** Of the 56 "force" claims, 27 involved improper arrest; 7, Rochin; 17, excessive
force; and 5, the Eighth Amendment.
This distribution roughly matches the findings in the 1970 to 1977 Connecticut
sample in Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 793 (1979)
(noting that 52% of the cases involved allegations of excessive force, 46% involved
allegations of false arrest, and 17% involved allegedly illegal searches) and the 1985 to
1986 New Jersey survey in Fisher et al., Civil Liability of New Jersey Police Officers:
An Overview, 10 CRIM. JUST. Q. 45, 56 (1989) (noting that 56% of damage cases in-
volved "assault & battery"; 54%, false arrest; 41%, false imprisonment; 29%, malicious
prosecution; and 24%, search/seizure). Cf id. at 76 (noting that 57% of all cases, state
and federal, were settled); see also Kappeler, supra note 159, at 325 (reporting that in a
national sample of opinions in reported Section 1983 cases involving police officers,
55.7% claimed false arrest, 44% claimed excessive force or assault, and 16% claimed
unlawful search and seizure).
161 See infra Table 20.
162 See id. The sense that excessive force constitutes the most important area of po-
lice abuse litigation is reinforced by my examination of the 1994 verdicts involving
police officers reported in Lexis's "Verdicts" library.
81 FEDERAL VERDICTS
Force 47 (58%) 43% for plaintiff
Arrest 20 (24%) 45% for plaintiff
Search 14 (17%) 57% for plaintiff
66 STATE VERDICTS
Force 48 (72%) 66% for plaintiff
Arrest 13 (20%) 61% for plaintiff
Search 5 (7.5%) 40% for plaintiff
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last resort for those claiming physical abuse by the police. A substantial
portion of the work of lower federal courts in this arena again involves an
effort to implement not abstract and contestable notions of social justice but
concrete and common senses that law enforcement officials may not abuse
the person of the citizenry by disproportionate force or arbitrary arrest. 163
How effective this work proves to be is a different question. The bulk of
the cases in which federal trial courts published opinions were damage ac-
tions.
163 The cases retrieved from the 1994 Lexis "Verdicts" library tell a similar story: 16
federal verdicts involved uses of potentially lethal force, 31 involved minor uses of
force, 20 involved arrests, and 14 involved searches. Based on that library, the same
can be said of state court actions against the police.
Claims involving unlawful searches of property unaccompanied by violence or
arrest, however, accounted for 17% of the federal police verdicts and only 7% of the
state verdicts. Cases involving searches unaccompanied by physical abuse resulted in
three federal verdicts for more than $67,000 (the overall median verdict), but there were
no state verdicts in that range.
1997]
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Table 20
Table of Constitutional Claims
Query: 1994 Federal District Court Cases
Police = Yes
Damages = Yes
Violations Total Claims Rejected Possible Sustained % Rej. % Poss. % Sust.
4th Arrest 26 10 14 2 38.46% 53.85% 7.69%
4th Excessive Force 16 4 11 1 25.00% 68.75% 6.25%
4th Search/Seizure 14 8 5 1 57.14% 35.71% 7.14%
Criminal Procedural DP 10 6 2 2 60.00% 20.00% 20.00%
Equal Protection 7 4 2 1 57.14% 28.57% 14.29%
SDP-Rochin 6 2 4 0 33.33% 66.67% 0.00%
8th Cruel/Unusual
Other Constitutional Claim
Freedom of Speech
Criminal Trial Violations
6th - Effective Counsel
Administrative Procedural DP
6th - Right to Fair Trial
5th - Self Incrimination
Rationality - Property
Freedom of Association
Freedom of Press
Establishment Clause
Free Exercise
Minimal Contacts DP
Federal Structure
Rationality - Liberty
Commerce Clause
SDP-Punitive Damages
Takings
8th - Excessive Fines
5th - Double Jeopardy
SDP-Fundamental Rights
5 3
4 3
4 2
2 2
2 2
2 1
2 2
1 1
0 I
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0
0
0
0 60.00% 40.00%
0 75.00% 25.00%
0" 50.00% 50.00%
0 100.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00%
0 50.00% 50.00%
0 100.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00%
0 100.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
0 0.00% 0.00%
.0 0.00% 0.00%
103 52 44 7 50.49% 42.72%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.000/0
0.00%
0.00 0
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
6.80%TOTALS:
. 1
(';v;1 Procedural DP
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At a minimum, from my sample it appears that more than five hundred
federal damage actions based on police conduct around the country reached
the stage of active consideration by federal courts in published opinions in
1994, and more than three hundred survived initial consideration. Depending
on what inflation factor seems most reasonable, this could represent 3000 to
6000 cases filed in federal court, of which 2000 to 3500 are potentially
successful." Unlike prisoner cases, these successes were not entirely sym-
bolic. From a computerized search of a sample of verdicts in 1994, I was
able to identify at least seventy-six police abuse cases that went to trial in
federal courts, resulting in thirty-one plaintiff verdicts totalling $22.4 mil-
lion.165 A 1991 survey by the Police Foundation identified $48.9 million
paid in settlements and verdicts in 128 excessive force cases in 1991.166
16 Two calculations point to this range. First, in 1980, Eisenberg and Schwab found
that 30% of the constitutional nonprisoner tort complaints in their three surveyed federal
districts involved claims against police, with a 60% success rate. Eisenberg & Schwab,
supra note 137, at 525. They found that roughly 80% of the Administrative Office
category "Other Civil Rights Claims" were constitutional tort claims. Id. The total "oth-
er civil rights cases" commenced in 1993 were 13,776. MECHAM, supra note 63, at 143
tbl. C-2A. This suggests that a total of 3300 police civil rights cases filed in federal
courts in 1993 (.8 x .3 x 13776), with a 60% (2000) survival rate.
Second, for 1994, Lexis collected 20,338 federal district court opinions, and for
1993, 229,850 cases were filed in district courts. Id. at 141 tbl. C-2A. If the distribution
of collected cases matches the overall distribution of cases filed, the 54 cases in my
sample represent 540 Lexis cases and 6200 (540 x 229,850/20,338) cases, of which
62% (3800) survived.
A 1991 survey of a large sample of police departments identified 2558 pending
cases against police officers involving allegations of excessive force. 1 ANTONY M.
PATE & LORIE FRIDELL, POLICE USE OF FORCE: OFFICIAL REPORTS, CITIZEN COM-
PLAINTS AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES, 148 (1993); 2 PATE & FRIDELL, supra, at tbl. B-
37. Cf Mary M. Cheh, Are Law Suits an Answer to Police Brutality?, in AND JUSTICE
FOR ALL: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 233, 250
(William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1995) (estimating 1700 to 2600 federal civil
rights police misconduct cases per year).
16 I searched the Lexis "Verdicts" library for cases mentioning "police." After cull-
ing for duplicates, I found 81 police abuse cases, of which 75 reached trial. The 31
plaintiffs' verdicts averaged $636,000, with a median of $67,000. Sixty-six state court
cases were reported, of which 61 reached trial. Recoveries totalled $87 million, of
which $45 million was accounted for by one New York case in which a high speed
chase left the minor plaintiff an invalid with an IQ of 35. The 43 plaintiff verdicts and
settlements averaged $2.02 million, with a median of $200,000.
'6 See 2 PATE & FRIDELL, supra note 164, at tbls. B-39 and B-40.1.
A recent report by a special counsel to the Los Angeles Police Department reports
that Los Angeles paid $13.6 million in settlements and verdicts for police abuse litiga-
tion in 1995, and $67.5 million over the period 1991 to 1995. MERRICK BOBB, FIVE
YEARS LATER 55 (1996).
Cheh estimates that payments in police misconduct suits in Los Angeles totaled $11
million in 1990, $13 million in 1991, and $14 million in 1992; in New York City, $44
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At one level, compared to the 2000 to 3000 annual complaints enter-
tained by the Civil Rights division of the U.S. Justice Depart-
ment-complaints which resulted in fifty grand jury present-
ments 16--private actions in the federal courts seem relatively promising as
a mode of police control.1 61 On the other hand, this level of involvement
compares to a 1993 estimate of 373,550 police officers on duty around the
country, with reported complaints of excessive force averaging between 20
and 50 per 1000 officers and with total police budgets that exceeded $24
billion. 169
Based on the national average, a police officer has one chance in one
hundred of being sued in federal court in a given year for abuses of civil
rights; the chances that any particular encounter with a citizen will eventuate
in judicial review is probably lower. 7' Most suits are not brought, many
of those brought are dismissed, and many of those which survive are settled.
Evidence suggests that in New York and Los Angeles, for example, the
million from 1987 to 1991; in Detroit, $20 million in 1990; and in Miami Beach, $3.5
million from 1986 to 1992. Cheh, supra note 164, at 250 n. 37.
167 JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAw 209 (1993); Cheh,
supra note 164, at 233, 241 n.19, 248.
168 Thus, unlike the impression left on Professor Powell by his examination of Su-
preme Court precedent that "[s]tripped of the channeling that the [constitutional]
tradition's moral inquiries provided, the American polity's employment of violence is
increasingly wayward, increasingly brutal," H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADI-
TION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 262 (1993), it appears that lower Federal
courts remain available to at least act as a medium of constitutional critique.
169 See BRIAN REAVES, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 1993 (Bureau of Justice Sta-
tistics 1996) (reporting that 230,000 uniformed officers responded to service calls and
that total budgets were $24.3 billion in 1993).
Pate and Fridell report that the city police departments they surveyed in 1991 re-
ceived 47.5 complaints of excessive force per 1000 officers, while sheriff's departments
received an average of 20.7 complaints per 1000. 1 PATE & FRIDELL, supra note 164,
at 107. The rate of civil actions alleging excessive force in city police departments was
23.7 per 1000 officers, and in sheriff's departments, 14.5 per 1000. 2 id. at tbl. B-38.1.
The total complaints identified in the sample were 15,608. 2 id. at tbl. B-11.1.
In the city of Los Angeles, during the past five years, the 8700 police officers aver-
aged 2377 "uses of force" per year and 640 complaints of misconduct. BOBB, supra
note 166, at 7, 37.
170 In the Police Foundation sample, roughly 25,000 incidents of police uses of force
were reported in 1991, which resulted in 2558 lawsuits. 2 PATE & FRIDELL, supra note
164, at tbl. B-3.1. The sample of incidents clearly underreports use of "bodily force,"
however, because only 198 police departments reported statistics for that category,
while 557 reported statistics for the "civilians shot and killed" category. See id. More-
over, if one includes searches and arrests as deployments of potential force that may
give rise to constitutional actions, the percentage of encounters that reach judicial re-
view drops still further. Cf. BOBB, supra note 166, at 38 (noting that in Los Angeles,
there is less than one "force related encounter" per 100 arrests).
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police departments treated excessive force suits costing an average of $4
million to $10 million annually as a cost of doing business.171
The result could differ in particular situations. Where a street-level bu-
reaucrat views simply being sued as a significant cost, where the suit pro-
vides information and leverage to supervisors within the bureaucracy or
polity who themselves are attuned to the constitutional value, or where the
information revealed or dramatized in the lawsuit itself generates popular
reaction, civil rights actions may have a practical and immediate impact. But
the real effect of such litigation, if an effect exists at all, will usually be
heuristic rather than deterrent. The hope must be that the shadow of episodic
intervention will provide a normative beacon for officials who have some
fidelity to constitutional ideals."2
17 BOBB, supra note 166, at 55, 62, 77 (citing $13 million as the annual cost of
police litigation verdicts and settlements in the Los Angles Police Department in an
annual budget of more than $1 billion and noting that efforts to minimize risk were
"still in their infancy"); PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN
THE AMERICAS 100-02 (1995) (noting the average payments in Los Angeles in 1990 of
$1300 per officer and the average payments in New York during the period 1987 to
1992 of $400 per officer).
The Los Angeles County Sheriff testified in 1995 that recoveries for the 28 to 30
annual fatal shootings by his officers come out of a $20 million litigation fund annually
budgeted for his department. Aiding Police Who Are Sued: Hearings on H.R. 1446
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 1995 WL 668727 (Nov. 8, 1995) (statement of Los Angeles Sheriff Sherman
Block). Because excess funds are returned to the county, the financial incentive to mini-
mize recoveries is diluted.
" In theory, just as a small number of prison injunctive class actions are probably of
more practical import than the much larger number of damage actions, one might think
that a small number of police injunctions could serve a similar purpose.
Unfortunately, since Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), and Los Angeles v. Ly-
ons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), the obstacle of finding a plaintiff who is currently subject to
the challenged practice has proved an almost insurmountable barrier to prospective
relief in most police cases. See, e.g., Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies and Videotape: The
Need for an Effective Federal Role in Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66
S. CAL. L. REV. 1453 (1993); Alison L. Patton, Note, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why
42 USC Section 1983 Is Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753
(1993).
Police abuse is generally sporadic rather than predictable, so most claimants at best
seek retrospective relief. If the federal government chooses to use it, Congress has in
1994 provided authorization for pattern or practice suits by the Attorney General against
police departments that regularly violate civil rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (1994). To
the best of my knowledge, the only case brought pursuant to this statute is an action
against the police department of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, which resulted in a consent
decree establishing structural mechanisms for controlling police brutality. See Jon
Schmitz, A Blueprint for Change, PITSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Feb. 27, 1997, at A-14.
After searching all reported constitutional claims in the 1994 Lexis federal district
court database, I identified nine opinions involving class actions against police. Two in-
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Is this hope plausible? With respect to fine grained judgments under the
Fourth Amendment, there is reason to be dubious. Police officers often
appear to have neither detailed knowledge of their precise legal obligations
nor the incentive to obtain it. One recent study reports that in a survey of
more than five hundred police officers in three cities, the officers identified
their legal obligations in borderline situations under the Fourth Amendment
barely more often than random chance would dictate. 73 Furthermore, if
damages are sought from individual officers, the officer will be protected
from personal liability in close calls unless no reasonable officer could have
believed that her actions were lawful. 74
Episodic judicial interventions could serve to establish in the conscious-
ness of officers and their superiors the simple fact that there are some lim-
its-that even in the midst of the war on drugs, for example, not everything
goes. "'75 A study of New York City police officers concluded that many
volved successful efforts to obtain injunctive relief, though they were not efforts to
enjoin street-level police abuse. Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 853 F.Supp. 716
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (enjoining the enforcement of an ordinance prohibiting begging); Alli-
ance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3070 (N.D. I11.
1994) (involving the administration of a 1981 consent decree involving political surveil-
lance), rev'd and vacated, 119 F. 3d 472 (7th Cir. 1997).
Two others involved successful damage actions. Hvorcik v. Sheahan, 847 F. Supp.
1414 (N.D. I11. 1994) (granting summary judgment on liability to a class of citizens
arrested on the basis of invalid warrants which had already been quashed); Jones v.
Cochran, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20625 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (granting summary judgment
on liability to a class of defendants detained by police after being acquitted at trial).
One class action, Johns v. Deleonardis, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8916 (N.D. I11. 1994),
sought damages for a police raid on a meeting of the Chicago Gypsy Counsel, but it
was not a challenge to any systematic practices.
Two cases denied class treatment for damage claims. Douglas v. Sheahan, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12098 (N.D. I11. 1994) (alleging a practice of issuing inaccurate war-
rants); Davis v. City of Philadelphia, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3640 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(alleging illegal confiscation of personal property). One denied standing to plaintiffs
seeking to bring an injunctive class action suit challenging allegedly racially motivated
traffic stops. Washington v. Vogel, 156 F.R.D. 676 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
173 William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. Mich J. L.
Reform 311, 332 (1991). This finding is notably less prevalent with respect to the
"bright line" rules of Miranda and the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 338-39.
"7 See, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991) (establishing the standard for
qualified immunity for arrest); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (holding
that in determining whether an officer was entitled to qualified immunity, the relevant
inquiry is whether a reasonable officer could have believed that a warrantless search
was lawful).
175 In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), Justice Frankfurter opined that the core concern of the Fourth Amendment
is "[tlhe security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police," but he re-
502 [Vol. 5:2
EXPLORING THE DARK MATTER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
officers are Holmesian positivists: in the absence of the concrete sanctions
imposed by the exclusionary rule, "most police officers interpret the Wolf
case as not having imposed any legal obligation on the police since, under
that decision, the evidence would still be admissible no matter how it was
obtained." '76 Yet two recent investigators were struck by the "consistent
unwillingness of [more than half of the surveyed] officers.., to depart
from the Constitution's requirements""' regarding searches even in situa-
tions in which direct employment sanctions or liability were unlikely. The
investigators hypothesize that "[e]xclusion provides officers with a day-to-
day reminder of the importance of adherence to the law."'78 The hope
must be that the lower federal courts' episodic intervention can likewise
serve as a "still small voice" stimulating the willingness of officers to ac-
knowledge constitutional commands.'
fused to impose the exclusionary rule. Id. at 27. Mapp reversed that decision on the
grounds that constitutional exhortations without sanction are entirely ineffective.
Mapp has not been overruled, though Professor Kamisar points out that the recent
evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine has left the exclusionary rule in a state in
which "if the criminal goes free, it is because the constable has flouted the Fourth
Amendment, not because he has made an honest blunder". Yale Kamisar, Remembering
the "Old World" of Criminal Procedure: A Reply to Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.
L. REFORM 537, 554 (1990). Moreover, the constitutionally mandatory provision of
counsel in criminal cases under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), means that
the exclusionary remedy will be wielded with at least some modicum of expertise.
176 Milton A. Loewenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
49 UMKC L. REV. 24, 29 (1980).
177 Heffernan & Lovely, supra note 173, at 351.
178 Id.
'" See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev.
820, 852 (1994) (arguing that constitutional enforcement provides an "alternative vi-
sion" for "good cops" to follow); cf Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function
of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
In some ways, the depressingly prevalent findings of police willingness to engage
in perjury to escape the exclusionary rule, see, e.g., Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence,
Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts,
63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75 (1992); Kevin R. Reitz, Testifying as a Problem of Crime Con-
trol: A Reply to Professor Slobogin, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1061 (1996); Christopher
Slobogin, Testifying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV.
1037 (1996), can be read as confirming the existence of this function, for, like any
hypocrisy, "testifying" is the homage of vice to virtue. Officers must know the rules in
order to claim they have followed them, and the officer who is attracted to either hones-
ty or constitutional norms will seek to obey the rules.
The sporadic nature of current judicial intervention, even in the area of physical
abuse, however, suggests that claims that a damage remedy will adequately substitute
for the elimination of the exclusionary rule, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting an administra-
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The alternative interpretation is that in both the area of prisons and po-
lice, the availability of federal court remedies is simply a fig leaf placed on
the brutality our society sanctions. This is the interpretation of other consti-
tutional criminal procedure landmarks suggested by some more pessimistic
scholars.' I must confess that on many days this account of the role of
police abuse litigation seems plausible to me. If only these abuses were not
hidden behind a veil of alleged constitutional rights, a real movement to
exert control over them might emerge.
Ultimately, however, this hope is even less compelling than the optimis-
tic vision of constitutional litigation; the history of political efforts to control
abuse in law enforcement has hardly been a model of efficacy, and there is
certainly no indication that it has been more effective in the absence of
purported constitutional safeguards. At the end of the day, even the illusion
of rights has two values.
First, as long as the courts continue to articulate the claim that official
violence has its limits, some officials will believe it. Sometimes the threat of
being taken to court will tap into a disinclination to the adverse publicity
which accompanies a solemn allegation of impropriety. Like the news of
acquittals, the news of the dismissal of a suit often has less impact than the
news of its inception. Sometimes the information discovered and disclosed
in court will galvanize a torpid bureaucracy into action, 8' and sometimes
tive damage tribunal as a substitution for the exclusionary rule); Akhil Reed Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757, 785 (1994); Slobogin,
supra, leave a certain plausibility behind. This is not a new lesson, see, e.g., Caleb
Foote, Tort Remedies of Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493
(1955), but one which periodically seems to need reiteration. See Donald Dripps, Akhil
Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: "Here I Go Down that Wrong
Road Again", 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559 (1996); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the
Fourth Amendment is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 60 (1994);
Steiker, supra, at 849-51.
"8o Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF L. REV. 673 (1992) (sug-
gesting that Miranda was essentially a way of bleeding off objections to the criminal
justice system); Louis Michael Seidman, Criminal Procedure as the Servant of Politics,
12 CONST. COMMENTARY 207 (1995) (asserting that constitutional protections make
prosecutors' jobs easier); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts:
Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109
HARv. L. REV. 355 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court's death penalty jurispru-
dence has served to entrench capital punishment by providing a patina of decency); see
also LIPSKY, supra note 100, at 42-43, 134-35 (asserting that due process and illusory
rights to appeal legitimize the continuation of abusive practices).
181 Thus, in one recent case, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. No. 96-6015 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 4, 1996), the City of Philadelphia responded to a police abuse scandal, dam-
age actions, federal prosecutions, and the prospect of an injunctive class action by com-
mitting itself to institute a comprehensive restructuring of its systems for controlling
police abuse and appointing both internal and external monitors. See Shannon Duffy,
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the courts' statements will be a call to the official's better self. As long as
courts articulate a norm that officials have an obligation to act "reasonably"
even when enforcing drug laws, the official inclined to act with basic decen-
cy has a basis to claim that that inclination does not cause her to abandon
her duty but rather to fulfill it.
Second, and equally important, the citizens subject to government au-
thority may believe the myth. As long as claims are sometimes vindicated,
the belief that one has rights is a basis for organization, self-respect, and
autonomy. To be without rights is to be a slave, and the result is all too
often resignation. To be defrauded of one's rights is to be abused, and the
result-as we saw in the reaction to the acquittal of Rodney King's assail-
ants in Los Angeles-is often rage.
III. IMPLICATIONS
Having surveyed constitutional practice in the 1990s, I now draw some
conclusions. The results of my survey in many ways confirm conventional
constitutional theories. In both the Supreme Court and the trial court sam-
ples, litigation involving legislative judgments was likely to fall within the
relatively uncontroversial categories described by most constitutional theo-
rists. The activism with respect to federal governmental structure which
permeates much of the Supreme Court's docket is rare at the trial court
level, and the beneficiaries of trial court determinations are less likely to be
business and property claimants. Nevertheless, in general, legislative review
by the trial courts mirrors determinations at the Supreme Court level.
Such legislative confrontations, however, represent only a minority of
the situations in which the Constitution is actually invoked before the Su-
preme Court, and at the trial court level that portion shrinks still further. The
most frequent constitutional claims in trial litigation concern the use of force
or discretion by individual officials. The claims are brought not by business-
es but by individuals--often those who are dispossessed-and usually the
claims are for damages. In the following pages, I examine what these obser-
vations suggest about the role of courts and constitutional adjudication.
City Settles Cop Reform Lawsuits; Plaintiffs' Lawyers to Monitor Progress, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCIER, Sept. 5, 1996; Joseph Slobodzian, City Tries To Contain Cop Scandal
Damage, N.Y. LAW J., Feb. 5, 1996, at A10. In the interests of full disclosure, I should
note that I worked with plaintiffs' counsel in that case.
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A. The Countermajoritarian Difficulty Confined
1. Comparative Institutional Competence and Democracy
First, we should remember that a great deal of what federal courts actu-
ally do with the Constitution does not raise the "countermajoritarian diffi-
culty" directly. The power of the "countermajoritarian difficulty" is in part a
function of the degree of majoritarianism that characterizes the decisions
being reviewed. A decision by a cop on the beat has a different democratic
pedigree than an act of Congress. To say we should prefer decisions of
judges to those of police officers does not necessarily fly in the face of
popular self-rule.
If we move beyond the fact that neither most police officers nor most
judges are directly accountable to the electorate, the issue of judicial review
becomes a comparative one. Whether one is attempting to achieve morally
correct results, accurate accounts of constitutional norms-however
judged-, or efficiency, the question of which institution is most likely to
achieve "correct" results becomes crucial. If the manifest defects of the
courts are less than their competitors', then courts should make the constitu-
tional determinations.'82
In all bureaucracies, the bureaucracy's mission tends to dwarf competing
values. To believe that HHS is good at devising welfare proposals does not
mean that it has a comparative advantage at judging the appropriate scope of
rights against searches and seizures. The FDA is interested in drug safety,
not international trade or free speech; the state welfare department focuses
on efficient delivery of services, not rights of migration.
Experience suggests still less that individual case workers have a com-
182 For efficiency arguments, see, for example, NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT AL-
TERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 204
(1994) ("In the complex world of institutional choice, foxes might be assigned to guard
the chicken coop where the alternatives (bears, weasels, and so forth) are worse."); Neil
K. Komesar, Slow Learning in Constitutional Analysis, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 212 (1993);
cf Einar R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Re-
view?, 101 YALE L. J. 31 (1991) (arguing that probable failings of courts'
decisionmaking processes are even greater than those of legislatures).
For arguments regarding the relative moral capacity of courts and legislatures, see,
for example, PERRY, supra note 7, at 21, 95-104; Frederick Schauer, Constitutional
Positivism, 25 CONN. L. REV. 797 (1993); for arguments regarding the relative capacity
of courts and administrative officials, see Frederick Schauer, The Occasions of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 72 B.U. L. REV. 729, 735-38 (1992). Professor Schauer observes
that the desire, as a matter of ideal political theory, to allow important matters to be
decided by popular determination might be an independent reason for courts to defer in
constitutional cases, id. at 734, but, by hypothesis, the competition in most of the non-
legislative cases has a relatively diluted democratic pedigree.
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parative advantage. Many of the situations in which the constitution is de-
ployed in the federal courts-indeed in a vast majority of the cases in the
trial courts-involve confrontations with street-level bureaucrats who can
neither be tightly bound by rules nor be required to give reasons for their
actions. The office water cooler is not likely to be the locus of
transformative constitutional dialogue.
Michael Perry suggests the protection of human rights by courts is nec-
essarily countermajoritarian: "[I]f there really were consensual values of a
determinate helpful sort, there would probably be little need for the Court
frequently to enforce them against electorally accountable offi-
cials ... ."' The problem, of course, is that the "electorally accountable
officials" against whom the courts most frequently enforce constitutional
norms include police, prison guards, and prosecutors whose accountability
hardly equates with a popular mandate. Indeed, a primary characteristic of
these street-level bureaucrats is the difficulty in prospectively constraining
their discretion.14
Both of these concerns-the single-mindedness of the focus on bureau-
cratic missions and the relative unreliability of street-level bureaucrats as
constitutional decisionmakers-are particularly salient in the areas of correc-
tions and law enforcement which account for such large portions of the trial
courts' constitutional review." In each setting, a bureaucratically mono-
chromatic view of the world is exacerbated in total institutions where offi-
cials confront potentially hostile "clients" (with associated cognitive disso-
nance), where danger imposes the need for mutual loyalty among an insular
corps of officials, and where individual "clients" are disenfranchised or
powerless.
The costs of violations in such contexts, moreover, are concentrated on
isolated individuals, while the benefits accrue to the polity at large. However
much the polity may adhere to beliefs in the importance of search warrants,
due process, or limits on physical force in the abstract, when the interests of
a particular (often) low-status individual are balanced against an organiza-
tional mission, the incentive of the bureaucrat is to slight rights.1
6
'83 MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 94
(1982). The point echoes Justice Frankfurter's argument in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 31 (suggesting that suspects whose constitutional rights have been violated should
be remitted "to the remedies of private action and such protection as the internal disci-
pline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion, may afford") and Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 242-44 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
u LIPSKY, supra note 100, at 15, 159. The danger is that if the constraints of mini-
mal decency are regularly violated by street-level bureaucrats with impunity, such viola-
tions will no longer be viewed as repugnant, and a deadened public opinion will allow
them to be enacted into law.
185 As Professor Schauer points out, these types of concerns prompted the imposition
of the warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment. Schauer, supra note 182, at 734.
1' Should we not rely on the political process more generally to discipline such
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2. Reversibility and the Trial Courts
This does not mean that the "countermajoritarian difficulty" is entirely
illusory in the cases which comprise the bulk of judicial review. When Al-
exander Bickel coined the phrase, his claim was that democracy "means that
a representative majority has the power to accomplish a reversal" of a con-
tested policy.187 When a federal court strikes down an action by a bureau-
crat or another court in the name of the Constitution, that action cannot be
rehabilitated by the direct representative processes. When the police are
enjoined from interfering with a controversial anti-abortion (or gay rights)
demonstration, a subsequent local ordinance or state or federal statute per-
mitting such interference may not withstand judicial scrutiny, no matter how
great the popular enthusiasm for the legislation."s
Three factors, however, temper these concerns. First, the initial judgment
regarding the actions of a local bureaucrat often simply initiates a dialogue.
A determination that a particular bureaucrat's action is unreasonable or is
invidiously motivated may do little more than send the majoritarian branch
organizational overreaching in the long run? In part, the story is the old one of "preju-
dice against discrete and insular minorities," United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), amplified by the fact that victims are not predictable:
for most individuals, the prospect of abuse is unlikely enough and sufficiently unpre-
dictable that they will rarely take political action. Organizational costs are high, and
unlike statutes or public rules, the practices of ingrown bureaucracies are difficult sub-
jects for political debate and control. The combination of the difficulty of obtaining
information about organizational practices, the difficulty of identifying effective inter-
ventions, and the "organizational stasis" identified by my colleague Susan Sturm com-
bine to make judicial intervention particularly useful in such areas. See Susan Sturm,
Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 805, 810 (1990).
187 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 17 (1962).
188 On the other hand, given the structure of constitutional doctrine, it may. For ex-
ample, in the "limited public forum" area, which has generated a large number of cases
in recent First Amendment adjudication, a municipality which seeks to eliminate contro-
versial speech can tailor access to the forum by appropriately general rules to exclude
speech as long as those rules are "viewpoint neutral" and "reasonable." See, e.g.,
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (applying
"limited public forum" test in the context of denying funds to a religious student publi-
cation); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (applying "limited public fo-
rum" test to uphold a regulation prohibiting solicitation on post office premises); Frisby
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding the portion of a municipal ordinance which
banned picketing in front of a particular residence); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense
& Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (holding that the government may exclude
charities from a charity drive aimed at federal employees if the exclusion was not
aimed at suppressing particular viewpoints).
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back to the drawing boards. An effort to bar a specific demonstration under
the terms of a disorderly conduct statute may be unavailing, while a regula-
tion by a representative body prohibiting all demonstrations near medical
facilities may be upheld. The tendency of recent doctrine to focus either on
balancing and reasonableness or on the presence or absence of constitution-
ally impermissible administrative intent by officials means that a trial court's
decision---or even a Supreme Court mandate-invalidating one administra-
tive determination has limited applicability to a similar decision by a differ-
ent government entity or a subsequent decision by the same one. The coun-
termajoritarian difficulty is diluted to the extent that the court's legal theory
leaves representative institutions with the authority to effectively pursue
their goals despite a constitutional determination. As we have seen, much of
the trial court's constitutional caseload is of precisely this variety.
In many cases, the trial courts do not purport to invalidate the value
choices of responsible branches of government. Unlike the challenges in
Brown, Roe, and Romer, in which the Court declared majoritarian value
choices to be constitutionally impermissible, the challenges before the trial
courts are often leveled at the methods by which social choices are carried
out. The legal sources of these claims often bear the seeds of their own
qualification.
The First Amendment prohibits all viewpoint-based prohibitions on
protected speech, but the Fourth Amendment prohibits only "unreasonable"
searches and seizures. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits all denials of
equal protection, but deprivations of life, liberty, and property must merely
be accompanied by procedures that provide "due" process. Constitutional
limitations in the classical core purport to be apodictic: they often bar with
one degree of absoluteness or another even the effort to achieve a pro-
scribed goal. The limitations which protect most basic decencies are condi-
tional; they call for a particularistic reconciliation of conceded public con-
cerns with human dignity. Courts often review means rather than ends or
values,189 and under current doctrine, even in the classical core of judicial
review, the Court in recent years has forged doctrinal devices that limit the
degree to which courts resolving particular disputes bind popular value
choices. 190
189 Thus, despite his skepticism of open-ended "value based" judicial review, Profes-
sor Ely felt no qualms about approving noninterpretive review under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause because "[t]he subject is punishments, not the entire range
of government action." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 14 (1980). He
similarly accepted procedural review under the Due Process Clause because "the ques-
tions that are relevant here-how seriously the complainant is being hurt and how much
it will cost to give him a more effective hearing-are importantly different from ...
how desirable or important the substantive policy the legislature has decided to follow
is." Id. at 21; see id. at 95-97.
190 The Fourth Amendment, of course, has for many years been a home for "all-
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Second, most of the review of street-level decisionmaking, and hence
most constitutional review in trial courts outside of review of judicial deter-
minations, occurs in damage actions. 9' This means that the official action
has already taken place and, with respect to whatever underlying policy is at
issue, official decisions have been determinative. The issue before the courts
is whether the polity should be required to pay damages. If the courts find a
constitutional violation, the determination is "reversible" by a popular ma-
jority willing to pay for the privilege. Indeed, in most cases it is not the
courts alone who impose this obligation but the courts in concert with juries,
which are themselves popularly responsive bodies. The one thing that cannot
be reversed is the polity's obligation to pay for the constitutional damage it
causes.
Third, most cases in which constitutional norms are vindicated in the
lower courts are not resolved by authoritative judicial statement; if a plain-
tiff prevails, it is usually through settlement. A case which survives initial
judicial screening obliges the government's representatives to defend their
actions. But in settlements, where the popular representatives have entered
into an agreement in the shadow of the law, the result is less a coup d'6tat
than a result of a dialogue between the government and those whom it seeks
to govern.
B. The Courts As Ordinary Moral Observers: Moral Consensus Renewed
Some of the constitutional work of the federal courts is concerned with
realizing controversial aspirational ideals or preserving integrated systems of
democratic governance. In a great bulk of cases, however, the common
values courts bring to bear involve the moral minimalism which Sissela Bok
identifies as basic and common across cultures: the necessity to limit the
things-considered reasonableness," and Eighth Amendment cases forbid deliberate indif-
ference or malicious desire to cause harm. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825
(1994). The emerging focus on motive and viewpoint neutrality in First Amendment
cases both in public forum and employment situations, cf. Elena Kagan, Private Speech,
Public Purpose: the Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996), and in equal protection, see, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct.
1894 (1996); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976), provide similar limitations on the generalizability of the constraints
imposed by particular decisions. See generally T. Alexander Aleinkoff, Constitutional
Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L. J. 943 (1987); Sullivan, supra note 62.
191 Among trial court claims involving administrative agencies, 60% (60/101) in-
volved damage claims; among claims arising out of actions by police, 78% (103/131);
and among claims against individual officials, 90% (166/131). Nor was this solely a
function of prisoners' tendency to bring damage actions: among prisoners challenging
bureaucratic determinations, 86% (86/101) cases involved damage claims; among non-
prisoners, 69% (109/157).
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government's exercise of its power to harm or confine the person of its
citizens and the requirement of fair procedures.192 These values constitute
the "dark matter" that holds our constitutional universe together. Adjudica-
tion of cases involving those values calls particularly upon the comparative
advantages of trial courts as constitutional expositors.
1. The Nature of the Claims
Americans believe that the government should be constrained in its
ability to inflict bodily harm on its citizens. The sources of this consensus
are three-fold. First, there is wide agreement that the imposition of physical
harm is an evil. As Professor Shklar notes, "[T]he liberalism of fear, which
makes cruelty the first vice, quite rightly recognizes that fear reduces us to
mere reactive units of sensation, and that does impose a public ethos on us.
One begins with what is to be avoided ....
The very definition of the state as the legitimate monopolist of coercive
violence makes clear that within an effective legal order, the government is
a most potent source of fear. The need to constrain the exercise of official
violence lies at the heart of the first ten amendments." As Shklar ob-
serves,
The first right is to be protected against the fear of cruelty.
People have rights as a shield against this greatest of public
192 See SissELA BOK, COMMON VALUES 15-16, 18-19, 30, 57 (1995) (citing duties to
refrain from coercion and violence and rudimentary fairness in procedural justice); cf
STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE 90 (1989) ("[T]he great evils of
human experience, reaffirmed in every age ... [are] murder and the destri'iction of life,
imprisonment, enslavement[,] ... physical pain, and torture."); MICHAEL WALZER,
THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD 2-3 (1994) (arguing for
recognition of a "minimal" or "thin" political morality that is embedded in, and can be
recognized by, a large variety of cultures involving "the end to arbitrary arrests, equal
and impartial law enforcement, the abolition [special] privileges"); id. at 9-10 (identify-
ing "injuries and wrongs no person should have to endure," such as "murder, deceit,
torture, oppression, and tyranny").
193 JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES 5 (1984); cf Sullivan, supra note 60, at 93
("The bedrock concept of coercion is force. If you can find force in the picture, a viola-
tion of [a] constitutional right is at hand."); AvISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY
85 (1996) ("Cruelty is the ultimate evil; preventing cruelty, is the supreme moral com-
-. ,..Jment"). Margalit, however, extends the proposition from physical to mental cruel-
ty. See generally id.
194 Cf H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 264 (1993) ("[C]onstitutionalism is the
most fundamental mode by which the American republic attempts to channel and miti-
gate the violence of the state and (since the state attempts to enforce a monopoly on
violence by violence) the society.").
1997]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
vices .... Justice itself is only a web of legal arrangements
required to keep cruelty in check, especially by those who
have most of the instruments of intimidation closest at
hand .... [L]aws ... have one primary objective: to relieve
each one of us of the burden of fear so that we an feel free
because the government does not, indeed cannot, terrorize
US. 195
The threat of physical abuse is more than cause for apprehension in its
own right-it is potentially toxic to the independence of the citizenry that
American democracy presupposes. Thus, Justice Frankfurter periodically
expressed the proposition that "[m]odern totalitarianisms have been a stark
reminder, but did not newly teach, that the kicked-in door is the symbol of a
rule of fear and violence fatal to institutions founded on respect for [human]
integrity."' 96
195 SHKLAR, supra note 193, at 237-38; id. at 244 ("Throughout history, war and
punishment have been the primary functions of government .... Weber chose to put it
in a nutshell by defining the state as the holder of a monopoly on legitimate use of
force .... [The definition] encourage[s] demands for limited government, for justice as
the sole public virtue, and underlines the political significance of putting cruelty first.");
cf KOMESAR, supra note 182, at 202 ("[T]he single greatest threat to the rules and
indeed to the game comes from the monopoly of force that characterizes the govern-
ment. The military and the police are central functionaries in any constitutional govern-
ment. But they are also its major threats.").
19 Monroe v. Pape,.365 U.S. 167, 209 (1961) (citing, at 208, the "conception ex-
pressed in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 [(1948)], that 'The security of one's pri-
vacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police ... is basic to a free society."').
Professor Klarman plausibly suggests that part of the impetus for the evolution of
criminal justice constraints during the second half of the twentieth century arose from
reaction to the experiences of repressive Nazi "justice." Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking
the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 64-66 (1996); cf
Richard Primus, Note, A Brooding Omnipresence: Totalitarianism in Postwar Constitu-
tional Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 389 (1996).
As a subsidiary matter, a willingness to perpetrate violence is often a function of
social distance. See, e.g, STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974); ARNE
JOHAN VETLESEN, PERCEPTION, EMPATHY AND JUDGEMENT 202-03, 273-77 (1994). If
we worry that constitutional limits should bind the treatment of those who are distant
from the majority, cf ELY, supra note 189, at 158-64 (asserting that dangers of "we-
they" thinking trigger constitutional review), then control of official violence is a good
place to start.
Professor Sunstein argues, "The commitment to citizenship requires that people
have a large degree of security and independence from the state .... [as] a precondition
for the independence that is necessary for the role of the citizen." CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 136 (1993). Sunstein would push the point much farther
than broken doors and broken bones, however, incorporating a right to property, free-
dom from desperate conditions, and a "sphere of autonomy into which the state may not
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When my teenage daughter recently pressed me for a set of truths that
could serve as anchors in a world of diverse moral perceptions, I began my
efforts to respond by asserting that cruelty is evil and love is good. The
federal courts in recent years have come close to abandoning the aspiration
that the Constitution, unaided, can further the labors of love (or its cognates,
equality and affirmative claims to dignity), but they retain a constitutional
role in the prevention of cruelty. At a basic level, the proposition that gov-
ernment officers cannot abuse citizens' bodies in pursuit of public good
represents a minimal commitment to decency to which even the most anti-
activist of judges gives allegiance.
In many areas where this commitment asserts itself, constitutional re-
view is "extratextual"; it is difficult to ground a judicial warrant firmly in
textual or narrowly originalist claims.'97 Yet there is relatively little contro-
versy that some judicial intervention is appropriate.'98 The only forceful
debate revolves around the appropriate degree of intervention.
In part this consensus follows from the nature of the norms courts in-
voke. The rights to avoid arbitrary and demeaning incarceration for mental
illness, physical abuse or denial of medical care while in custody, sexual
assault under color of the law, like the rights against official impairment of
bodily integrity, baseless arrests or searches, and the emerging Fourth
Amendment right against groundless prosecution are all linked to unremark-
able normative claims. Although courts in these areas implement value
choices that may be only loosely grounded in the text of the Constitution,
enter." Id. at 136-39. In his hands, the argument seems to evolve from a bill of particu-
lars indicting the precursors to tyranny into a shopping list.
197 Thus, the right to bodily integrity, rooted in the "canons of decency and fairness
which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples," Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952), has transmigrated to the Fourth Amendment for those sub-
jected to physical abuse by police, see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); Brower
v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), and
to the Eighth Amendment for prisoners, see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994);
Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1 (1992). It remains textually ungrounded for mental
patients, see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), and civilians, c.f U.S. v.
Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380 (6th Cir.) (en banc) (holding that a constitutional right not to be
sexually assaulted by a judge is not "clearly established"), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 1219
(1997). The right to minimally decent medical care for prisoners has been discovered in
the Eighth Amendment, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), and the right to
avoid baseless prosecutions has been shoe-horned into the Fourth Amendment, see
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994). Cf Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 353 (1974) (asserting that such issues
are "too large, too ungoverned by a commanding text or clear institutional dictates, to
be laid solidly to rest").
198 Justice Thomas may be an exception. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,
17-29 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Eighth Amendment should
not be interpreted to protect prisoners from harsh treatment).
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there seems to be no call to invoke fancy constitutional methodology; there
is recognition on all sides that the courts are appropriate moral arbiters of
some side constraints under which the government operates.
Dissenting from the judicial activism of Lochner v. New York,' 99 Jus-
tice Holmes maintained that a court should not invalidate the "natural out-
come of dominant opinion" unless the challenged act "would infringe funda-
mental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our
people and our law."'' Holmes's intellectual heir, Richard Posner, has
written approvingly of Holmes's "rule of thumb" that a law is constitutional
"unless it made him want to 'puke.""'2" Such definitions limit judicial re-
view, but they do not eliminate it.
Thus, even as the current Court has renounced open-ended evaluation of
public justifications of run of the mill traffic stops in Whren v. United
States, 2 it reaffirmed the propriety of balancing intrusiveness against pub-
lic necessity in "searches and seizures conducted in an extraordinary man-
ner, unusually harmful to an individual's privacy or ... physical inter-
ests.""2 3 The constitutional claims invoked in these cases are keyed to irre-
ducibly contextual moral insights regarding physical harm and individual
dignity.
Although Michael Perry has announced, in terms common to many
commentators, that "[c]onsensual values would probably be of little help to
the main body of persons who press human rights claims in the Court,"2 4
the most prevalent, though not the most visible, constitutional claims before
the Court in the 1990-1995 Terms involve issues in which consensus on
values in fact obtains.2"5 These cases swell to a clear majority of the lower
196 U.S. 45 (1905).
Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2o" Richard Posner, Legal Reasoning from the Top Down and from the Bottom Up:
The Question of Unenumerated Constitutional Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 447
(1992).
202 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
13 Id. at 1776 (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) (unannounced entry
into a home); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (seizure by means of deadly
force); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (use of a surgical incision to obtain evi-
dence); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (entry into a home without a war-
rant)).
204 PERRY, supra note 183, at 94.
' Professor Perry takes the position that substantive due process is "by consensus
the most controversial" category in the corpus of constitutional law. PERRY, supra note
183, at 5. This is true, however, only in the areas of reproduction, sexuality, and family
rights, where the Court seeks to aid in the transformation of national values.
Where the Court and the trial courts are engaged in realizing basic immunities
against physical abuse, the doubts as to whether the Court should be involved at all are
substantially less intense. Indeed, in some ways the effort to transform the abortion
debate into a debate about "bodily integrity" sought to capitalize on precisely that
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court docket.2"
Because a large element of the Court's adjudication, and the vast bulk of
the lower courts' adjudication, is keyed to striking violations of minimal
moral norms, it follows that it would be a mistake to rely on courts as a
screen for the overall morality or legitimacy of government action." The
failure to intervene does not mean that government actions are just, but
simply that they are no more unjust than the run of the mill oppressions we
live with in an imperfect world. The norms of basic decency are not often
violated by overt legislative mandate; only rarely does a legislature affirma-
tively seek to abuse the persons of its citizens.'
uncontroversial point. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997)
(interpreting the abortion right as linked to bodily integrity); id. at 2287 (Souter, J.,
concurring); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849, 857
(1992) (plurality opinion) (linking the abortion right to bodily integrity); id. at 915
(Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 926 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Thus, Professor Perry's reductio that "moral skepticism is a terribly difficult posi-
tion to take seriously in this post-Holocaustal age," PERRY, supra note 183, at 105,
founders on the fact that freedom from physical abuse is what stands in the way of
government-sanctioned torture, slavery, and genocide and that this freedom is grounded
precisely in the moral consensus that abortion cases have not yet achieved. The efforts
to restrain police abuse and torture are not fundamental political-moral problems; rather,
they are, gritty issues of holding functionaries to the terms of a basic moral consensus.
' Professor Perry's critique of the courts as guardians of consensus values therefore
is at odds with the bulk of what the lower courts do. Perry suggests that "if there really
were consensual values of a determinate, helpful sort, there would probably be little
need for the Court frequently to enforce them against electorally accountable officials."
See PERRY, supra note 183, at 94. But much of the enforcement in the lower courts is
directed against officials who, while they may be electorally accountable in some indi-
rect sense, do not stand for election themselves. Moreover, the defendants' and whose
low-level discretion is not subject to effective supervision. See generally LIPSKY, supra
note 100.
The demands of minimal physical decency are not, in fact, widely debated in the
United States so much as dwarfed by the demands of professional roles. Professor Perry
acknowledges as much in his discussion of institutional reform litigation but fails to rec-
ognize how much of the constitutional caseload falls into this paradigm. See PERRY,
supra note 183, at 153. Professor Perry also suggests that "consensual values would
probably be of little help to the main body of persons who press human rights claims in
the Court-persons whose skin is not white or whose politics or lifestyle is heterodox."
Id. at 94. Again, particularly in view of the lower courts' caseloads, it is precisely these
individuals who lay claim to the assistance of federal courts in vindicating the minimal
rights that the consensus of society acknowledges.
E.g., Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in Consti-
tutional Adjudication, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 93 (1995); cf Dahl, supra note 36, at
295.
208 The sole contemporary exception is capital punishment.
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2. The Trial Court's Judicial Role Elaborated
The major role of the federal trial courts in constitutional litigation thus
differs importantly from that of the seekers of neutral principles, the strivers
for social aspiration and prophecy, or the archaeologists of historical inten-
tion that appear in most constitutional theory.
The challenge for trial court judges is not so much to identify political
or moral norms as to disentangle competing factual narratives and map
constitutional boundaries by established moral polestars. In this endeavor,
sophisticated doctrinal or philosophical reasoning is not likely to be crucial.
Indeed, in most cases, doctrine is at best indicative of the elements of the
competing accounts presented to the courts.
The Supreme Court has adopted broad standards that embody basic
social judgments; prohibitions against "deliberate indifference" or "unreason-
able" use of force are examples.' The judge in such situations seeks to
engage her moral sense (and/or that of the jury) with the immediate situation
before her, rather than bring her analytic or policy resources to bear on
larger questions. These are norms of decency and proportionality, not maxi-
mization and aspiration.210
Trial courts are not well-adapted to formulate, and speak to the public
on behalf of, a national vision of good."' Unlike the Supreme Court, the
trial court judge is unitary-she does not encompass within her psyche a
range of political orientations, she need not accommodate her views to ob-
tain a majority, and she need not justify herself except as necessary to per-
suade an appellate court to affirm her. She also is unlikely to be able to
develop a coherent vision of the law over time for she cannot set her own
See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (holding that the Eighth Amen-
dment bars subjecting prisoners to "deliberate indifference" to the risk of serious physi-
cal harm); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993) (same); Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97 (1976) (same); see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (holding that
the Fourth Amendment bars "objectively unreasonable" uses of force by police); Ten-
nessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment bars the use
of deadly force against fleeing felons).
210 The same is true in the 31 cases in which due process challenges to personal
jurisdiction were resolved under the "minimum contacts" doctrine (38% (12) successful)
and in many of the 50 nonprisoner cases in which the presence or absence of adminis-
trative due process is at issue (32% (16) possible or successful).
2' Thus, theorists who rely on the role of the Supreme Court as a national educator
to anchor judicial review, e.g., PHILLIP BOBBITI, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 184-87, 209-
19 (1982); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67
N.Y.U.L. REv. 961, 962 (1992); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging
Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Poli-
tics, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 2121, 2154-57 (1990); Cass Sunstein, Leaving Things Unde-
cided, 110 HARv. L. REv. 6, 69 (1996), offer scant basis for the implementation of that
function at the trial level.
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agenda and has no access to the vast majority of cases. Lower court judges
visit issues episodically rather than synoptically. By the time an issue ap-
pears again, it is likely that other decisionmakers of equal or greater authori-
ty will have addressed the question.
Unlike Supreme Court opinions, which may enshrine striking phrases in
the legal and public consciousness, lower courts are unlikely to catch the
national eye, even if they issue determinative opinions. This is still more
true in the case of a settlement or blank jury verdict, and, as we have seen,
it is the rare case in which a constitutional claim actually goes successfully
to trial.212 If the trial courts are to have pedagogic impact, they must do so
by actions rather than words.
Trial courts are, however, differentially well-suited to give substance to
the ideals of protection against abuses by street-level bureaucrats. A student
of the Supreme Court's decisions regarding certiorari reported, "Time and
again my informants-justices and clerks-stated that the Supreme Court
was not there to insure justice." '213 By contrast, doing justice is precisely
the job description of the trial judges.214
This realm is dominated by what Bruce Ackerman once characterized as
the "ordinary observer";215 the terms of evaluation are often ones which, as
Professor Feldman puts the matter, "tend to be world-guided by social facts,
such as conventional mores, shared cultural ideas, community values, and
customs." '216 Because the courts seek to affect the actions of low-level offi-
212 See supra Table 6 (showing that at the trial level, 14.75% of legislative claims
were sustained, and 37% were "possible"); Table 11 (showing that at the trial level,
9.74% of nonlegislative claims were sustained, and 21.62% of nonlegislative cases were
"possible").
213 PERRY, supra note 183, at 36; see id. at 266 (quoting a Supreme Court justice as
saying, "This is not a court to simply assure that justice is done .... Basically we see it
not as a court of justice.").
214 In one striking example, Judge Raymond Broderick commented in an address to
the Third Circuit Historical Society (May 4, 1995) that, while considering the repellant
practices of the Pennhurst State School and Hospital, he was confronted by his law
clerk with the proposition that under Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974), a court
should not resolve constitutional questions if other means of approaching the result are
available. Judge Broderick responded, "Yes, I've read the case .... Now here are a
couple of other ways in which Pennhurst violates the constitution." Telephone Interview
with Judge Raymond Broderick (Sept. 9, 1997). See Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (Broderick, J.) (upholding the constitution-
al right to deinstitutionalization), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir.
1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). The Pennhurst institution was ultimately closed pursu-
ant to a consent decree. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 610 F. Supp.
1221 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
21s BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 15-20 (1977).
216 Heidi Li Feldman, Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1187, 1212
(1994). Feldman refers to concepts like negligence, but issues of deliberate indifference,
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cials, we can expect them to gravitate toward rules and standards that are
phrased or justified not in terms of high theory but in terms of social judg-
ments that can guide these actors.217
I am suggesting a distinction between "high" constitutional law and
"low" constitutional law. The former seeks to resolve basic moral questions
or structure the basis on which we govern ourselves as a matter of moral or
political theory and is applicable by the lower courts in a relatively mechan-
ical fashion. Mundane or "low" constitutional law takes commonly accepted
moral or political commitments as its basis and applies those commitments
to particular facts in a way that calls upon courts to make moral judgments
by confronting the personal narratives before them.218 Particularly where
control of government cruelty is at issue, the relevant principles tend to be
"low" ones, which "know only two figures and one place: victimizers and
victims here and now. 219
The strength of the trial courts in deploying such principles is precisely
in that they see the victims. Professor Sager has commented that "whenever
I learn of great abuses of citizens at the hands of their state, I find myself
wishing that a courageous and independent judiciary, . . . were in place, and
I think our national experience justifies the optimism in the judicial process
implicit in that wish., 2 ' But where Professor Sager bases his faith in the
common law process's ability to foster a "reflective equilibrium," I suspect
that the more relevant capacity of the trial courts is the willingness to give
unreasonable force, probable cause, legitimate expectations, and adequate process have
much the same character.
217 Cf. id. at 1233 (asserting that legal concepts of negligence are constrained by the
fact that it is a "legal concept applied by lay people [sic] (jurors) and according to
which the lay people are supposed to act, must be intelligible to and resonate with
laypeople").
To the extent that the Supreme Court has resolved the debate in bright-line prophy-
lactic rules (e.g., Miranda) the role of the lower court is in most cases "simply" to find
the facts. But even in these situations, resolution of conflicting factual accounts gives
room for the play of the trial court's faculty of judgment. See, e.g., George C. Thomas
III, Book Review, An Assault on the Temple of Miranda, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLO-
GY 807, 824 (1995) (reviewing JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE
LAw (1993)) (asserting that the "vast jurisprudence" of "close cases" under Miranda
allows judges to "decide them based on whether they believe the suspect was coerced
or otherwise treated unfairly").
218 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1733, 1752 (1995) (arguing for "low-level" rules that can obtain broad agreement rather
than "high-level" comprehensive theories). Sunstein waffles on whether "higher level"
principles might be appropriate in constitutional interpretation; in the business of the
federal trial courts, they are rarely deployed explicitly.
219 SHKLAR, supra note 193, at 241.
220 Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 956
(1990).
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substance to a visceral revulsion for government cruelty when confronted
with particular victims.2 1 This function, particularly in administering con-
sent decrees (and presumably in facilitating settlements in damage actions),
is informed less by interpretive theory than by a concrete sense of injustice.
The key move in this drama is getting the case into federal court. Once
the trial judge has plausible jurisdiction, the state must justify its actions or
spend time and energy to get the trial judge reversed. In many areas of
contemporary American law, this does not require constitutional interven-
tion. Normative claims based on equality have access to federal court under
an array of civil rights statutes.222 The Constitution proves to be a crucial
ticket of admission to federal courts primarily in the areas of extratextual
claims to physical integrity and First Amendment assertions of free expres-
sion rights.223
C. How Does It Work?
Trial courts make several thousand judgments each year regarding
whether particular assaults on a citizen's person and liberty are "unreason-
able." Is it plausible to believe that judges will generate a coherent code of
police conduct? Obviously it is not. No judge is in a position to synoptically
account for all of the. judgments made by her peers around the country. The
probability of inconsistency is simply too high. Moreover, we cannot expect
the "reasonable" decisions made by the police in New York City, for exam-
ple, to be identical to those of their peers in Grand Junction, Iowa if the
likelihood of violent assault on police differs in the two cities.
Is the judge to act, at least, as a proxy for the Supreme Court (or per-
haps the local circuit), comparing the situation before her to the array of
cases in which the relevant precedents have been judged reasonable or un-
reasonable? This might be the implication of the Court's recent decision in
" Thus, unlike Professor Levinson, see generally Levinson, supra note 7, I believe
that the role of the trial courts is not to woodenly parrot the "doctrine" handed down by
the Supreme Court but rather to give that "doctrine" the reality of justice through re-
peated application. Likewise, even if one does not take issue with Professor Schauer's
claim that "[i]f one looks at the federal and state appellate courts, instead of looking at
the Supreme Court, . . . claims are either upheld or denied on the basis of little more
than mechanical application of existing rules with little anguish on the part of the
courts," Schauer, supra note 9, at 410, the same could not be said of the trial courts'
task, a point Schauer acknowledges. See id. at 411.
2 E.g., Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993);
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993); Voting Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973p (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
My findings regarding the six reported trial court cases in which challenges to the
rationality of regulatory actions survived initial scrutiny suggest that the function may
be invoked by property owners as well, though not as frequently.
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Ornelas v. United States,2' which deputized the federal courts of appeal to
undertake de novo review of the "common sense, nontechnical" findings of
"reasonable suspicion and probable cause" as a way of avoiding definitions
of legal rights which differ from judge to judge.2' The Court also rejected
a proposal that a pretextual traffic stop should be deemed "reasonable" only
if a reasonable officer would have made the stop, maintaining that the dem-
ands of the Fourth Amendment are objective and should not "vary from
place to place and time to time."226
The pattern of precedent is likely to be too thin for national uniformity.
If judgments of "reasonableness" were matters of principle, we might expect
trial judges to extrapolate from a limited class of Supreme Court judgments
a line of demarcation between the permissible and the impermissible, and
we might expect appellate review to police that line. But the judgments of
principle are not contested; it is the application that is at issue, and here the
difference between too much force and acceptable force, or between proba-
ble cause and its absence, is likely to turn on contextual judgments which
spin out of precedential control. The most the Supreme Court or the federal
appellate courts do is lay down a description of the factors relevant to the
inquiry.
Thus, even as it announced a de novo review policy in Ornelas, the
Court admonished appellate courts to give "due weight" to the inferences
drawn by resident judges and police officials.2' If, as Professor Stuntz
suggested, the Fourth Amendment is in essence a tort law for the police, 9
we are likely to find, as the Court did in the days when it administered a
national law of railroad torts, that clearly defined rules of Fourth Amend-
ment engagement are beyond the capabilities of appellate judges.23
These concerns are exacerbated when we realize that most lower court
opinions on police practices are damage cases. The ultimate determination is
likely to be made by a jury rather than a judge on the basis of credibility
determinations. Whatever their other virtues, we do not expect the decisions
of different juries across the nation to be mutually consistent.
In many of these situations, exact control on the ground may be neither
116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996).
22' Id. at 1662.
Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
2,7Ornelas, 116 S. Ct. at 1662.
Id. at 1663.
229 William Stuntz, Warrants and the Fourth Amendment, 77 VA. L REV. 881, 899
(1991).
230 Compare Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927) (establish-
ing as a matter of law requirements for drivers of vehicles at grade crossings to avoid
contributory negligence), with Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934) (aban-
doning the effort to impose such requirements on the ground that judgments of negli-
gence must be "taken over from the facts of life").
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feasible nor desirable. In a street confrontation, Fyfe and Skolnick argue, the
actual ability of higher level officials to constrain the exercise of police
discretion is distinctly limited, and efforts to micromanage may reduce the
effectiveness of leadership.23' The challenge is to inculcate a sense of fi-
delity to relevant norms. In part, this can be done by clear and forceful
action, whether by courts or administrators. 2
32
How, then, should a court approach the question of "reasonableness"?
The guiding virtues here are common law virtues: impartiality and practical
wisdom combined with a willingness to address the facts of the case, to
listen with an open mind, and to empathize with the litigants. The courts
and juries provide a perspective outside of the parochial confines of a pro-
fession authorized to deal in violence and serve as a reminder that the bear-
ers of gun and badge must ultimately account to civilian society.
The difficulty, of course, is that the trial judge's moral perceptions may
have a tendency to bend-to the prevailing winds no less than the street-level
bureaucrat's. When the well-scrubbed police officer and the disheveled
homeless man stand before the court, the moral balance is likely to be af-
fected by enthusiasm for law enforcement.
Such intervention is not fundamentally antidemocratic, but it may repli-
cate the disadvantages of the political process, for the claims of low-status
individuals are more likely to be rejected by a jury. Still, by facing the
reality of the harm that has been inflicted, the jury may be able to move
away from initial rejection. The damage action gives victims a voice. Unlike
the demonized "mugger" of public debate, the plaintiff in a damage action
comes before the decisionmaker in his civilian persona to tell his story and
' Skolnick & Fyfe, supra note 167, at 120 ("Hard and fast rules are viable in me-
chanical work situations, but they are of little assistance in dealing with the fluid discre-
tionary situations that are the core of police work"); id. at 137 ("When administrations
are weak or too far out of touch with the reality of the streets-as when police chiefs
pretend that hard and fast rules govern officers' behavior-they are rejected by offi-
cers.").
This perception is an instance of a broader point: for many street-level bureaucrats,
the combination of complexity of task, resource constraints, and necessity of individual-
ized responsiveness leave it "difficult if not impossible to severely reduce discretion."
LIPSKY, supra note 100, at 15.
232 Thus when police hierarchies introduced deadly force policies in earnest, police
shootings dropped dramatically. See, e.g., CHEVIGNY, supra note 171, at 66-67, 134-36
(asserting that deadly force guidelines and administrative review reduced shootings in
New York City and elsewhere); James Fyfe, Administrative Interventions on Police
Shooting Discretion: An Empirical Examination, 7 J. CRIM. JUST. 309 (1979); James J.
Fyfe & Jeffrey T. Walker, Garner Plus Five Years: An Examination of Supreme Court
Intervention into Police Discretion and Legislative Prerogatives, 14 AM. J. CRIM. JUST.
167 (1990); Skolnick & Fyfe, supra note 167, at 141-42 (noting that clear use of force
policies reduced police shootings). Control of street-level discretion in less dramatic
violence, however, often must rely on more subtle cultural pressures.
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appeal to the decisionmaker's humanity. The plaintiff is not an abstract
threat but a concrete individual who has suffered harm. The damage action
ultimately requires the plaintiff to exercise his voice in a democratic context.
The jury-a random sample of the polity-is the interlocutor. 3
In the context of damage actions, contextual judgments of decency and
reasonableness are ultimately the appealing alternative. Bright-line rules
might persuade the court to allow a case go to the jury, but the jury is likely
to award damages based on precisely the community perceptions such rules
seek to efface. Furthermore, to the extent that the court is limited to apply-
ing bright-line rules, the temptation is to draw the rules with ever more
ample room for authorities to maneuver. It is thus better, perhaps, to enunci-
ate a rule sufficiently responsive to factual nuance and allow claimants into
court where they can engage the factfinder's empathy.2'
When all is said, the opportunity to vindicate constitutional rights is
worthwhile beyond any concrete impact it may have as a deterrent. What
would we say about a society that empowered its officials to search citizens
on whim, to physically abuse them without redress, or to deprive them of
livelihood and liberty without appeal or recourse? It is the definition of
tyranny."'
The suit for redress of constitutional violations is a means of allowing
society to restore dignity to victims of governmental abuse. Professor
Fletcher argues that the "minimal task of the criminal trial is to stand by the
victims, to restore their dignity, to find a way for them to think of them-
" Why not rely on state law? Practically, in addition to the parity debate, many
states have adopted immunity statutes. But doesn't that provide exactly the response to
the claim that these are shared values? One answer is the interest group argument: loss
is suffered stochastically and diffusely, and gain is attained directly by the bureaucracy.
Additionally, the jury is itself a measure of value consensuses.
. " Cf Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurablilty in Constitutional
LaK, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1441, 1496 (1990) ("A skillful narrative may bring one to com-
prehend another's experience or perspective, perhaps effectuation a normative 'gestalt
switch' or perhaps just changing one's appreciation of the stakes.").
Matters stand differently where the relevant constitutional rule engages not concrete
consensus values but political norms. It is not the moral sense of the court that is to be
engaged with respect to the harm suffered by the individual before it but the court's
sensitivity to the danger the challenged action poses to social structure. In the First
Amendment context, very little of the story a Klansman tells is likely to add weight to
his claim. If it engages the court, it will be at the level of abstract commitment; abstract
rules are entirely appropriate as a means of guarding against being blinded by particu-
lars.
"5 See SHKLAR, supra note 193, at 28 ("'This is what it means to be a slave: to be
abused and bear it, compelled by violence to suffer wrong."') (quoting Euripides). It is
no coincidence that the procedural form in which Dred Scott sought his freedom was a
suit for trespass vi et armis against his alleged master. See Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S.
393, 469 (1857).
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selves once again as men and women equal to all others."'  The ability to
call officials to account in a civil trial can similarly be a step toward restor-
ing lost dignity; at the very least, it leaves the plaintiffs a means of an-
nouncing their equality with the officials who abused them.
Equally important, it is an expression that the powers of the state are not
without limits. Hannah Arendt claims that "the first step on the'road to total
domination is to kill the juridical person in man., 237 Conversely, the ability
of an individual to call the state to a constitutional accounting is a step on
the road to freedom. In this, the idea that the courts may act only in the
presence of systemic malfunction238 seems profoundly misdirected. It is
precisely the unique sense of each individual's individual liberty that should
be the ward of the courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
In considering the adoption of the Bill of Rights, James Madison voiced
skepticism as to the efficacy of those "parchment barriers" entrusted to the
courts. "The restrictions however strongly marked on paper will never be
regarded when opposed to the decided sense of the public, and after repeat-
ed violations in extraordinary cases, they will lose even their ordinary
efficacy."239 Nonetheless, Madison believed that written guarantees in fun-
damental law had two potential uses: as security against anti-democratic
236 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS 6, 201-03 (1995) (asserting that punishment counteracts domination by reducing
the criminal to the position of the victim-when the criminal suffers as the victim suf-
fered, equality between the two is reestablished).
237 HANNAH ARENDT, ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 447 (1974). LAWRENCE
WECHSLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE: SETTLING ACCOUNTS WITH TORTURERS 242-43
(1990), uses Arendt's aphorism to argue that to expose torturers and to hold them ac-
countable is an essential step toward the reemergence of a free society.
238 See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 139-52 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (dissenting from Court's allowance of a patient's civil rights action against state
mental hospital employees who admitted him to a hospital without ensuring that he was
competent to sign voluntary admission forms); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)
(denying a prisoner's claim that prison officials had violated his due process rights
because it was a "random and unauthorized" violation); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individu-
al Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343, 367 (1993) ("The Con-
stitution requires an adequate system of remedies to keep the government, in general
and on average, tolerably within the bounds of law. One person's interest in remediation
can be sacrificed . . . ."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-
Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 .HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1787-88 (1991)
(asserting that denial of individual remedies is tolerable if systematic incentives to obey
the law are appropriate).
239 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 299 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland
eds., 1979).
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abuses and as an educational device.4" In the first dimension, he recog-
nized that in some circumstances, "the danger of oppression" would arise
from "usurped acts of the Government" rather than "the interested majorities
of the people", 4' In the second, he hoped that "the political truths declared
in that solemn manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental max-
ims of a free Government, and as they become incorporated with the nation-
al sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and passion." 2
As the twentieth century closes, our constitutional practice remains
Madisonian in the first dimension. It is only the minority of Supreme Court
cases and the barest fraction of trial court cases in which the constitutional
rights of individuals confront the "decided sense of the public" articulated
through their elected representatives. Rather, the work of constitutional re-
view is predominantly to confront the "usurpations" by individual govern-
ment officials.
In these confrontations, the citizen is only sporadically successful-a
fact which initially casts doubt on the second Madisonian claim. The educa-
tion the public can gain in constitutional norms from even the denial of a
motion to dismiss in a police abuse damage action is limited; the guidance
from the grant of such a motion is still less. Yet the fact that courts must
consider the motion keeps alive the concepts that citizens have rights that
constrain government officials and that the United States is a country where
those rights may be asserted in court.
This sporadic success is not surprising. A generation ago, when the
Warren Court laid the foundations for the constitutional damage action,
Justice Harlan recognized that "for a variety of reasons, the remedy may not
often be sought" and that judicially constructed immunities were likely often
to preclude recovery." Still, he maintained,
at the very least such-a remedy would be available for the
most flagrant and patently unjustified sorts of police conduct.
Although litigants may not often choose to seek relief, it is
important, in a civilized society, that the judicial branch of
the Nation's government stand ready to afford a remedy in
these circumstances."
The importance does not lie in a belief that every violation will be avoided,
or that most violators will be punished, but rather the simple affirmation that
240 Id. at 297-300.
24 Id. at 298-99.
242 Id.
23 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
244 Id.
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we are, or seek to be, a civilized society.
APPENDIX
The 1990-1996 Supreme Court Sample
The cases in the Supreme Court sample were taken from the Supreme
Court's 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995 Terms, using the Lexis
search, "Constitutional right or unconstitutional or constitutional violation or
violate constitution or First Amendment or Fourth Amendment or Fifth
Amendment or Eighth Amendment or due process or cruel unusual or equal
protection or Commerce Clause or Takings Clause or obligation of contract
and syllabus (held)." I then excluded cases which did not in fact raise con-
stitutional claims, which left 292 cases. The search yielded all of the Su-
preme Court cases raising constitutional claims of which I am aware during
the six year period.
The 1994 Trial Court Sample
The cases in the trial court sample began with a search of the Lexis
United States District Court (Library: Genfed, File: Dist) database during the
summer of 1995 using the same search used in the Supreme Court database
without the syllabus "held" limitation and using the term, "Date=1994". This
generated a universe of 5058 opinions. From this universe, my research
assistant examined and coded every tenth case, and I checked the coding.
After excluding cases which fell within the search but did not in fact raise
constitutional claims, a sample of 431 cases remained, suggesting that of the
20,253 Lexis-published district court opinions, about 20% deal with consti-
tutional issues. In each coding, some cases raised more than one constitu-
tional claim. Data is often reported, therefore, by both claim and case.
This trial court sample, although representative of the cases reported on
Lexis, still represents only a fraction of the cases entertained by the federal
district courts during 1994. Overall, less than one in ten cases filed in feder-
al district courts results in an opinion reported on Lexis. In 1993, according
to the Administrative Office, parties filed 275,753 cases in the federal dis-
trict courts.4 5 Lexis reports 20,253 opinions, both civil and criminal, for
1994, the year in which most of the cases filed in 1993 would have been
resolved.
The proportion is even smaller for some groups. In 1993, prisoners filed
13,054 habeas corpus petitions; 6 my sample contained only sixty-seven
'" See MECHAM, supra note 63, at 141 tbl. C-2A (229,850 civil cases), 207 tbl. D-2
(45,903 criminal cases).
246 Id. at 142 tbl. C-2A.
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habeas opinions, representing 670 cases, or approximately one case in twen-
ty. Also in 1993, prisoners filed 33,933 civil rights cases;" my sample
contains 166 opinions in prisoner cases, representing 1660 cases (4.8%).
Among nonprisoner civil rights cases, the percentage in the sample is
higher. In 1993, the Administrative Office recorded 13,776 "other civil
rights cases" and 12,962 "employment civil rights cases,""8 of which
10.8% were probably constitutional claims.249 My sample includes 171
nonprisoner cases seeking affirmative relief, representing 1710 cases
(12.3%). 250
The potential for selection bias in this sample is manifest, and there is
virtually no data on which way the bias might cut." 1 Nonetheless, life is
short, and the possibilities of a reasonably easily available nationwide sam-
ple s~ems to outweigh methodological difficulties. Whenever possible, I
have compared my results with other writers' partial results for particular
issues.
A list of the cases in each sample is on file with the William & Mary
Bill of Rights Journal.
2A7 Id.
248 Id.
29 See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics: Employ-
ment Discrimination Litigation Over the Business Cycle, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 709, 715
(1993) (reporting that among 1247 "employment civil rights cases," 10.8% raised con-
stitutional claims).
250 Cf Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal District Courts through Published Cases: A
Research Note, 15 JUST. Sys. J. 782, 790 (1992) (noting that 12% of the civil rights
cases decided from 1982 to 1984 by the federal district courts for Minnesota were re-
ported on Lexis); Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its
Tip : A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases,
24 LAw & Soc. REV. 1133 (1990) (asserting that 80-90% of the employment discrimi-
nation cases were not published on Lexis, and an average of 8.1% of the civil cases in
seven selected districts were published).
251 Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 137, at 508, suggest that trial judges -are more
likely to publish opinions granting summary judgment for defendants than opinions
denying such judgments; Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 250, at 1150, find that
among employment discrimination cases, published cases tend to be more complex, and
unpublished cases have a greater tendency to be settled.
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